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Abstract of the Thesis
This thesis is a critical exploration of Serbian film during the 1990s and its potential to provide a 
critique of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. In this dissertation I focus upon how selected films 
provide insight into the ideological discourse of the 1990s within the Serbian socio-political and 
cultural context. I discuss a range of Serbian films produced during the 1990s, and I analyse in 
detail  several  films,  in  particular  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame  (Lepa  sela,  lepo  gore,  Srdjan 
Dragojevic, 1995) and Wounds (Rane, Srdjan Dragojevic, 1998), in which I focus on the depiction 
of  nationalist  and  religious  elements  in  the  films.  I  analyse  cinematic  representations  of  the 
nationalist-religious  ideology,  its  characteristics,  impacts  and  promotion.  On  the  basis  of  this 
analysis I consider the extent to which these cinematic representations are subversive. 
My dissertation has seven chapters. In chapter 1, which is an introduction to the thesis, I 
state my research questions and methodology. In chapter 2 I discuss the research context and 
I consider literature relevant to my research. Since I am basing my research upon different 
fields, I divide this chapter into three parts: the first one is devoted to the field of film and 
religion in which I position this study; the second part is on the literature that I used for the 
exploration  of  the  socio-political  context  of  the  1990s;  and  the  last  part  is  devoted  to 
literature  written  on  Balkan,  Yugoslav  and  Serbian  cinema.  In  chapter  3  I  provide  an 
analysis of the Serbian socio-cultural and political context of the 1990s. Chapter 3 is divided 
into eight parts, in which I primarily focus on the creation, characteristics and impacts of the 
nationalist-religious  ideology.  This  discussion  includes  an  analysis  of  the  interaction 
between  the  Church  and  the  state  in  the  promotion  of  this  ideological  discourse.  This 
chapter  is  important  for  the  further  analysis  of  Serbian  film,  its  contextualization,  and 
understanding the main issues which films communicated. In chapter 4 I analyse Serbian 
films produced during the 1990s. In the first part of this chapter, and for the purpose of 
contextualization of Serbian film, I first briefly discuss the cinematic tradition of former 
Yugoslavia: the  Black Wave movement. I move on to discuss the cinematic context of the 
1990s and the films produced over this period of time. I particularly focus on several films 
which dealt with the political-ideological context of the 1990s. I discuss the most significant 
films which dealt with the war, violence, ideology and the collapse of Serbian society under 
the Milosevic regime.  The aim of this chapter is to provide a cinematic context for the 
analysed  films  and  a  clearer  understanding  of  Serbian  film  of  the  1990s  as  politically 
engaged cinema.  Chapter 5 is  devoted to the film  Pretty Village, Pretty Flame  while in 
chapter 6 I analyse the film Wounds.  I analyse these two films separately because of their 
unique  depictions  of  the  nationalist-religious  ideology.  Both  chapters  are  structured  the 
same way and are divided into two major parts. In the first part of each chapter I consider 
the film's plot, its genre and its production, as well as discussing the film's critical reception. 
In the second part of each chapter I analyse the film narrative and images. At the end of each 
chapter I discuss the results of my analysis. Chapter 7 is the last chapter of my thesis and is 
devoted to the conclusion. In this final chapter I discuss the findings based on the cinematic 
and contextual analysis in the previous chapters. As part of my final remarks, I outline the 
contributions this study has made and future research that can be developed on the basis of 
this thesis.
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1.0. Serbia as a Focus of the Study
This  thesis is  an interdisciplinary study of Serbian film during the 1990s and its 
potential  to provide a critique of the dominant political regime. There are several 
reasons why I chose to concentrate upon Serbian film and its potential to provide 
ideological  criticism.  I  became  interested  in  exploring  the  films  from  my  own 
country partly because of the way in which they dealt with the Yugoslav conflict and 
the political ideology of the Milosevic regime. My interest is in the local political 
ideology of the 1990s and its cinematic depiction. It proved useful to study the films 
that were produced in Serbia, investigating how domestic filmmakers portrayed the 
ideology  and  whether  they  expressed  any  criticism  in  their  depictions.  I  have 
discovered that Serbian cinema is a rich resource for exploration of the cinematic 
representation  of  religion and nationalism,  which has  been largely overlooked in 
studies  on  Serbian  cinema.  The  cinematic  depiction  of  the  nationalist-religious 
ideology of the 1990s and the possible subversiveness of such representation is the 
focus of this study. 
I decided to focus on the representation of religion and nationalism because, as I 
demonstrate later, these two elements lie at the core of Milosevic's populist political 
ideology. The nationalist-religious ideology that I discuss in this thesis, has been a 
permanent problem of Serbian society from the 1980s until the present, surviving 
many  political  twists,  including  Milosevic's  downfall  in  2000.  This  ideological 
discourse is still supported by some of the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
academics  and  a  significant  number  of  political  parties  in  Serbia.  In  this  sense, 
nationalist-religious  ideology,  that  proved  to  be  such  a  powerful  weapon  in  the 
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1990s,  still echoes through Serbian socio-political and cultural life and is connected 
to many ongoing issues.  Only in the time of writing up this thesis, from 2005 to 
2008,  several  important  events  happened  that  are  closely  related  to  this  study: 
Slobodan Milosevic died in Scheveningen in the Hague (2006),  Monetengro became 
an  independent  state  (2006),  Kosovo  declared  its  independence  (2008),  which 
resulted in an escalation of violence in the Belgrade streets led by the prime minister 
Vojislav  Kostunica,  the  main  advocate  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  of  post-
Milosevic Serbia, who lost the elections held in 2008; and finally, Radovan Karadzic 
was arrested and put on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague. The reactions to some of these events by certain 
political parties, media and the wider population reveal that this ideology that was 
formed in the late 1980s still has strong influences on Serbian society. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church, whose political role is also an element of this study, 
reacted strongly to some of these recent events revealing that loyalty to the concept 
of nationalist-religious ideology has not been abandoned yet. The Church in Serbia is 
now faced with important changes embodied in the question of whether it should 
continue  its  hard-line  conservative  nationalist-religious  program,  known from the 
1990s, or whether it should undertake serious reforms and open up for ecumenical 
dialogue. In spite of some positive signs that Serbia is finally divorcing itself from its 
dark past of the Milosevic time, many issues need to be resolved for this to happen. 
Serbia  is  in  the  process  of  so-called  European integration,  but  the current  socio-
political  context  reveals  ideological  clashes  within  Serbian  society.  Although the 
citizens  clearly  voted  for  the  pro-European  political  course,  the  Serbian  elite  is 
divided between those who are against the EU and advocate a so-called sovereign 
democracy based upon the premises of the nationalist-religious ideology from the 
Milosevic-era and those who are of liberal, pro-European political orientation. As in 
Milosevic's time, the mainstream media since 2000 has often been promoting anti-
EU ideas, denying Serbian responsibility for the war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia 
(and  therefore  aggravating  the  process  of  reconciliation  in  the  Balkans)  and has 
continued  to  recognize  war-criminals  as  national  heroes.  At  the  same  time  the 
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independent  media  and journalists  have  been exposed to physical  attacks  several 
times over the past few years. Corruption and crime inherited from the Milosevic-era 
require  urgent  political  solutions,  such  as  regulation  of  the  judicial  system  for 
example,  which  only  the  substantial  reforms  that  form  a  part  of  European 
integrations can provide. While some of Milosevic's ideologists, academics, Church 
leaders and politicians are looking towards Russia, Serbian citizens, as their votes in 
the last elections confirmed, are looking towards Europe. Serbia is still waiting to be 
considered as  a  possible  candidate  for the EU.  In this  sense,  the problem of the 
nationalist-religious ideology, whose cinematic representations I investigate in this 
thesis,  is  still  very much alive and connected to the contemporary socio-political 
context in Serbia. 
Many studies have been written on the break-up of Yugoslavia.1 Although some of 
them dealt with religion, national myths, or the role of the Church in the conflict, I 
found a lack of systematic study that would connect all these elements and discuss 
the ideological aspects of the Church, the socio-political impacts of its interaction 
with the state, and the representation of Orthodoxy in popular culture and film in 
particular. Although there are important works and studies on Serbian cinema of the 
1990s, which I discuss in this thesis, they all lack the themes that lie at the core of 
this research: the analysis of religion and nationalism in the films. In this sense this 
thesis is a pioneering work. 
Finally  my  personal  relationship  to  the  subject  had  considerable  significance  in 
directing my research interests. I was born and raised in Yugoslavia, but after its 
break-up, Serbia is now officially considered as my country of origin, since I am a 
native of Belgrade. The experience that I gained from living in Serbia in the troubled 
1 Bennet, Christopher: Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, London: Hurst & Company, 1996; Duijzings, 
Ger: Religion and the Politics of the Identity in Kosovo, London: Hurst & Company, 2000; Jovic, 
Dejan: Jugoslavija – drzava koja je odumrla: uspon, kriza i pad Cetvrte Jugoslavije, Beograd: 
Samizdat, 2003; Judah, Tim: The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2000; Perica, Vjekoslav: Balkan Idols: Religion and 
Nationalism in Yugoslav States, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; Popov, Nebojsa: 
Srpska strana rata, Beograd: Bigz, 1996; Silber, Laura and Little, Allan: Yugoslavia Death of a  
Nation, USA: TV Books Inc, 1995; Thomas, Robert: Serbia Under Milosevic, Politics in the 1990s, 
London: Hurst & Company, 1999.
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times that I describe in this thesis were beneficial in many ways for my work. I deal 
with issues and events to which I was a direct witness. Studying at the Theological 
Faculty of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade during the time of the regime 
provided me with an insight into how the Church perceived national issues and how 
it contributed to the creation of religious ideology, which  represents a divorce from 
what many believe to be the Orthodox tradition and a deviation of its praxis.2 After 
Milosevic's  downfall  and  assuming  that  the  socio-political  situation  changed,  I 
continued masters studies at the same faculty. The obstacles with which I was faced 
made me the first unofficial dissident of the Theological Faculty in Belgrade, and 
helped me to understand that things cannot be changed “overnight.” I started looking 
for scholarships to come abroad and continue my research and education in a safer 
and better environment. The day when I took the IELTS language test at the British 
Consulate in Belgrade, which was a pre-condition for my enrolment at the University 
of Edinburgh, was the day when the first  democratic  Serbian Prime Minister,  Dr 
Zoran Djindjic, was buried. With Djindjic's assassination it seemed that Serbia had 
returned to the Milosevic era and that much more time would be needed for a true 
recovery of Serbian society. At the time when I left my country, many people had 
lost the hope and enthusiasm that they had after Milosevic's downfall. I left Serbia in 
2004: a chance to continue my education, improve my academic knowledge and be 
able to speak freely was a gift to me, but I also left with the hope that through my 
work I can speak on behalf of those who stayed. 
I also need to say that my interest in media and film has a long history: during my 
time at high school I studied film history and I still remember the delight with which 
I gazed at the first camera of the Lumière brothers that is kept in the Yugoslav Film 
Archive in Belgrade. My work experience on an independent TV station in Belgrade 
where I was a TV editor during the 1990s, together with my particular love and 
interest in film, shaped and directed my research interests and encouraged me in my 
academic work. This thesis is a result of all these elements. 
2 For a more detailed explanation see chapters 2 and 3.
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1.0.1. The Focus of this Thesis and Research Questions
At the heart of this study is an analysis of the range of Serbian films produced  in the 
1990s. The films I discuss in this thesis were also screened abroad and were present 
at  many International  Film Festivals.  My initial  personal  intuition was that  these 
films act subversively. As has become clear through careful study of these films the 
representation is far more ambiguous than I first thought. The ways in which the 
films  were  received  and  reinterpreted  suggest  that  while  the  directors  may  have 
intended these films to act as a critical  response to the regime in fact they were 
sometimes perceived as pro-regime films.   
In this thesis I focus upon the question of how Serbian films of the 1990s can inform 
us  about  the  ideological  discourse  of  the  Milosevic  regime.  In  other  words,  the 
central  focus of my analysis is on the cinematic representation of the nationalist-
religious ideology that lay at the core of the political ideology of the 1990s. The 
films I analyze in chapters 5 and 6 in greater detail,  Pretty Village, Pretty Flame 
(Lepa  sela,  lepo  gore,  Srdjan  Dragojevic,  1995)  and  Wounds (Rane,  Srdjan 
Dragojevic, 1998), I selected because I find them to be the most representative in the 
depiction of national and religious issues, symbols and images. These are popular 
and well-known films in Serbia, but also in the other former Yugoslav republics. I 
break my research question into several sub-questions necessary for detailed analysis 
and for answering the main question. In this sense, I look further at how religion and 
religious issues are depicted in the selected films, how they are linked to nationalism, 
how this  depiction  informs us  about  religion  and its  importance  for  the  regime's 
ideology,  and  finally  how  these  films  depict  the  promotion  and  impacts  of  the 
nationalist-religious ideology on Serbian society. 
My next, but not less important question is whether the representations of nationalist-
religious ideology are subversive or whether those films are simply reflecting the 
ideological context in which they were made. In other words, did the films frame the 
ideology or did the ideology frame the films? If it is the case that we consider this 
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cinematic representation to be subversive, we would consider them to be films that 
tend to “escape” the ideological context that frames them, and speak from a critical 
point  of  view.  In  this  case  could  we  consider  Serbian  films  to  be  a  form  of 
ideological critique?  In this thesis I will suggest that several Serbian films in a subtle 
way interrogated the ideology of violence of the 1990s.  
It is important to identify what I mean by subversive cinema. In the first place this 
refers  to  political  subversion,  or  to  be more  precise:  subversion  of  the dominant 
political ideology of the 1990s. I will investigate different ways in which cinema 
subverts this political ideology by analysing film narrative, characterization, images 
and  symbols,  and  their  changing  and  at  times  ambigious  meaning  in  the  films' 
context.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  resistance  and  subversiveness. 
Resistance  involves  a  call  to  revolution  whereas  subversiveness  involves  an 
invitation  to  reconsider  ideology.  Subversiveness  sometimes  attacks  indirectly, 
sometimes undermines. It is always subtle and it relies on ambiguity. On the other 
hand, the cinema of resistance has the potential to change the filmic style and reject 
prevailing ideological  aesthetics.3 The prevailing aesthetics  in a society can often 
reflect a society's dominant ideology. On the other hand, the cinema of subversion 
adopts the society's aesthetics and its filmmaking style to use it subtly as a tool of 
subversion when it is required.4 
It  is important to note that I am dealing with ambiguous films which were made 
during the civil war and in an internationally isolated and economically exhausted 
Serbia  under  the  Milosevic  regime.  Because  of  its  ambiguity  and  its  historical 
proximity to the conflict, the reception of these films, as we will see further, was 
very  diverse.  The  debates  of  film  critics  and  scholars  raised  the  question  of 
politically correct and incorrect films, which is one of the problems that I discuss in 
my thesis. In spite of the fact that critics and scholars discussed the political aspects 
3 This is the case with the Black Wave. See chapter 4. 
4 I will discuss the cinematic subversiveness in Serbian cinema in chapter 2, sections 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. 
In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I investigate different forms of cinematic subversion through the analysis of 
film narrative, images and symbols. In my concluding chapter, in section 7.3., I narrow down the main 
points on subversive elements in Serbian film of the 1990s based on results of my analysis. 
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of  the  films,  they  overlooked  the  cinematic  depiction  of  religion  and its  link  to 
nationalism, which is an unavoidable part of a discussion on the political ideology of 
the 1990s. In this thesis I aim to fill the gap in the existing readings of Serbian film. 
My study is pertinent for those scholars who consider issues of nationalism, identity 
and religion in the Balkans and in Serbia as a part of that.
 
1.1. Methodology
The main focus of this thesis are several Serbian films which I analyze in detail in 
order to answer my research questions. Since this study is interdisciplinary by nature, 
my approach to the subject involves a combination of different methods, which will 
be discussed in this chapter. My methodology can be considered as a cultural studies 
approach  which  was  advocated  among  recent  scholars  of  film  and  religion  by 
Melanie Wright.5 A multidimensional aspect is at the core of such an approach and of 
this thesis. Multi-dimensionality is reflected in the wide range of different research 
done  for  this  thesis  which  involved  diverse  fields  and  resources,  interviews  and 
application  of  textual  and  contextual  analysis,  analysis  of  images,  and  critical 
reception.  My aim is to investigate and provide an answer to the primary questions 
of this thesis and thus provide a better understanding of the films but also of the 
ideological context of the 1990s and the interconnection between ideology and film. 
The first section of this chapter, 1.1.1. is devoted to the methodological approaches 
to the film analysis. In section 1.1.2. I discuss the contextual analysis which refers to 
the socio-political background and analysis of the nationalist-religious ideology. In 
section 1.1.3. I discuss methodological approaches to the film analysis.
1.1.1. Cultural Studies Approach to Cinema 
The focus of this thesis is  an in-depth analysis  of two Serbian films, selected as 
representative samples  in accordance with my research questions. My methodology 
can be characterized as a cultural studies approach to cinema, due to the combination 
5 Wright, Melanie: Religion and Film: An Introduction, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007.
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of different methods employed in the analysis.  A cultural studies approach in the 
field of film and religion has been advocated by scholars such as Margaret Miles,6 
John  Lyden7 and  as  mentioned  before,  Melanie  Wright.  My  work  reflects  the 
multidimensionality  which  Wright  proposed,  in  several  aspects.  First,  the  socio-
political and ideological context, as explained in the previous section, is analyzed in 
order to contextualize Serbian film but also aiming to introduce the readers to the 
characteristics of the ideology whose cinematic representation will be explored in 
subsequent chapters. Such an approach into the analysis of the films enabled me to 
bring  specialist knowledge.8 Second, my selection of films is done in accordance 
with the stated research questions, which means that the films are relevant to the 
questions in hand.9 Third, I consider film text, context, images and film music as 
equally important in my analysis. It can be considered therefore that I approach the 
films as cultural text (my italics) which as such can inform us about the ideological 
discourse of the Milosevic regime and the political ideology of the 1990s. Treating 
film as a cultural text means also that I investigate how the films can inform us about 
the context in which they were made. In this sense, I allow the films to “speak for 
themselves.” Adopting a cultural studies approach enabled me to combine analysis of 
different  aspects  of  the  films,  such  as  contextual,  narrative  and  visual  analysis, 
including the analysis of the critical responses to the films and ideological criticism 
of the films. In the next sections I will discuss these different approaches that I used 
in my research. 
1.1.2. Contextual Analysis
The contextual analysis is an important aspect of this study for several reasons which 
will be discussed here. First it is important to identify what I mean by “contextual 
analysis”.  I  consider  two aspects:  first,  the contextualization of  the  film text  and 
6 Miles, Margaret: Seeing is Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1996. 
7 Lyden, John: Film as Religion, New York: University Press, 2003.
8 Wright argued that religious scholars can enrich discussion on film by bringing in aspects that might 
be overlooked by film scholars. For this discussion see Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p.30.
9 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p.19.
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image within the wider context of the film, and second, the analysis of the socio-
political  context  of  the  1990s  (chapter  3).  The  final  aim  of  this  analysis  is  to 
contextualize  these  Serbian  films  within  the  specific  socio-political  and  cultural 
context of the 1990s and to explore how this context is reflected in the films. Only 
then is it possible to consider whether or not the films subvert the ideological context 
in which they were produced. Regarding the contextualization of the text and image, 
it means primarily that the film images, symbols, characters, music and dialogue are 
not considered as a separate entity but that they are placed and analysed within the 
complex film structure.
To acknowledge all these cinematic devices as interdependent is a starting point for 
further analysis of their meaning. The second aspect of contextual analysis involves 
contextualizing the film and its main topic within the concrete cultural and socio-
political time in Serbia. In this sense, the analysis of Serbian films and answering my 
research questions would not be possible without an analysis of the socio-political 
context of the 1990s, or to be more precise, of the formation and characteristics of 
the political ideology of the Milosevic regime. 
The analysis of the socio-political context is given in Chapter 3, in which I aim first 
to explain what nationalist-religious ideology is and how it was used for political 
purposes,  and second to describe the context  in which Serbian films were made. 
Understanding this ideological and political context is essential for reading the films 
and the cinematic representation of the ideology. I analyse the complex interaction 
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state, as well as the origins, formation 
and impacts of the nationalist-religious ideology within the Church.  For the first part 
of my research, which refers to the state, I use literature that is relevant to this topic 
and that is discussed separately in chapter 2, the literature review. I selected works 
which dealt with the time period of the formation of the political ideology and the 
rise of Slobodan Milosevic. I analyse the new political discourse that prevailed in the 
late 1980s and that was introduced by Milosevic's political apparatus. My focus is on 
the  nationalist  character  of  this  political  discourse  and  the  introduction  of 
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mythological  and religious  elements  into  the  political  statements  and speeches.  I 
selected some crucial socio-political events and I focus upon those which were most 
significant  for  the subject  explored,  such as  the  celebration of  the  six  hundredth 
anniversary of the battle in Kosovo in 1989, when both the Church and the state 
showed the most significant unity around the Serbian national question. The reason 
for focusing upon the 1980s is because this was the time when nationalist-religious 
ideology came to the fore and was probably at its strongest, since Milosevic later lost 
the support of the Church, or at least a part of the Church, especially after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was signed. The nationalist-religious discourse could be described 
as “hate speech” and was a catalyst for the war. For this part of my research and for 
the purposes of my discussion of the socio-political background in Chapter 3 I used 
the  Archive  of  the  National  Library  of  Serbia,  where  I  considered  articles  from 
editions  of  the  newspaper  Politika,  published in  1989.  Analysis  of  these  articles 
clarified how the media were shaping this ideological discourse and thus how they 
were used as a powerful tool in the propaganda of the Milosevic regime. Analysis of 
these texts shows not only a shift from the communist principles of Tito's Yugoslavia 
to hard core nationalism but also how for the first time since World War II the state 
newspapers devoted significant space to the Church and Orthodoxy. I also analyse 
the context in which religious themes emerged, as well as the popular representation 
of  Orthodoxy,  emergence  of  national  myths,  mythological  language  and pseudo-
historical content of the political speeches. Such political propaganda was used to 
support the process of hegemonization and to provide justification for Milosevic's 
radical political program.
 
It was useful to compare these articles to those published by the Serbian Orthodox 
Church during the same period of time. Most relevant articles are already quoted in 
studies by other Serbian scholars, mainly in Radmila Radic's Crkva i srpsko pitanje 
(The  Church  and  the  Serbian  National  Question, my  translation).10 Applying  a 
comparative method when approaching these texts, published both by the state and 
the Church, enabled me to find similarities and differences between them in public 
10 Radic, Radmila: “Crkva i srpsko pitanje” in Popov, Nebojsa, ed.:  Srpska strana rata, Beograd: 
Bigz, 1996.
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discourse  and  thus  to  understand  how  the  nationalist-religious  ideology  was 
communicated in the public sphere. This was important for discussing the impacts of 
such  ideological  discourse  on  Serbian  society  and  its  contribution  to  national 
hegemony, which in turn enabled Milosevic to realize his political plans. Studies and 
publications  on media  propaganda and on the  socio-political  role  of  independent 
media  were extremely helpful in defining the role of the media in the conflict and in 
the  spread  of  ideology  through  the  public  sphere.  They  also  contributed  to 
contextualizing  my  discussion  within  the  Serbian  cultural  milieu  that  contained 
voices of resistance that expressed strong criticism against the regime and the official 
ideology.
My  exploration  of  the  nationalist-religious  ideology  formed  within  the  Church 
includes  analysis  of  different  texts  written  by  theologians  such  as  Nikolaj 
Velimirovic, who established some of its main principles. His work resonates in later 
works  and  ideas  of  prominent  theologians  and  leading  bishops  of  the  Serbian 
Orthodox Church. How these ideas were shaped into a specific ideology that became 
a political programme of the Church in the 1990s, and how it interacted with the 
political ideology of the state is a part of the separate discussion in chapter 3.  
For  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  I  also  used  original  documents,  such  as  the 
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which is available on-
line both in Serbian and in English. My research includes other relevant documents 
available on-line, such as reports of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, on 
nationalism and religion. Interviews, on-line articles, and radio programmes such as 
Pescanik B92,  which  gathered  different  scholars  around  discussions  on  Serbian 
nationalism and the religious issues, are also included in my research. It is important 
to note that I read all the data in Serbian, some of them I translated myself and where 
available I used the existing English translations. 
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1.1.3. (A) Narrative Analysis
My analysis can be considered partially as a narrative analysis because it includes a 
discussion  of  the  storyline,  plot,  characters  and  their  interaction.11 As  Bordwell 
suggests, although a theory of narration is “drawn from the mimetic tradition”12 it 
goes beyond this because “a narrative film represents story events through the vision 
of an invisible or imaginary witness.”13 The modes of narration and its alternatives 
need to be acknowledged as an important aspect of film theory and in discussion of 
film narrative.14 Bordwell however criticized the tendency of focusing on “certain 
film techniques” or “isolated narrative devices at the expense of the whole film.”15 
In my analysis I focus only partially on narrative since for example I do not consider 
specific film techniques or spectatorship. I focus rather on elements such as the plot, 
storyline, film text and dialogues, characters, and setting. I also consider the narrative 
patterns  such  as  flashbacks  and  parallel  stories  in  films.  In  my  analysis  I 
contextualize  these narratives in the film. In other words,  I  connect  what can be 
analysed as isolated elements to the wider context of the film in order to discuss their 
meaning.
 
The narrative analysis is important for this study for several reasons. The film text is 
an important resource for understanding the ideological discourse of that time. Its full 
meaning however is  revealed through interaction with other  elements  of the film 
narrative, and also in the visual expressions. The film text as such can inform us on 
the cultural matrix of the 1990s. Careful analysis of the film text can reveal whether 
it reflects or subverts the ideological assumptions of the time. The analysis of the 
characters  is  important  for  several  reasons.  The  characters  often  reflect  specific 
social groups. They are a device through which the ideological discourse that shapes 
their actions and world-view is expressed. For example, in chapter 6, the analysis of 
11 See Bordwell, David: Narration in the Fiction Film, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 157.
12 Bordwell, David: Ibid, p. 9
13 Bordwell, David: Ibid, p. 9. 
14 Bordwell considers different meanings of the term “mode”, suggesting the theoretical connection 
to Aristotelian “mode of imitation.” See Bordwell, David: Ibid, p.150. For a different model of 
narration see also p.150-334.
15 Bordwell, David: Ibid, Introduction, xiii.
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the  characters  of  the  film  Wounds,  reveals  social  and  cultural  conflicts  and  the 
complex  issue  of  identity  in  the  post-Tito  era.  The  identification  of  the  main 
characters with the criminals shows the vital role of ideological fantasies in creating 
a “dominant fiction” which “present a mirror for group identification” and which 
resulted in “the loss of reality and ideological fantasies.”16 The characters also inform 
us about the perception of women in the culture of the 1990s and the interconnection 
between religion and nationalism, issues that will be explored in chapters 5 and 6.  
Storyline is another important element that I consider in this study. The storyline of 
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame  was changed several times during the shooting of the 
film, even becoming a political issue.17 The film montage, the use of flashbacks in 
creating parallel stories is characteristic of Dragojevic's films, and has an important 
place in structuring the narrative. “A narrative of dark spaces” in Serbian films has 
the metaphorical function of representing Serbian society. These metaphors, as Igor 
Krstic argues “have to be interpreted by means of their sub-contexts.”18  These are all 
elements that will be considered in my analysis as they reveal important and often 
overlooked aspects of the films. 
1.1.3. (B) Visual Analysis
The work of Melanie Wright drew attention to the importance of considering other 
elements in film analysis, such as the film's language.19 In this study I analyse visual 
language of the film,  images, symbols, and  mise-en-scene.20 In my analysis I give 
consideration to the film's music, which in the case of the Serbian films has a similar 
function to images: it is a part of the sub-text of the film, which inform us about the 
ideological context just as much as the film text does.
16 Krstic, Igor: Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and 
Identity through Popular Culture, Other Voices, V.2, N.2, (March 2002), 
http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/index.html 
17 See Iordanova, Dina: Cinema of Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 143. This 
problem will be discussed in chapter 5. 
18 Krstic emphasizes the importance of considering of the “relationship between historical trauma and 
fantasy.” See Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
19 See Wright, Melanie: Ibid.  
20 See Hayward, Susan: Key Concepts in Cinema Studies, London: Routledge, 1996.
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In terms of visual analysis I focus on the national and religious images and symbols 
in  the  films.  I  consider  the  religious  images  and  their  traditional  meaning  in 
Orthodoxy and the shift in their meaning and interpretation in the popular culture of 
the 1990s as it is represented in the films. Religious symbols often become national 
symbols.  It  is  important  to  analyse  this  cinematic  representation for two reasons. 
First,  to  discuss  how  the  films  depicted  the  connection  between  religion  and 
nationalism,  and  second  to  explore  the  possible  subversive  aspects  of  such 
representations. If we analyse the religious imagery separately from the context of 
the  film,  as  an  independent  entity,  we  may  find  that  these  images  primarily 
communicate  their  sacred  meaning.  When  they  are  observed  within  the  specific 
setting in which they are placed, however, their meaning can change. James Monaco 
argued that the single image does not constitute the basic unit of meaning in film.21 I 
propose in this thesis that the reading of religious images and further discussion on 
their  function have to be considered only within the film's wider context.  In this 
sense  I  explore  the  new meaning that  these  images  receive  within  the  cinematic 
context. For instance, a religious image such as the cross or the Last Supper, which is 
a  part  of  the Wounds'  mise-en-scene,  in  a Christian  context  communicate  certain 
sacramental meanings. If we observe them not as isolated elements but within the 
film context,  their  meaning  changes,  revealing  completely  new aspects.22 In  this 
sense I investigate the shift of sacred images to social symbols, which David Morgan 
discusses.23 This shift framed by the camera's eye reflects the actual changes in the 
society of the 1990s, for which reason it is important to contextualize this discussion 
of cinematic depictions within the wider socio-political context of the 1990s.  
My analysis as previously mentioned includes the  mise-en-scene.  Mise-en-scene in 
film criticism is primarily considered as “the modification of space.”24 According to 
Jean-Luc Godard mise-en-scene can be “as expressionistic as montage”25, and as its 
21 Monaco, James: How to Read a Film: The Art, Technology, Language, History, and Theory of  
Film and Media, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.129.
22 See Morgan, David: The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice, Berkley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2005. 
23 Morgan, David: Ibid.  
24 Monaco, James: Ibid, p.142
25 Monaco, James: Ibid, p.146.
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final aim can be considered the expression of “psychological reality that transcends 
physical,  plastic  reality.”26 Igor  Krstic  who  uses  a  psychoanalytic  approach  to 
Serbian  films  of  the  1990s  recognizes  mise-en-scene as  desire  since  it  reflects 
unconscious fantasies.27  In my analysis I focus on mise-en-scene as a communicator 
of metaphorical meaning that resembles cultural reality. Religious symbols constitute 
an important part of films' mise-en-scene. This is particularly the case with the film 
Wounds.  Mise-en-scene  in  this  case “illustrates  the  self-destructive  drive  of  the 
protagonists.”28 It not so much provides religious criticism as much as pointing to the 
deviation,  the  loss  of  values  and  moral  boundaries  within  Serbian  society.  The 
presence of Christ's image in Wounds witnesses in a metaphorical way to the absence 
of Christ. It transcends the image of a godless society, by representing “the theme of 
the living dead.”29 This society is paradoxically at the same time overwhelmed with 
Orthodox  iconography,  which  in  the  end  communicates  only  violence  and  self-
destruction.  Therefore  the  presence  of  Christ's  image  in  the  mise-en-scene has  a 
reverse function, to signify the destruction and absence of personal and collective 
ethics in a society ruled by the ideology of violence, destruction and hate towards 
others.  
The films' images therefore have “culturally determined connotations.”30 As James 
Monaco suggested  “the  shot  is  the  word of  film,  the  scene  its  sentence  and the 
sequence  its  paragraph”31,  all  of  which  are  placed  in  a  complex  order  that 
communicates certain meaning. In this study I focus upon visual expressions of the 
films in order to define their connection to the narrative and to explore the meaning 
they constitute. 
26 Monaco, James: Ibid, p.146.
27 See Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
28 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
29 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
30 Monaco, James: Ibid, p.131.
31 Monaco, James: Ibid, p.129.
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1.1.3. (C) Critical Responses to the Films
It  is  important  to say that “media reception theory” identifies the audience as an 
“active, involved public.”32 In the field of media, religion and culture there has been 
a shift towards the analysis of the audience reception.33 Stewart Hoover in his study 
Religion in the Media Age demonstrates the importance of considering the audience 
in determining how media consumption interacts with the religious and cultural life.34 
A similar trend shows in the field of film and religion where scholars such as Clive 
Marsh,35 Christopher Deacy36 and Gaye Ortiz37 have emphasized the importance of 
examining the participative role of the audience. 
Audience research forms a part this thesis. The response of scholars and film critics 
constitutes an important part of my research and it provides a framework for further 
discussion of the films. In fact by reviewing the reception by scholars and critics I 
shed light on the controversial reception of the debated films. The critical reception, 
discussed in this thesis, is valuable to consider because of the diverse, and sometimes 
extreme reactions that followed these films. Looking at the critical reception was also 
helpful for identifying major issues connected to these films and narrowing down my 
discussion. My research on critical reception included different sources. In the first 
place I referred to books published on Serbian films, such as Cinema of Flames by 
Dina Iordanova,38 and different texts mostly by Serbian authors published in on-line 
journals. I also included film critiques and reviews from different countries, from 
32 Pearson, E. Roberta and Simpson, Philip: Critical Dictionary of Film and Television Theory, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=bBj1HsOpS9wC&pg=PA352&lpg=PA352&dq=habermas+on+fil
m&source=web&ots=OJ8treB4mV&sig=nSgdqAQbKCZFOvF-
JVgWsuAYcFQ&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=7&ct=result#PPA354,M1, p. 354; Last 
accessed: 17/11/2008.
33 See Mitchell, Jolyon: “Emerging Conversations in the Study of Media, Religion and Culture” in 
Mitchell, Jolyon and Marriage, Sophia eds.: Mediating Religion: Conversations in Religion, Media 
and Culture, London: T & T Clark, 2003, p. 337-350.
34 Hoover, Stewart: Religion in the Media Age, London, New York: Routledge, 2006. 
35 Marsh, Clive: Cinema and Sentiment, Film’s Challenge to Theology, Milton Keynes UK & 
Waynesboro, USA: Paternoster, 2004.
36 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Theology and Film: Challenging the Sacred/Secular Divide, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.
37 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid.
38 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, 2001.
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former Yugoslavia to foreign ones, that are available on-line, on different web sites. I 
have  also  included  personal  interviews  with  relevant  film  critics,  directors  and 
professors.
For the purpose of this study I also interviewed the director of the selected films, 
Srdjan Dragojevic, German film critic Bernd Buder, who specialized in Yugoslav 
and post-Yugoslav cinema, and professor from the Faculty of Drama in Belgrade, 
writer and screenwriter Filip David. All interviews were conducted through email. 
Each  was  structured  differently,  according  to  the  specialized  knowledge  of  the 
interviewee. In the interview with director Srdjan Dragojevic my aim was to shed 
light on the circumstances in which films were made, find out the original motifs and 
intentions of the director in order to provide some of the answers to my research 
questions. One of the issues I sought to identify through the interviews was the extent 
to which the director was aware of the ideological framework and influences in the 
process of filmmaking and how the representation of some of the issues differs from 
the ideological context.  I was also interested to know whether the director criticized 
religion intentionally or whether he simply depicted it as an existing facet of society. 
1.1.3. (D) Ideological Criticism
 
Because  of  their  political  aspects  Serbian  films  were  widely  discussed  both  by 
scholars  and  critics.  Through  my  research  on  the  representation  of  nationalist-
religious ideology I was faced with questions about the ways in which film can act 
critically towards the dominant ideology and whether it is capable of escaping the 
ideological frame in which it was made. This is one of the key questions in my thesis 
that  inevitably  arises  out  of  my  primary  research  questions,  and  which  will  be 
discussed throughout this thesis. Because of my analysis of the cinematic depiction 
of ideology it can be considered that I approach  these films as ideological critique of 
the 1990s political  regime. In this sense we can say that  “every film is  political, 
inasmuch as it is determined by the ideology which produces it (or within which it is 
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produced).”39 The  next  issue,  that  connects  to  my  question  of  the  films' 
subversiveness, is whether this is possible in the case when film operates within the 
particular ideological framework of its time and additionally adopts, in the case of 
national cinema, global stereotypes embodied in popular, mostly Hollywood films. 
This is clearly the case and is an ambiguous issue within Serbian film of the 1990s, 
that  was  a  matter  of  debate  by  film  scholars  and  critics.  This  problem will  be 
explored further in this thesis, by considering different theories of film scholars on 
Serbian cinema, and exploration of the films per se.  
As Commoli and Narboni argue, “once we realize that it is the nature of the system 
to turn the cinema into an instrument of ideology, we can see that the filmmaker's 
first task is to show up the cinema's so-called 'depiction of reality'.”40 As they further 
argue the problem of depiction of reality is solved in the so-called art cinema which 
“seeks to solve the problem in a sophisticated way: by the device of  ambiguity.”41 
They provide several categories in which they discuss different ways that films can 
function within  ideological contexts.42 Commoli and Narboni conclude that it is “the 
job of  film criticism”43 to  identify  where specific  films differ  in  their  relation to 
ideological context within which they were made. Martin and Ostwalt distinguish 
three types of criticism in exploration of religion and film: theological, mythological 
and ideological criticism, proposing a fourth type which would combine all  three 
approaches.44 One  of  the  attempts  of  this  study  is  to  provide  ideological  and 
mythological criticism in exploration of ideological representation in the films. To do 
so I  use a  cultural  studies approach which enables me to apply a  wide range of 
different  methods  in  analysis,  from the  analysis  of  the  socio-political  context  to 
analysis  of  the  films  themselves,  for  the  purpose  of  better  understanding  of  the 
39 Commoli, Jean-Luc and Narboni, Jean: “Cinema/Ideology/Criticism” in Braudy, Leo and Cohen, 
Marshall: Film Theory and Criticism, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 754.
40 Commoli, Jean-Luc and Narboni, Jean: Ibid, p. 755.
41 Commoli, Jean-Luc and Narboni, Jean: Ibid, p. 721.
42 For the whole discussion see Commoli, Jean-Luc and Narboni, Jean: Ibid, p. 755-759.
43 Commoli, Jean-Luc and Narboni, Jean: Ibid, p. 754.
44 See Nolan, Steve: “Towards a New Religious Film Criticism: Using Film to Understand Religious 
Identity Rather than Locate Cinematic Analogue” in Mitchell, Jolyon and Marriage, Sophia eds.: 
Mediating Religion, London, New York: T& T Clark, 2003, p. 175-176. 
See also: Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene, eds.: Screening the Sacred: Religion, Myth and 
Ideology in Popular American Film, Boulder, Colorado; Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p.7.
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material  studied  and  the  topic.  In  this  regard,  I  do  not  seek  to  offer  simplified 
answers in consideration of the ideological framework of Serbian films, but rather to 
emphasize the importance of various elements in understanding the films, especially 
when it comes to categorizing films as politically correct or incorrect, which film 
critics tended to do in the case of the Serbian films, as will be discussed in this thesis. 
In  the  next  section  I  turn  to  a  discussion  of  contextual  analysis  as  an  equally 
important approach that I employ in my analysis.  
1.2. The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis has seven chapters altogether. In this chapter I have stated my research 
questions and outlined my methodology. In chapter 2, I discuss the research context 
and I consider a range of different literature relevant to my research. I divide this 
chapter into three parts. The first part is devoted to the field of  film and religion in 
which I position this study.  I discuss works which are the most pertinent to my thesis 
and I explain how this study contributes to the field. In the second part I discuss the 
literature that I used for the exploration of the socio-political context of the 1990s, 
which includes studies and works from diverse fields. The third part is devoted to 
literature written on Balkan, Yugoslav and Serbian cinema. I focus in particular on 
different  studies  and  analysis  written  on  Serbian  film  of  the  1990s,  which  is 
important for the further discussion of Serbian film and for my analysis of the critical 
reception of the films. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis is devoted to analysis of the socio-political context of the 
1990s and the creation of Milosevic's political ideology, which involves the period of 
the  1980s and 1990s.  I  focus  on the  formation  and characteristics  of  nationalist-
religious ideology in spheres of “secular and sacred”, in the state and the Church, and 
the political and social impacts of their interaction. In the first part of this chapter I 
briefly consider some of the historical roots of nationalist-religious ideology and then 
shift  to  concrete  events  and  the  rise  of  Serbian  nationalism  in  the  late  1980s.  I 
explain how the process of homogenization started after Milosevic gained power in 
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the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia, how it was supported by 
institutions such as the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and I describe the 
main characteristics of this new public political discourse. I then consider the role of 
the Church in the political events that took place at the same period of time and in the 
process of recreating Serbian national identity. I discuss the attitude of the Church 
towards  the  Serbian  national  question  and  how it  supported  the  development  of 
nationalism  and  religious  ideology.  I  suggest  that  the  Kosovo  Myth played  an 
important role in this process.  I consider the nationalist and religious aspects of this 
myth. My aim is not just to point to its exploitation for political purposes but  rather 
to  consider  what  a  nationalist-religious  ideology  actually  means  in  the  Serbian 
context. The political ideology around which the Church and the state were united 
was  crucial  in  mobilizing  the  masses  in  the  late  1980s  and  for  the  purposes  of 
political  support to Milosevic. Within this chapter I also consider the role of the 
media in spreading the new ideological discourse. “Hate speech” combined with the 
new  cultural  forms,  which  represented  the  new  aesthetic  of  the  1990s,  were 
forerunners  to  the  war.  The  discussion  on  mediascape  includes  the  populist 
representation of Orthodoxy. The aim of this third chapter is to describe the socio-
political  context  of  the  Milosevic  regime  and  explain  the  nationalist-religious 
ideology as the essence of the new political ideology that will be explored in relation 
to the films.
Chapters 4 to 6 are devoted to a critical exploration of 1990s films and they represent 
the core of this study. In chapter 4 I investigate the cinematic context of the 1990s. I 
discuss how the films produced over this period of time represent both the war and 
the impacts of the political ideology of the Milosevic regime.  In the first part of this 
chapter I briefly discuss Yugoslav cinematography and one of the most important 
cinematographic movements: the Black Wave. There are several reasons why I open 
this chapter with a discussion of the Yugoslav cinematography and the Black Wave 
movement.  First, it  is important to contextualize Serbian cinema within a specific 
cultural and historical frame. Second, my aim is to point to the tradition of politically 
engaged  films  which  started  with  the  Black  Wave.  Third,  it  is  important  to 
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contextualize  the  subsequent  discussion  of  politically  subversive  films  within  a 
specific cultural tradition. 
The next part of chapter 4 represents a critical examination of films produced in the 
1990s. Among a number of films that I briefly mention, I select those films that dealt 
with the socio-political issues of the 1990s.  My aim is to demonstrate that Serbian 
cinema of the 1990s was socially and politically engaged cinema and that the film 
directors were strongly engaged with issues of that time, such as the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the escalation of the conflict. I discuss a diversity of perspectives 
that the films provided on the theme of the civil war and Milosevic's Serbia. The 
political  character  of  these  films  is  evident  in  the  fact  that  they  were  critically 
depicting the ongoing issues in Serbian society. On the other hand some of these 
films were perceived by critics as not critical enough. I investigate in detail how the 
films depicted the civil war, the political regime and Serbian society of the 1990s. In 
order to enrich this discussion I discuss two particular films which dealt in greater 
detail with the problems of ideology and violence that resulted:  Keg of Gunpowder 
(Bure  Baruta,  Goran  Paskaljevic,  1998)  and  Premeditated  Murder (Ubistvo  s  
Predumisljajem, Gorcin Stojanovic, 1996). In the case of the first film I investigate 
how the film portrayed how the problem of violence was connected to state violence 
and to the political regime of the 1990s. The second film,  Premeditated Murder, I 
explore because of its  significant portrayal  of the totalitarian ideologies and their 
impacts on society and on the so-called ordinary people.  Both films interrogate the 
assumption that Serbian film of the 1990s tended to show the civil war as a part of 
mythological  circle  and  a  part  of  the  “Balkans'  destiny.”  With  this  discussion  I 
conclude chapter 4. The analysis of the last film represents a form of introduction to 
the next chapters in which I deal in more detail with the cinematic representation of 
nationalist-religious ideology. At the end of chapter 4 I explain why I chose two 
specific films for further analysis and discussion. At the heart of my fourth chapter is 
the  analysis  of  the  range of  films  produced in the  1990s.  The discussion  of  the 
cinematic context of the 1990s leads on to a detailed analysis of the two specific 
films.
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In chapter 5, I analyse the film Pretty Village, Pretty Flame (Lepa sela, lepo gore, 
Srdjan Dragojevic). In the first part of this chapter I discuss film genre and I give 
background information about the film production and the plot. In the next section I 
discuss the critical reception of the film, how it was perceived by different critics and 
scholars  and the main issues  that  the critics  addressed  concerning this  film.  The 
second part of this chapter is devoted to the film analysis. I first focus on an analysis 
of the main characters. The analysis of the characters is divided into four sections. In 
each of these sections I discuss the main issues which are depicted through the main 
characters  who  are  representatives  of  specific  social  groups.  I  also  analyse  the 
depiction  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  in  the  film.  Due  to  the  complex 
representation of the ideology and its impacts in the film I divide my analysis into 
several parts. In the first part I discuss the national and religious identity of the main 
characters,  in  the  second  part  I  analyse  the  religious  images  in  the  film,  their 
connection to national symbols and their place and meaning within the film setting 
and the context of the story. Next I consider the cinematic portrayal of the emergence 
of pseudo-historical discourse into the public sphere and its importance in creating a 
nationalist-religious ideology. In the next part I analyse the cinematic representation 
of media propaganda and its role in spreading the new political discourse. In the last 
part  of  my  analysis  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  I  investigate  the  cinematic 
representation of 'others', how our perception of others (my italics) was shaped and 
influenced by this dominant ideology. The overall aim in this chapter is to analyse in 
detail the diverse narrative and visual structures that portray the nationalist-religious 
ideology, its formation, main characteristics and impacts. 
 
In chapter 6 I analyse the film  Wounds (Rane, Srdjan Dragojevic). This chapter is 
structured  similarly  to  the  previous  one.  In  the  first  part  I  discuss  film  genre, 
production,  plot  and  critical  reception  of  the  film.  The  analysis  of  the  critical 
reception  of  this  film,  as  in  the  previous  case,  has  importance  for  the  further 
discussion  on  the  cinematic  representation  of  ideology,  and  its  possible 
subversiveness. In the next part of this chapter I analyse the characters in the film. 
The aim is to contextualize these characters in the socio-political and cultural milieu 
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of the 1990s. My analysis is divided into three categories: in the first I consider the 
portrayal  of  the  generational  and  ideological  clash,  in  the  second I  consider  the 
portrayal of the women in the cultural context of the 1990s, while in the third I look 
at the depiction of criminals and war profiteers. The characters in these categories 
represent specific social and cultural groups that emerged during the 1990s and they 
should be understood within this wider context.  
The following section is  devoted to the analysis  of the depiction of  the political 
ideology of the Milosevic regime and is divided into four different sections. I first 
discuss how the film portrays the emergence of nationalism into the public sphere in 
the  early  1990s.  I  then  focus on  the  function  of  religious  images  and  national 
symbols  in  the wider context  of  the film. Following on from this  I  consider  the 
depiction of media propaganda, since in this film the director devotes much more 
space to the role of regime's media. I analyse these diverse perspectives that film 
provides on Milosevic's media. I finally discuss the cinematic representation of the 
new culture of the 1990s, the interconnection between economic collapse, turbo-folk 
culture, and crime as direct consequences of the new political ideology. My aim is to 
contribute  to  an  understanding  of  how  this  film  critically  explored  the  role  of 
ideology in creating the new socio-cultural political environment of the 1990s.  
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of this thesis. In the first part of my conclusion I 
discuss  the  films  analysed  and how they portray  nationalist-religious  ideology.  I 
summarize the main points that emerge from my analysis. Next I consider to what 
extent  these  portrayals  can  be  considered  subversive.  I  suggest  how  this  study 
contributes to the wider discussion on Serbian cinema and I propose new approaches 
in reading Serbian film. The ambiguous character of the films requires shifting the 
focus to aspects of the films which were frequently neglected in existing readings. At 




This introductory chapter of my thesis has outlined my research motives, the aims 
and  objectives  of  this  study,  and  my methodological  approaches  to  the  research 
material. In the first part of this chapter I explained why Serbia is the focus of this 
study, why I decided to explore Serbian films of the 1990s and my personal reasons 
which inspired me as a researcher to undertake this study. I also explained how this 
study connects to the contemporary socio-political context in Serbia, and how the 
topic which I  investigate  has not lost  its  relevance.  Next,  I  outlined my research 
questions and the focus of my research. I stated the initial and main question with 
which I began this research, which was how Serbian films can inform us about  the 
ideological discourse of the 1990s. I further identified two main questions that arise 
from  this  initial  one,  which  are:  how  did  the  films  portray  nationalist-religious 
ideology and can these cinematic portrayals be considered subversive? 
I then moved on to outline my research methodology and explained how I analyse 
Serbian films in order to answer my research questions.  I  discussed in detail  the 
different approaches that I use in this thesis. Since this is an interdisciplinary study I 
offer an overall picture of the different methodological approaches I use some of 
which are “borrowed” from different disciplines, such as those from film theory for 
example, in order to enrich my research. These different approaches were crucial for 
my research in finding answers to the key questions of this thesis.
The last section of this opening chapter was devoted to the structure of my thesis. I 
explain in detail how I structured each chapter. My aim was to explain how each of 
these chapters can inform us not only about the specific subject discussed but also 
how they are connected and lead towards my conclusion. The next chapter of this 
thesis is devoted to the research context, which is important for the positioning of 
this study and for understanding the different contexts which were pertinent to my 





The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  provide  a  discussion  of  the  different  research 
contexts  relevant to this study. Stewart  Hoover in his  Religion in the Media Age 
observes  media  as  a  “common  culture.”1 Since  “religious  values  and beliefs  are 
diffused  throughout  popular  culture”2 it  is  important  to  consider  carefully  the 
interdisciplinary resources available for making sense of this diffusion. As I stated in 
the previous chapter the aim of this thesis is to investigate how 1990s Serbian films 
depicted religious beliefs and what this depiction says both about films and religion 
in Serbian 1990s context. The investigation of this issue required broad research that 
included works of scholars from different areas and academic disciplines, from the 
fields  of  film  and  religion  and  film  studies,  to  political  studies,  sociology  and 
anthropology. 
Reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of this study I divide this chapter into three 
parts. The first part is devoted to the field of film and religion, in which this thesis is 
positioned.  I  review  the  field  framing  the  most  significant  discussions  for  my 
research. In the second part of this chapter I survey the literature which is directly 
relevant  to  chapter  3,  and  which  aims  to  contextualize  this  thesis  within  the 
ideological  context  of  the  1990s.  In  chapter  3  my focus  is  upon the  nationalist-
religious ideology and therefore the literature I survey is selected according to this 
focus. The third part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of Serbian cinema as a 
part of former Yugoslav and Balkan cinema. This part is divided into two sections: 
the  first  section  surveys  the  literature  written  on  Yugoslav  cinema  and  its  most 
1 Hoover, Stewart: Religion in the Media Age, London: Routledge, 2006. 
2 Hoover, Stewart: Ibid, p.121.
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significant cinematic traditions while in the second part  I discuss the studies and 
works on Serbian cinema of the 1990s. 
My aim in this chapter is to explain first how this thesis contributes to the field of 
film and religion, and second how it bridges the gap in existing studies on Serbian 
cinematography. It is important to note that the role of the Church in the formation of 
nationalist-religious ideology has not been studied enough. In this sense I hope that 
my thesis can contribute also to those scholars of diverse disciplines who have an 
interest  in  the  issues  of  religion,  nation  and  identity  in  the  Balkans  and  post-
Yugoslav context.         
2.1. Film and Religion 
2.1.1. Introduction
This  study  is  located  within  the  field  of  film  and  religion.  To  make  a  fully 
comprehensive  review  of  the  field  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work.  In  this 
discussion which includes a brief survey of the field, I  consider the scholars whose 
work  informed me on  different  aspects  and  approaches  in  the  field  of  film and 
religion. Before I turn to discuss these approaches in this emerging field I briefly 
discuss the early beginnings of the cinema and the historical background of the field. 
The  discussion  on  different  approaches  in  film  and  religion I  divide  into  three 
sections.  These  three  sections  are  constructed  according  to  some  of  the  main 
approaches that scholars of religion and film have applied in their work: biblical, 
theological and cultural studies approaches. It is important to emphasize that all these 
categories are negotiable, for example the theological approach might use some of 
the methods of cultural studies, which does not exclude theological reflections in 
reading films. The theological approach includes both how theologians read certain 
film texts and how the audience makes theological meanings from symbols, images 
and  narrative  in  so-called  secular  or  less  explicit  religious  films.  It  is  useful  to 
remember  that  many of  the  scholars  who are  discussed  here,  regardless  of  their 
particular  approaches,  proposed  a  dialogical  model  when  it  comes  to  film  and 
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religion.3 Therefore it is important to note that these categories are not definite and 
that many of these approaches may overlap and argue for similar methods in the 
exploration of religion and film. Among the many works that I consider here are also 
those who informed me on what my work  is not  (my italics) within this dialogue, 
which  was  important  in  helping  me  to  place  my study within  the  field.  For  the 
purpose  of  this  thesis  however  I  also  discuss  the  most  pertinent  works  for  my 
research and the ones which thus contributed to this study.  
2.1.2. Early Beginnings of Cinema and the Development of the Field of Film and 
Religion 
Before I turn to consider the specific works in the field it is useful to underline the 
fact  that  the  interaction  between  religion  and  film  has  existed  since  the  early 
expansion of the cinema. Cinema has remained of interest to theologians from its 
early beginnings until the present. The religious representatives in the early age of 
cinema  tended  to  reject  motion  pictures  as  they  were  concerned  with  negative 
impacts  that  film  might  have  on  the  audience  and  believers,  which  resulted  in 
censorship.4 Throughout  the  decades  different  parties  in  diverse  countries  were 
considering the so-called negative, immoral, influence of cinema, such as was the 
case  with  Iran  and Turkey.5 Cinema was  also  considered  as  a  powerful  political 
weapon from the Soviet Union to  Nazi Germany exemplified by the release of the 
Triumph of the Will.6 
Cinema, which has a power to mediate the transcendental and to engage with the 
most delicate issues of  human existence, remained in the focus of theologians and 
religious scholars. Many scholars have focused upon different theological reflections 
3 Deacy and Ortiz proposed a dialogical model in film and religion studies but a similar initiative can 
also be found in works of scholars such as  Clive Marsh or Robert Johnston. 
4 See Aldgate, Anthony: Censorship in Theatre and Cinema, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005. 
5 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Theology and Film: Challenging the Sacred/Secular Divide, 
Oxford: Blackwell, p. 109.
6 Triumph of the Will (1935) is a Nazi propagandist film made by Leni Riefenstahl. DVD Triumph of  
the Will, Synapse: 2001.
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on cinema in order to identify how the relationship of  religion and film developed 
throughout  history  and  which  directions  it  takes  in  the  present.  A survey of  the 
history of the relationship between the church and Hollywood is given in Johnston's 
Reel Spirituality.7 
Robert Johnston described theological responses to film as  historically moving from: 
avoidance,  caution,  dialogue,  and appropriation to divine encounter.8 Similarly  to 
Johnston, Lloyd Baugh identifies diverse trends in reading the so-called Jesus films 
within their historical framework. The field emerges in the 1970s with the works of 
scholars, such as Neil Hurley or Ron Holloway, who started theological discussion 
on  film.  Ronald  Holloway  argued  that  cinema  experienced  its  momentum  of 
communion with existentialism, meaning that its power lies in sketching life as it is 
and  thus  raising  fundamental  questions.9 Exploration  of  social  and  historical 
conditions as well as human nature, in Holloway’s view, demonstrates the openness 
of  cinema  for  contemplation  on  existing  problems.  Holloway  argued  that  this 
openness  of  cinema for problems represents  openness  for  the transcendent.10 The 
discipline  of  film and religion within academia  developed in the 1990s with the 
emergence of a number of academic studies and scholars who dealt in various ways 
with film and theology or religious studies.  
2.1.3. Film and Religion in Dialogue 
A survey of a rich body of film and religion studies and theoretical discussions is 
given by Terry Lindvall in his Religion and Film.11 Lindvall's work surveys the field 
from its early beginnings to the most recent discussions, and as such was important 
for  my research  as  it  extended my knowledge and directed  me  to  more  specific 
7 Johnston, Robert: Reel Spirituality: Theology and Film in Dialogue, Michigan: Baker Academic, 
2000
8 Johnston, Robert: Ibid, p. 41. 
9 Holloway, Ronald: Beyond the Image, Geneva: Film Oikoumene, World Council of Churches, 1977, 
p. 21.
10 Holloway, Ronald: Ibid, p. 24. 
11 Lindvall, Terry:  Religion and Film, Part II: Theology and Pedagogy, Communication Research 
Trends, Centre for Study of Communication and Culture, Volume 24 (2005) No.1.
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explorations in the field, which are relevant to this study. Many scholars encountered 
cinema  as  a  theological  resource  while  there  was  a  significant  number  who 
advocated a cultural studies approach in religion and film field.  While films with 
explicit religious themes as those that depict religion and religious questions can be 
approached from a theological perspective, secular films represented a challenge for 
theologians. 
With a growing tendency of theologians and religion scholars to consider so-called 
secular films, there emerges and develops a dialogue between religion and theology 
and film.12 Some of the questions raised by religious scholars are whether film can 
actually perform religion and if so in what ways, and whether film is becoming “a 
substitute for religion.”13 In this sense we can identify the shift in the focus from how 
film can represent  religion and biblical  texts to  observation of film as a form of 
religion,  a so-called sacred space in which viewers are  gathered around common 
experience in search of spirituality or spiritual answers. 
Mitchell and Plate provided a variety of articles on the relationship between film and 
theology and religious studies in The Religion and Film Reader.14 The historical shift 
of the subjects and genre being studied informs about the growing developments of 
the  field;  explorations  move  from  religion  and  film  to  film  as religion.  They 
identified three models as the most common in the film and religion dialogue, the 
first  one can be described as “religion in film”15 in which scholars explored “the 
ways  religious  symbols,  themes,  or  figures  are  portrayed  through  the  narrative, 
sounds,  images...”16 then  “film  as religion  in  which  film  and  religion  serve  an 
12 Almost all scholars that are discussed in this section considered films which did not have explicit 
religious themes. Their focus shifts from Jesus films to Hollywood popular films. Among scholars are 
Christopher Deacy,  Gaye Ortiz, Margaret Miles, Clive Marsh, Erin Runions, Melanie Wright, John 
Lyden.
13 See Lyden, John: Film as Religion, New York: University Press, 2003; Also see Marsh, Clive: 
Cinema and Sentiment, Film’s Challenge to Theology, Milton Keynes UK & Waynesboro, USA: 
Paternoster, 2004.
14 Mitchell, Jolyon and Plate, S. Brent: The Religion and Film Reader, New York, London: 
Routledge, 2007.
15 Mitchell, Jolyon and Plate, S. Brent: Ibid, p. 3. 
16 Mitchell, Jolyon and Plate, S. Brent: Ibid, p. 3. 
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analogous function...particularly in the cinematic viewing experience”17, and finally 
there is a “broad view of religion  and  film.”18 My research would fit into the first 
category, since I am analysing religion in film. 
In  addition  Mitchell  and  Plate's  work  outlined  the  history  of  the  field  and  also 
identified key resources for my research. The range of work given in this study, from 
scholars  of  film  studies  and  religion  to  filmmakers,  provided  a  multicultural 
perspective  on the film and religion field.  Mitchell  and Plate's  work summarized 
recent  discussions  in  the  religion  and  film  field,  with  theological  and  biblical 
approaches as a separate topic.  The study not only involves European and North 
American perspectives but also provides a global vision of Africa, the Middle East, 
Asia and Australia.  Mitchell questions when it comes to global perspectives what we 
can identify as religious in film, in the case of some cultures (or filmmakers) which 
do not have the category of “religious” as Western civilization does or how we deal 
with  directors  who  have  no  interest  in  religion  but  deal  with  “ultimate 
significance.”19  
The use of films as a theological resource is not central for my study and my research 
focuses more upon how film can inform us about religion and the ideological context 
of  society.  I  do  consider  however,  how cinematic  representation  of  religion  and 
religious images, can be a tool of subversion. While my research is more informed 
by the work of scholars working with a cultural studies approach I do also draw on 
the work of scholars who adopted different approaches. It is important to note that 
current  film  and  religious  dialogue  has  developed  towards  considering  different 
genres  and  audience  research.  The  field  however  still  lacks  studies  on  national 
cinemas, which is the gap I intend to fill with this study. In the next sections I will 
discuss three main approaches in the field. The most space is devoted to the cultural 
studies approach since this is the approach that I undertake in this thesis. 
17 Mitchell, Jolyon and Plate, S. Brent: Ibid, p. 3. 
18 Mitchell, Jolyon and Plate, S. Brent: Ibid, p. 3. 
19 Mitchell, Jolyon and Plate, S. Brent: Ibid, p. 3.
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2.1.4. Biblical Approach
The relation between the Bible and film has long been a matter of interest in the 
field.  These  studies  include  films  which  explicitly  dealt  with  cinematic 
representations  of  Jesus  but  also  films  which  reflect  other  biblical  texts  and 
parabolas. In this part I discuss two scholars, Erin Runions and Lloyd Baugh, who 
use a biblical  approach in reading the film to investigate the correlation between 
Bible text and films and in order to define the subversive potential of such cinematic 
representations. Their works informed me on different aspects of filmic depiction of 
religious  images  and biblical  texts  which  once  transmitted  to  the  big  screen  can 
communicate controversial meanings.  
Baugh's study Imaging the Divine20, could be considered as a combination of both a 
historical  and  biblical  approach,  for  two  reasons:  first,  because  he  provides  a 
historical review of two approaches to Jesus films, and second because he discusses 
subversive representations of biblical text in the film. For example, Baugh considers 
Pasolini's  The  Gospel  According  to  Saint  Matthew  as  the  film  which  brought  a 
“revolutionary aspect of Jesus”, and consequently was condemned by the extreme 
right  wing  in  Italy  resulting  in  fascist  demonstrations  during  the  Venice  Film 
Festival.21 Baugh points to the subversive representation of Jesus who differently 
from Zeffirelli's  one,  speaks  on  social  justice,  expressing  anger  and  demand for 
transformation. In Baugh's opinion this masterpiece of Pasolini was “motivated by 
the  hope  that  it  might  serve  to  bring  about  a  reconciliatory  dialogue  between 
Marxism and Christianity.”22 Resistance and subversiveness therefore are categories 
that can be found in so-called Jesus films, which is clearly the case with Pasolini's 
film, and biblical text as such becomes a source of  cinematic subversiveness.
20 Baugh, Lloyd: Imaging the Divine: Jesus and Christ-figures in Film, Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 
1997. 
21 Baugh, Lloyd: Ibid, p. 96.
22 Baugh, Lloyd: Ibid, p. 99.
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The correlation between the biblical text and film can construct theological themes in 
the  films  but  also  subversion  especially  if  films  deal  with  issues  which  require 
ideological positioning. Erin Runions in  How Hysterical23 uses a biblical frame in 
approaching the film text for her exploration on resistance in the Bible and cinema. 
Runions investigates biblical texts and film, and the “questions of identification with 
and  resistance  to  hegemonic  and  oppressive  societal  norms and  ideals.”24 In  her 
discussion  Runions  further  investigates  the  ideological  framework  that  surrounds 
films such as Three Kings, in which a biblical frame plays a crucial role in the final 
determination of the ideological context of the film. Biblical allusions and parallels 
to the text of the Bible, Runion sees not as subversive but as a subtle affirmation of 
the  U.S.  political  discourse.  Runions'  definition  of  resistance  as  “alternate 
identifications” was important for my exploration of Serbian films. In this sense I 
consider  the  possible  subversive  representation  of  religious  images  and text  as  a 
quest  for  an alternative.  This  problem will  be explored further  in  this  study and 
discussed in more detail in the conclusion. 
Both Runions' and Baugh's studies, although coming from a different approach, were 
important for my thesis. Their work drew my attention to the importance of biblical 
text in film. The allusions to the original biblical texts expressed through an image, 
for  example,  deserve  attention  since  they  can  be  a  source  for  understanding  the 
subversiveness of the film narrative. In the analysis of the film Wounds I investigate 
religious images among which some make allusions to Biblical text and meaning, 
such as the image of the Last Supper which symbolically represents liturgical unity 
in Christ.25 As I will argue in Chapter 6 the biblical text transmitted through this 
image, is used as a mode of subversion of the oppressive socio-political regime. 
23 Runions, Erin: How Hysterical: Identification and Resistance in the Bible and Film, New York; 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
24 Runions, Erin: Ibid, p.1. 
25 For further explanation of Orthodox Liturgy see Schmemann, Alexander: For the Life of the  
World, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2004.
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2.1.5. Theological Approach
In this section I consider a theological approach to cinema. Although in my study I 
do not take this approach I review some of the most important studies in the field in 
order to contextualize this thesis within the recent discussions in the field. Different 
from  a  biblical  approach,  which  mainly  focuses  upon  biblical  and  film  text,  a 
theological approach brings into discussion a variety of elements such as for example 
the film's aesthetics, the importance of an image, and the audience's response to such 
representations. Clive Marsh,26 Christopher Deacy,27 and Robert Johnston,28 are some 
of  the  scholars  who  emphasized  different  aspects  in  theological  approach  to  the 
cinema. 
Discussing film as a narrative, for example, Johnston emphasizes the importance of 
an image. In reading film as an image he explains how theology relates to images 
built upon Paul Tillich’s typology. The common element for all types of images is 
their ability to become mediators of ultimate reality.29 Johnston also emphasizes the 
significance  of  image,  that  has  been  often  overlooked  in  favour  of  film text  by 
protestant scholars.30 This was an important point for my study since in this thesis I 
give a considerable importance to analysis of the images. Johnston also emphasized 
the importance of theology outside the church considering cinema as valuable site of 
this, and he lists six further reasons why cinema should be studied by theologians.31 
He further proposes a “well-rounded approach to the cinema”32 and discusses auteur, 
26 Marsh, Clive: Cinema and Sentiment, Film’s Challenge to Theology, Milton Keynes UK & 
Waynesboro, USA: Paternoster, 2004
27 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid.
28 Johnston, Robert: Ibid.
29 Johnston, Robert: Ibid, p. 78. 
30 See Johnston, Robert: Ibid, p. 76-77.
31 The reasons are: God’s grace is present throughout human culture, (2) Theology should be 
concerned with the Spirit’s presence and work in the world, (3) God is active within the wider culture 
and speaks to us through all of life, (4) Image as well as word can help us to encounter God, (5) 
Theology’s narrative shape makes it particularly open to interaction with other stories, (6) the nature 
of constructive theology is a dialogue between God’s story (…) and our stories (…) See Johnston, 
Robert: Ibid, p. 64.
32 Johnston, Robert: Ibid, p.115.
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genre, thematic and cultural criticism suggesting further a necessity for theological 
criticism.33 Johnston's approach lacks a consideration of the problems of ideology, 
subversion and resistance  in theological  criticism.  He takes theology as  an equal 
dialogical partner in film studies, and fails to recognize the problems of cinematic 
subversion of theology, theological images and themes and thus he fails to provide 
theological  answers  to  such  problems.  Subversion  of  theology  in  the  cinematic 
context, its ideological assumptions remain issues that Johnston does not consider 
sufficiently in his study. 
Clive  Marsh  proposed  a  modification  of  Tillich's  model  of  correlation  which 
expresses  more space  for  theological  requirements  than it  really leaves space  for 
popular culture.34 Marsh further focuses on what the audience does with the film, 
examining the  interaction between the  film and the viewers.35 How the audience 
make meaning of the film and whether this has any theological significance seems to 
be one of the ongoing questions that scholars frequently ask. From the position of 
religious  studies  and  theology,  film  was  often  perceived  as  a  possible  site  for 
religious experience (my italics). This comes from assumptions such as, for example, 
that every film is religious because it is “about life and its meaning”36, that films 
“have theological significance as they are developing values and a belief system”37 or 
that “narrative structure itself is religious and provides transcendent meanings.”38 In 
this sense Marsh argued that the religious experience that a film can provide is to be 
found in  “key concepts  such as  salvation,  revelation  or  redemption,  even if  it  is 
secularised redemption”39 and in such cases the audience that has interest in religion 
and the transcendental can engage dialogically with film.40 Again, as in the previous 
33 Johnston, Robert: Ibid, p.151-172.
34 See Marsh, Clive: “Film and Theologies of Culture” in Marsh, Clive and Ortiz, Gaye, eds.: 
Explorations in Theology and Film, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 
35 Marsh, Clive: Ibid, p. 36. 
36 Wright, Melanie: Religion and Film: An Introduction, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007, p. 16. 
37 Clive Marsh quoted in Lindvall, Terry: Religion and Film, Part II: Theology and Pedagogy, 
Communication Research Trends, Centre for Study of Communication and Culture, Volume 24 
(2005) No.1, p. 5.
38 Lindvall, Terry: Ibid, p. 7. 
39 Marsh, Clive: Ibid, p. 48. 
40 Clive Marsh explores theological points in interaction with film through the analysis of The 
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case,  theology  is  taken  as  a  key  in  reading  the  issues  of  the  transcendent  and 
existential, but its critical potential when it comes to cinematic criticism of religion 
and theology as such, is not considered nor explored. In both cases, it seems that 
theology remains an isolated phenomenon which serves to help the audience to make 
meaning  out  of  the  film  text,  which  is  only  partially  true.  What  is  lacking  is 
considering subversion and resistance as theological categories that can enrich the 
theological approach to the cinema. 
Other scholars also proposed a dialogical model in the studies of film and religion. 
Eichenberger for example argued that both film and theology can learn a lot from 
each  other  and  the  research  in  this  field  has  to  be  dialogically  developed.  He 
expressed the need for a theology of image.41 One of the central questions is how 
film as an aesthetic form of expression could be considered as an icon. Icon, in this 
sense,  does  not  have  any  liturgical  connotation  but  refers  more  to  the  aesthetic 
representation  of  “the  inexpressible.”  Image  per  se can  be  powerful  as  much  as 
narrative can. I argue that when we speak about theology and film we need to pay 
more  attention  to  images,  as  theology  can  equally  participate  not  just  in  an 
examination  of  film  narrative  but  also  in  an  exploration  of  film  language.  My 
particular interest is in the use of sacred images, such as icons, in film and for the 
purpose of subversion. In other words, how can an initially sacred image in the film 
language represent something else, or be used for criticism of deviations of religion? 
A dialogical model when approaching film was further proposed by Deacy and Ortiz, 
who suggested that theology was never “conducted in a vacuum”42 and therefore the 
tendency  to  observe  Christianity  and  culture  as  two  separate  and  “monolithic 
entities”43 is not appropriate. In the Christ and culture correlation Deacy suggests the 
reconsideration of Niebuhr's model to set a discussion between sacred and secular, to 
Shawshank Redemption. Marsh, Clive: Ibid, p. 38-58. 
41 Eichenberger, Ambros: “Approaches to Film Criticism”, in May, John: New Image of Religious 
Film, Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1997, p. 6-7.
42 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 77.
43 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 66.
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some extent artificially divided realms.44 Deacy further suggests the model of “two 
way conversation”45, in which theologians should apply “appropriate critical tools”46 
when engaging with popular culture. Considering the significance of the works of 
scholars  such as  Aichele and Walsh in  Screening Scripture and Clive Marsh for 
advancing the dialogical model47, this book aims to provide a detailed overview of 
the manner and extent in which theology and film provides us with understanding on 
issues such as “the role of the women, the environment, violence, justice, war, and 
eschatology.”48 In this sense Ortiz and Deacy aim to bridge the gap between “the 
secular” and “sacred” in the field of religion and film. Ortiz and Deacy nevertheless 
fail to address how religion in film reflects the ideological and political issues of its 
context.
2.1.6. Cultural Studies Approach
In  this  section I  discuss  the  cultural  studies  approach  to  film.  A cultural  studies 
approach takes into consideration not only film narrative and film language but also 
the context in which specific cinematographies function. In this sense, film is a form 
of cultural text that informs us about society but also at the same time represents a 
product (my italics) that has economic, political and social value. Scholars such as 
Margaret  Miles,  John  Lyden,  and  Melanie  Wright  propose  the  cultural  studies 
approach in studying religion and film. Since I identify my approach as closest to 
cultural studies, here I will address some of the main points that these scholars make. 
A pioneer in the field who first advocated the cultural studies approach is Margaret 
Miles. In her study she focused on film as a product rather than film as the text, 
which is one of the reasons why she suggested a cultural studies approach to the 
44 See Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 8-65.
45 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 76. 
46 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 74.
47 See Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 4.
48 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 75.
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cinema.49 For Miles it is important to observe film as a product of various but at the 
same time specific socio-political and cultural conditions. In this sense “she studies 
the particular historical  moment  from which the film originates.”50 This approach 
proved useful for the purpose of this thesis, which is in a way a study not only of 
film, its narrative and image, but also of a particular historical and socio-political 
moment,  that as I argue, we can also learn about through film. My work extends 
Miles' position by putting into practice investigation of the film as a product of its 
time and specific conditions, or in other words, my analysis of the film is inseparable 
from  the  analysis  of  the  socio-political  context.  I  hope  to  demonstrate  that  the 
reading and understanding of particular films is impossible without acknowledging 
the social and historical frame as equally important for the discussion. What supports 
this argument is, as we will see further in this thesis, the reception that the films had 
among film scholars and critics whose diverse reading and criticism of the films was 
mainly determined by the film context: it came as a result of their reading of the text 
within a specific historical  and political  frame of Serbia of the 1990s. Miles was 
criticized on the grounds that her approach could have come from “any humanist 
discipline”51 and that “there is nothing particularly 'religious' about it”52 because of 
her readiness to adopt any social issue as related to religion. In this sense, my study 
will demonstrate why and how the historical and socio-political moment of the 1990s 
Serbia is directly related to religion. 
Developing Miles'  approach John Lyden encountered the significance of research 
into  the  audience.  Lyden  suggested  that  film  can  function  religiously,  offering 
“ritualized experience”53, which is an important aspect that should not be overlooked. 
Its  function  is  therefore  determined  by  the  audience.54 In  a  similar  fashion  both 
Deacy and Marsh, as discussed before, considered the question of the audience as 
49 Miles, Margaret: Seeing is Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1996. 
50 Miles, Margaret: Ibid, p. 23.
51 Watkins, Greg: Seeing and Being Seen: Distinctively Filmic and Religious Elements in Film, 
Journal of Religion and Film, Vol.3, No.2, October 1999, http://www.unomaha.edu/jrf/watkins.htm
52 Watkins, Greg: Ibid, http://www.unomaha.edu/jrf/watkins.htm
53 Lyden, John: Ibid, p. 4.
54 Lyden, John: Ibid, p. 44 - 48.
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vital for further research in the field. Although audience reception research is not 
within the scope of this study I consider the audience through the discussion on film 
reception by different scholars and film critics both from the Balkans and abroad.  
Furthermore Lyden argues that film, besides being a tool for the transcendent, can 
also  be an  ideological  tool  and as  such films can support  or  subvert  established 
power structures, questioning the society’s values.55 This aspect of Lyden's approach 
was valuable for my research in which I consider Serbian film as an ideological site, 
or in other words as a source for information on ideology in which religion with its 
institutional,  mythological and ritualizing aspects played a significant role. In this 
sense I am looking at film as a communicator of ideology, how film represents it and 
how it eventually subverts it through the representation of religion.   
Christopher Deacy and Gaye Ortiz's Theology and Film, has already been mentioned 
in the previous section which deals with theological approaches to film, but as I 
noted some of the scholars may be considered in more than one category. Ortiz and 
Deacy's book reconsiders to some extent the artificial division between “the secular” 
and  “the  sacred”,  proposing  that  every  film  can  be  qualified  as  religious.56 By 
addressing different  cinematic topics,  Deacy and Ortiz demonstrate  how theology 
provides  a  unique perspective  on the ongoing cinematic  issues,  showing that  the 
sacred  and secular  division is  not  tenable.  These  arguments certainly place  them 
among primarily theologically orientated scholars when it comes to the correlation 
with film studies. Deacy and Ortiz, however propose reconsideration of the methods 
and approaches in this interdisciplinary field and thus they challenge the existing 
boundaries in the theology and film framework, for which reason I include them also 
in this section. Their recognition of the necessity of applying different methodologies 
and approaches and arguing for a dialogical model, brings them closer to the cultural 
studies  approach.  Further,  Ortiz'  discussion  on  film  genre  and  her  proposal  in 
defining for example war-genre films, was extremely pertinent to my work. Ortiz 
argues that when we are defining war-genre we should first identify specific themes, 
55 Lindvall, Terry: Ibid, p. 5. 
56 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 84.
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such as for example the “ethics of killing” or “patriotism.”57 This was of importance 
for  my  analysis  of  the  films,  especially  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame,  which  is 
classified as a war film but actually was perceived by some critics, as we will see, as 
a pro-war film. In this sense, I follow, to some extent, Ortiz's proposed model of 
deconstructing  the genre according to the prevailing themes in the film. Patriotism, 
nationalism and the ethics of killing are the themes to be found in this film which I 
primarily classified as black comedy anti-war genre. The definition of the genre is 
important for this discussion on the representation of ideology in Serbian films and 
their  potential  subversiveness.  This  is  also  important  because  film  critics  often 
perceived those films as controversial. The view of critics on Serbian films opens the 
question of war-genre films and how we make a distinction between anti-war and 
war propagandist film.  Ortiz shows that genre is not only a negotiable term but that 
discussing  sub-genre  contributes  to  classifying  films  more  precisely.  She  also 
considers the importance of “religious and cultural attitudes” shifting the focus to 
what audiences actually do with the ideological presumptions of the film, arguing 
that  “questioning  the  war”  within  cinema  can  be  “one  of  the  ways  to  promote 
peace.”58 The categorization of Serbian films such as Pretty Village, Pretty Flame as 
belonging to the war film genre, as we will see further in this thesis, does not seem to 
be sufficient since the inevitable question is: what kind of war film do we speak 
about? Further it is important to consider which films we consider as pro-war or anti-
war films and why. My analysis further indicates that to answer this question is not 
always easy, especially if we bear in mind that, no matter how critical they tend to 
be, most of the time films operate within the context in which they were made. 
Therefore  an  important  question  is  whether  the  film  can  escape  the  ideological 
discourse of its  time. Even when we speak about  Black Wave films, which were 
considered by foreign critics often as anti-communist films or as films of resistance 
to  the  communist  regime  and totalitarian  ideology,  we  might  well  ask  the  same 
question. Bearing in mind that the  Black Wave films were an actual result of their 
context and time, we may also consider their criticism as one that could come from a 
57 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 162.
58 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz Gaye: Ibid, p. 177.
39
Marxist stand point. In this case their criticism of totalitarianism can refer not only to 
communism but also to some forms of capitalism. These are all issues that need to be 
considered  when  we  put  films  into  certain  categories  which  involve  political 
connotation.
Among scholars who advocated the cultural studies approach, Melanie Wright's work 
was in many respects the most relevant to my research. In her Religion and Film she 
develops  Miles'  approach  “in  several  respects”59 suggesting  a  multi-dimensional 
approach in the field of film and religion.60 This approach does not mean rejection of 
“previously  held  assumptions”61 but  enriching  the  field  by  taking  into  account 
cultural  studies  as  “integrative  of  a  range  of  strategies  used  by  specialist  film 
critics”62 which at the same time demonstrates an openness that “allows conversation 
with  the  particular  specialist  knowledge  and  methodologies  that  practitioners  of 
religious study (and theology) can bring to film.”63 Wright further argues about the 
importance  of  studying  film  language  within  the  field  of  religion  and  film, 
questioning whether in that sense “the film has been studied at all.”64 She argues that 
usually scholars of  religious studies and theology express a tendency to approach 
film just as a narrative and to neglect the visual side of the film that coexists from 
image and cut. In this sense the multi-dimensional approach she is proposing aims to 
provide a  methodological  framework which would “offer  a  richer  account of the 
films  concerned”  looking  at  how  film  texts  operate  within  and  also  construct 
particular contexts.65  In this way, Wright argues, it is possible “to  gain a sense of 
what 'film' is, both as a series of images...and as a social artefact.”66 She also stresses 
the importance of film selection which must be “relevant to the problems in hand”67 
and as such fit the aim of the project.68 
59 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 29.
60 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30
61 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
62 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
63 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
64 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 22.
65 Paraphrased, Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
66 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
67 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 19.
68 Paraphrased, Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 19.
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This study is aligned with what Wright called a multi-dimensional approach, because 
I  explore  the  film  text  and  the  cinematic  context,  and  critical  receptions.  The 
selection  of  films  to  be  analyzed  in  this  thesis  is,  following  Wright's  argument, 
relevant to my research questions and the problems I discuss. 
David  Morgan's  The  Sacred  Gaze:  Religious  Visual  Culture  in  Theory  and  
Practice,69 in which he deals with religious images and their diverse and changing 
meanings in the public sphere is useful here. His study on religious images and visual 
practices aims “to provide an interdisciplinary approach to the study of religion” and 
as such provides a good ground for the research of religion by different scholars of 
diverse disciplines. Morgan's study contributes to an understanding of the function of 
religious  images  within  different  religious  groups  and  their  social  and  cultural 
aspects.  Morgan's  discussion  on  subversion  of  religious  images  and  their  social 
function was pertinent for the purpose of this thesis and my analysis of religious 
images in the selected films. I analyse the function of religious images in popular 
culture, and how the films depicted the existing shift of religious images to social 
images in the popular culture of the 1990s. The  subversion of religious images in the 
films I discuss takes place in two ways: first, the films use the iconic images of the 
1990s, to show how religion was connected to aggressive nationalism, and second, 
some  of  the  sacred  images  of  Christian  faith  are  used  as  mise-en-scene,  to 
communicate  exactly  the  opposite  meaning  from  what  these  images  originally 
represented.  In  the  context  of  the  narrative  of  both  films  the  images  show  the 
transition  of  a  sacred  into  a  social  image  that  expresses  national  rather  than 
ecclesiastical  meaning. I investigate how the sacred images of the Orthodox faith 
became political symbols of the 1990s. They represented symbols of the exclusion of 
others. This exclusion stands directly against the Church and its claim to be rooted in 
the early Church Christian theology that is based on unity of all people in Christ and 
not  on  the  unity  of  a nation (my  italics)  in  Christ.  Morgan's  work  provided  a 
theoretical framework for my investigation of the function of religious images in the 
context of the 1990s, and consequently in the films. In my research I take a step 
69 Morgan, David: The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice, Berkley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2005. 
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further in that I explore how the visual can express the social context and eventually 
subvert the iconic images of popular culture providing in such a way a critique of the 
socio-political practice.  
Martin  and  Ostwalt  in  their  book  on  religion,  myth  and  ideology  in  popular 
American films70, propose a new type in film criticism which would be “a blend of 
theological, mythological and ideological criticism.”71 This study contributed to my 
research in several respects. First, the authors recognize the importance of focusing 
on political aspects of the contemporary films claiming that film has “the potential to 
reinforce,  to  challenge,  to  overturn,  or  to  crystallize  religious  perspectives, 
ideological assumptions, and fundamental values.”72 They devote a significant space 
to the issue of myth (my italics), which is one of the issues I tackle in this study and 
as a part of a discussion on national-religious ideology. The claim exposed in this 
book that “Hollywood ...creates a great number of mythic heroes”73 is an important 
point  of  view  for  considering  Serbian  film  of  the  1990s  as  one  influenced  by 
Hollywood cinema and thus as one that applies global stereotypes. In this sense, in 
my  analysis  of  the  characters  of  the  selected  films  I  deal  primarily  with  the 
representation of anti-heroes. Anti-heroes cannot, as I will argue later, support the 
national myths affirmed in the political ideology of the 1990s, but actually can only 
subvert them. This is a problem that will be discussed later towards the end of this 
study.  Second,  the  authors  in  this  book  “define  religion  in  different  ways”  and 
popular films are “communicating religious meanings, mythic stories, and bedrock 
ideological values.” 74 
Further, the authors claim that “by looking critically at films, we can learn a good 
deal about religion in the United States.”75 In this study I explore how the Serbian 
films of the 1990s inform us about religion in Serbia, how they depict its connection 
70 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene, eds.: Screening the Sacred: Religion, Myth and 
Ideology in Popular American Film, Boulder, Colorado; Oxford: Westview Press, 1995. 
71 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene: Ibid, p.7.
72 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene: Ibid, Preface, vii
73 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene: Ibid, p.70.
74 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene: Ibid, Preface, vii
75 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene: Ibid, Preface, viii
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to  the political  ideology embodied in nationalism, and how therefore they reflect 
ideological values of the 1990s. Finally, the authors identified that in film criticism 
there appeared “terms such as alienation, ideology, plenitude and resistance”76 which 
point  to  the  complex  structure  of  film  as  a  product  of  specific  socio-political 
conditions, that certainly deserves more attention in film studies and should not be 
overlooked by scholars of film and religion either. 
2.2. Socio-Political Background Literature
For the purpose of this study, especially Chapter 3 I investigated a large body of 
work and studies  on the  Balkans,  its  history,  politics  and culture.  My focus  was 
primarily on Serbia within the Yugoslav and Balkan geographical and socio-political 
context. My research included an investigation of its history and culture in a wider 
sense and for the purpose of identifying and contextualizing the period on which I 
am focused,  which is  from the mid-1980s throughout  the 1990s.  In order to,  for 
example, discuss the religious ideology of the 1990s, it was important to back track 
to its origins and its connection to the concept of nationhood, how it was in previous 
historical periods and what political applications it had then and how that relates to 
now. My research included a large body of different studies, papers, on-line articles 
and archive data that were relevant to this topic. The scholars that wrote books and 
studies on Yugoslavia and Serbia, its culture, politics and religion, or tried to define 
this cultural-political  space of the Balkans,  are from different disciplines: cultural 
studies, anthropology, political sciences, media studies and finally theology.  
Since  I  am primarily  focused  on  the  issue  of  nationalism  and  its  connection  to 
Serbian Orthodoxy I have investigated particularly the period in which this ideology 
prevailed,  which is the second half of the 1980s. This ideology, which became a 
pillar of the Milosevic regime, was a precursor to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the 
civil war. Therefore my focus was on the literature and work of different authors and 
scholars on this topic. My sources were primarily Serbian scholars and authors, but I 
76 Martin, Joel and Ostwalt, Conrade Eugene: Ibid, p. 2.
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have included several studies by foreign scholars and analysts. Since I am primarily 
focused  on  the  problem  of  nationalist-religious  ideology,  its  formation, 
characteristics and promotion in the public sphere, I narrowed my research on the 
literature that dealt more explicitly with these issues. Here I discuss the works and 
papers that were the most helpful in my research.
From rich material written on the break-up of Yugoslavia I selected the most helpful 
works for the discussion on this topic. Authors such as Christopher Bennet,77 Misha 
Glenny,78 Robert Thomas,79 James Gow,80 Maria Todorova,81 Vesna Goldsworthy82 
are a few among many whose work provided me with understanding of the variety of 
different discussions and diverse aspects of the Yugoslav break-up and Serbia's role 
in this process. Their research on socio-political and cultural characteristics of the 
Milosevic regime helped me in framing the most important aspects of the ideological 
impacts on Serbian society.  
The  doctoral  thesis  and  post  doctoral  research  of  Dejan  Jovic,  professor  at  the 
department  of  political  studies  at  the  University  of  Stirling,  on  Yugoslavia's 
disintegration was published as a book and represents an “analysis of political events 
through the interaction of text and context.”83 In this analysis Jovic gave rich insight 
into Yugoslav history, politics, economy, international relations and ideologies. One 
of what he called “newspaper explanations” of the war, based on the argument of so 
called historical, “ancient hate” that existed among Yugoslav people, Jovic dismisses 
as  an  inaccurate  and  populist  interpretation  which  offered  oversimplified 
explanations.84 Jovic's  recognition that  ideology has a central  place in “ideocratic 
77 Bennet, Christopher: Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, London: Hurst & Company, 1996.
78 Glenny, Misha: The Fall of Yugoslavia, London: Penguin Books, 1996; Glenny, Misha: The 
Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London: Granta Books, 2000.
79 Thomas, Robert: Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s, London: Hurst & Company, 1999.
80 Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, 
London: Hurst&Company, 1997.
81 Todorova, Maria: Imagining the Balkans, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
82 Goldsworthy, Vesna: Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination, New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 1998.
83 Jovic, Dejan: Jugoslavija – drzava koja je odumrla: uspon, kriza i pad Cetvrte Jugoslavije, 
Beograd: Samizdat, 2003, p. 13.
84 Jovic, Dejan: Ibid, p. 37-44.
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states”85,  such as was socialist  Yugoslavia,  was of significant importance for this 
research project. Although Jovic uses this recognition as an argument for his further 
discussion on the causes of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, this point was helpful to 
me in my analysis of the political background of the 1990s. In this sense I consider 
the 1990s ideology as being central and at the core of the regime's politics. Ideology 
aims to motivate political action and we can observe the development of the crisis 
and the war as a consequence of ideology, the new political ideology, formed in the 
late  1980s,  that  replaced  the  socialist  one.  This  is  an  important  point  for  this 
dissertation whose focus is an analysis of the nationalist-religious ideology.
The study of historian Latinka Perovic,  Izmedju anarhije i autokratije86 (Between 
Anarchy  and  Autocracy,  my  translation),  was  extremely  helpful  in  framing  the 
historical  background of the political  thought  in Serbia,  which was important  for 
contextualizing  the  political  ideas  and  ideology  discussed  in  Chapter  3.  Perovic 
provides an important insight into the political conflicts that existed in Serbia in the 
19th century, between so called liberals and people's option, which to a great extent 
influenced  the  later  definitions  and understanding  of  the  modern  state.  Giving  a 
review of the socio-political thought and events of the last century,  Perovic sheds 
light on different influences that shaped the so-called Serbian concept of the state, 
and the pro-Western and anti-Western attitudes regarding this subject. In this sense 
her work enriched my study, in defining the origins and different concepts of the 
Serbian  national  state,  how  these  ideas  were  developing  in  specific  historical 
circumstances  and  how  some  of  these  ideas  were  significantly  influenced  or 
supported by the Orthodox Church. Although her work does not explicitly deal with 
the religious issues,  she identified subjects  such as  patriarchalism or  collectivism 
and individualism87 (my italics) as ideas that were shaping political  thought were 
highly important for defining the connection between religiosity and nationhood in 
the Serbian context. Perovic identified that the so called Serbian national question, 
85 Jovic, Dejan: Ibid, p. 13.
86 Perovic, Latinka: Izmedju anarhije i autokratije: srpsko drustvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI), 
Beograd: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Ogledi Br. 8, 2006.
87 See Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 43-47, also discussion in chapter 2.
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related  to  the  question  of  Serbian  state  and  nationhood,  was  inseparable  from 
religion.88 Perovic's work contributed to my research providing important material 
for the historical frame for my discussion in Chapter 3. 
Other  works  on  the  break-up  of  Yugoslavia  were  helpful  in  identifying  crucial 
political  events  connected  to  the  emergence  of  nationalist  discourse.  Political 
discussions on the causes and reasons of Yugoslavia's disintegration were helpful in 
understanding that when we speak of this subject we must encounter many different 
factors from economic to cultural, and at the same time consider the international 
context, since the break-up of Yugoslavia took part after the fall of the Berlin wall 
and the disintegration of the Eastern block. Works of Serbian scholars of various 
disciplines published in the book Srpska strana rata 89(The Serbian side of the War), 
were extremely helpful on defining the basic tenets of this political ideology, and the 
issues of nationhood and religion. The most interesting works were by authors who 
dealt with the use of mythological discourse and its emergence in the public sphere. 
Here I discuss several studies which are directly relevant to my work. The work of 
Radmila Radic, Serbian historian, who investigated the role of the Serbian Church in 
political life of the 1980s and 1990s, provided important material and documents, 
from articles published by the Church to reviews of socio-political events in which 
the Church actively took part.  Her analysis  includes discussion of the connection 
between nation and religion in Serbia. Olivera Milosavljevic90 and Ger Duijzings91 
focused on the different aspects of the Kosovo Myth and its political use. In Chapter 
3  I  analyse  the  Kosovo  Myth as  an  example  in  which  religious  and  national 
converged. Serbian anthropologist Ivan Colovic92 wrote on Serbian national myths 
and  their  role  in  the  regime's  war-propaganda.  His  analysis  of  the  mythological 
88 See Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 24.
89 Popov, Nebojsa, ed.: Srpska strana rata, Beograd: Bigz, 1996.
90 Milosavljevic, Olivera: “Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke” in Popov, Nebojsa, ed.: Srpska strana rata, 
Beograd: BIGZ, 1996.
91 Duijzings, Ger: Religion and the Politics of the Identity in Kosovo, London: Hurst & Company, 
2000.
92 Colovic, Ivan: Politika simbola, Beograd: Fond za otvoreno drustvo, 2000, also Colovic, Ivan: 
Bordel ratnika: folklor, politika i rat, Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 1994.
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discourse  that  was  prevailing in  the public  sphere  was  equally  important  for  my 
analysis of the nationalist-religious ideology and the analysis of the selected films. 
Radivoje Radic dealt  with the emergence of pseudo-history in the Serbian public 
sphere.  Pseudo-history  was  an  important  part  of  the  ideological  discourse  which 
coexisted from national and religious myths, and its function was to represent Serbs 
as  a  unique  nation  in  the  world  and  to  support  the  ongoing  process  of 
homogenization.  How  far  these  claims  went  Radic  described  in  his  book  Serbs  
before and after Adam93 (Srbi pre Adama i posle njega). There are two reasons for 
focuing  on  pseudo history:  first,  because  of  its  importance  in  the  vox  populi of 
Milosevic's  propaganda  machinery  and  second,  because  this  phenomenon  was 
depicted  in  the  films.  Films  such  as  for  example  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame 
provide  an  insight  into  how  the  pseudo-historical  content  mixed  with  national-
religious  myths  influenced  ordinary  people.  This  problem  will  be  discussed  in 
Chapter 5. 
For the purpose of this study and analysis of the films I also read the original texts on 
which some of the films were based. First, I read the drama of Ljubomir Simovic94 
on which the film The Battle of Kosovo was based. It is important to note that I refer 
to the first version, since Simovic later published a revised version of this drama. 
This was important for my analysis of the political discourse of the Milosevic regime 
expressed  through  this  drama,  written  by  a  political  playwright  whose  writing 
embodied the discourse of the 1980s. Second, it helped me to understand the extent 
to  which  academics  were  shaping  this  ideological  discourse.  Although  I  do  not 
analyse Simovic's drama in this thesis, and I only briefly discuss the film based on it, 
this  text  provided  me  with  an  understanding  of  the  interconnection  between  the 
nationalism  promoted  by  politicians  and  religious  ideology  formed  within  the 
Church. Contextualizing this text within the specific socio-political frame helped me 
to identify characteristics of nationalist-religious ideology and its use as a political 
weapon.  
93 Radic, Radivoj: Srbi pre Adama i posle njega, Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 2003.
94 Simovic, Ljubomir: Boj na Kosovu, Beograd: Srpska knjizevna zadruga, 1989. 
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Tunel95 a novel by Vanja Bulic is the the next text that I considered for the purpose of 
this thesis, since it was used as an idea for Dragojevic's film Pretty Village, Pretty  
Flame. Bulic's text has nothing in common with the film version, except for the fact 
that  the main characters  are  trapped in the tunnel.  Everything else was changed. 
Although Vanja Bulic was one of the screen writers, comparison of his text to the 
film,  brought me to the inevitable conclusion that Dragojevic shaped the story in his 
own way, which from glorification of Serbian sufferings turned into a black comedy 
about undeserved glorification of Serbian warriors, which in the end gave the film a 
completely new meaning and consequently caused many debates. Although I do not 
compare the original Bulic text to the film in this thesis, it was a useful framework 
for my analysis to have an insight into the background of the creation of the film.   
My  research  also  included  the  original  novel  of  Slobodan  Selenic,  Ubistvo  s  
Predumisljajem96 (Premeditated Murder) on which the film of the same title, directed 
by Gorcin Stojanovic, was based. Although I do not analyse Selenic's book it was 
helpful to see the extent to which the director followed the original text, and how he 
integrated his own personal touch in his depiction of ideological conflicts. 
In  order  to  define  religious  ideology  I  have  investigated  a  range  of  theological 
literature,  writings  of  contemporary  Serbian  theologians,  and  books  and  articles 
published by the Church. This was first as a basis for my analysis of the religious 
ideology and nationalism that occurred within the Church, and second because my 
intention was to do comparative analysis, by looking at how these ideas overlapped 
with  the  official  political,  nationalist  discourse.  This  religious  ideology  was 
represented  and  mainly  justified  as  an  attempt  to  preserve  the  Serbian  national 
identity and its so called specific culture that Velimirovic defined as “above the East 
and above the West.”97 In order to highlight in this work some of the basic arguments 
of Serbian theologians, I summarize them through the careful selection of the most 
95 Bulic, Vanja: Tunel: Lepa sela, lepo gore, Beogradski izdavacko-graficki zavod, drugo izdanje, 
Beograd: Narodna biblioteka Srbije, izv.broj: 59.088, Beograd: 11/02/1997.
96 Selenic, Slobodan: Ubistvo s predumisljajem, Beograd: Prosveta, 1996. 
97 Velimirovic, Nikolaj: Iznad istoka i zapada, 
http://www.verujem.org/savremeni_teolozi_azbucni.htm
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important texts, which are discussed in Chapter 3. 
I chose therefore, besides contemporary Church leaders and theologians that were 
active  during  the  Milosevic  regime,  also  theologians  whose  worked  shaped  later 
theological arguments on nationhood and church. I primarily considered the works of 
Bishop Nikolai Velimirovic98, a 20th-century theologian, who died in the 1950s but 
whose work influenced later theologians, mainly bishops who represented a kind of 
elite  formed  in  the  Serbian  Orthodox  Church  in  the  mid  1980s.  This  elite  was 
influencing the Church's politics during the 1990s and their influence has remained 
strong until today. First I analyse the concept of the nationalist-religious ideology in 
Velimirovic's work. Second, I look at its later implications in the 1990s. To analyse 
this interconnection between Velimirovic's work, 1990s Serbian Church leaders and 
political ideology of the regime I chose the book that is the most representative for 
this  purpose:  The Philosophy of  War: The Lamb of God and the the Beast from  
Abyss.99   
Why was it important to analyse separately the nationalist-religious ideology formed 
within the Church? First, because most of the studies on Serbia and the Yugoslav 
war,  which  dealt  with  the  Milosevic  regime,  failed  to  frame  completely  the 
importance and impacts of the Church in creation of the political national ideology of 
the 1990s. Most of them did successfully frame the role of the Church in this period, 
providing rich data on what the Church was actually doing and what political moves 
it  undertook.  Some  of  them,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasized  the  importance  of 
national myths, analysing the discourse of the mythological language, and identified 
a lot of religious elements that proved to be inseparable from the national ones. What 
really lacked was more detailed discussion on the main premises of the religious 
ideology that existed within the Church, how and when it was formed, how it was 
used for political purposes and how it connected so naturally to the official regime's 
98 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Nacionalizam Svetog Save,  
http://www.verujem.org/savremeni_teolozi_azbucni.htm 
99 Group of Authors: Jagnje Bozije i zvijer iz bezdana, 
http://www.mitropolija.cg.yu/duhovnost/jagnje/
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ideology, and why it was so successful. 
It is important, however, to make a distinction between what I call religious ideology 
and Orthodoxy itself, meaning mainly its liturgical aspect and the universality that 
emanates  from  this.  Religious  ideology  of  the  1990s,  based  on  the  works  of 
theologians from earlier periods such as Velimirovic, represents a form of deviation 
from  Orthodoxy (my  italics).  The  deviation  is  primarily  to  be  found  in  the 
abandonment of unity in Christ for the sake of the national, in other words putting 
nationhood at the centre of the Church's activity, theology and mission instead of the 
liturgical praxis. My thesis is not a theological study; rather, I discuss the deviation 
of theology into national ideology, the deviation of religious praxis into the socio-
political praxis of exclusion of others (my italics). This discussion is for the purpose 
of the further analysis of films (chapters, 4, 5, and 6) and socio-political context of 
the 1990s (chapter 3). I do not discuss what liturgical praxis means from the point of 
view of Orthodox theology,  rather  I  discuss the deviation from this praxis in the 
social life of the Church. What does this mean? It means, as we will see in Chapter 3, 
that many prominent theologians in their preaching after the Liturgy were calling on 
national  unity  rather  than  to  unity  in  Christ.  By  providing  an  insight  into  the 
perspective of the Church on national issues and analysing the main tenets of the 
nationalist-religious ideology, my study contributes to those fields which dealt with 
the  ideology  of  the  Milosevic  regime  and  explored  the  changing  identities  and 
national and religious issues in the Balkans.  Nationalist-religious ideology,  which 
survived Milosevic's downfall and found its new expressions in the socio-political 
context after 2000 within the right wing national parties, remains a central issue in 
contemporary Serbia, which is one of the reasons why I believe that this discussion 
needs  to  be  continued  in  the  future.  How  the  nationalist-religious  ideology,  its 
symbolism and rhetoric, which I discuss in chapter 4, was represented in the films, is 
what I focus on in the analysis of the films. 
 
In  this  part  of  the  chapter  I  have surveyed  the most  significant  works  that  were 
directly  relevant  and helpful  to  my thesis  and chapter  3,  which is  on the  socio-
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political context of the 1990s. In the next section I will discuss the literature written 
primarily on Serbian cinema, which is rooted in traditions of Yugoslav cinema, and 
which will therefore also be briefly discussed.  
2.3. Balkan Cinema Literature
 
In this section I will focus on literature that was of vital importance for my thesis and 
film analysis,  and as such was a  primary resource for my research.  I  divide this 
section into two parts. In the first part I survey the literature on Yugoslav cinema. 
Discussion of Yugoslav film was important in my thesis for two reasons, first for the 
historical contextualization of Serbian film and for understanding the traditions and 
influences  that  it  had,  and  second,  because  it  has  importance  for  the  further 
discussion of the cinema of the 1990s, that develops in Serbia and after the break-up 
of Yugoslavia.  
In the second part of this section I focus on the rich body of literature written on the 
Serbian cinema of the 1990s by different scholars and critics. The purpose of this 
was to consider how these discussions informed my study and how my analysis of 
films contributes to the research on Serbian film and in this sense enriches diverse 
perspectives and develops new approaches in studying Balkan cinema. 
2.3.1. Historical Frame: Yugoslav Cinema 
My research included a number of different books, articles and critiques written on 
Serbian cinema, recognized as a part of the Balkan cinema and the East European 
cinema.  Discussion  of  Serbian  cinema  of  the  1990s  often  included  various 
discussions  of  Yugoslav  cinema.  For  my  thesis  it  was  important  to  discuss  a 
historical frame of Serbian cinema which I do in Chapter 4. In this chapter I focus 
primarily on the period of the 1960s known for the Black Wave movement. There are 
two  reasons  for  this:  historical  and  socio-political  contextualization  of  Serbian 
cinema, and shedding light on diverse traditions that influenced Yugoslav cinema 
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and therefore later Serbian cinema. Such a historical frame enables understanding of 
the diverse perspectives and discussions on the character (my italics) of the films of 
the 1990s. My sources were films produced in this time period (1960s-1970s). Of 
great help in understanding the Black Wave movement was a documentary Censored 
Without Censorship in which auteurs of this period give authentic statements about 
the movement, its cultural and socio-political importance, revealing the background 
of  the  film  making  process  and  the  cinematic  traditions  that  influenced  them. 
Interviews with some of the directors, such as Zelimir Zilnik, available on-line, were 
of great help in understanding the  Black Wave and its authors, the specific socio-
political  and  cultural  circumstances  and  their  vision  of  the  issues  of  totalitarian 
ideologies.
Besides the Serbian literature on the history of Yugoslav cinema, most beneficial was 
Daniel Goulding's study:  Liberated Cinema. Goulding offers not only rich material 
on the history and development of Yugoslav cinematography but also provides an 
important  and  interesting  analysis  of  the  Black  Wave  movement.  Goulding's 
exploration on this movement, gives an analysis of Black Wave film framed by the 
discussion on its  importance as  praxis.100 As Goulding notices praxis connects to 
aesthetics as a form of “complete freedom of artistic expression”101 which has the 
function of responsible criticism of existing conditions in society.102 This criticism 
includes strong opposition to “dogma and myths in all its forms.”103 Goulding's study 
is not only informative regarding the most important aspects of the Black Wave and 
the  historical  contextualization  of  Serbian  cinema,  also  it  gave  me  direction  in 
research on possible forms of subversiveness and ideological criticism in the cinema 
of the 1990s, especially when it comes to the cinematic representation of national 
and religious popular myths. In my study I will be exploring the new cinematic forms 
100 Goulding notices that the stance of some of the Black Wave auteurs was close to the philosophical 
radicalism of the Praxis group. To explain what praxis is and what it is not, Goulding quotes 
philosopher Danko Grlic's “most radical Marxist-derived formulation” in which Grlic argued that 
practice is “opposed to everything established” and stands against all that is “passive, merely 
meditative, non-creative”. See Goulding, Daniel: Liberated Cinema: the Yugoslav Experience, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 81. 
101 Goulding, Daniel: Ibid, p. 81. 
102 Goulding, Daniel: Ibid, p. 81. 
103 Goulding, Daniel: Ibid, p. 81. 
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of subversion through the analysis of film representation of ideology and myths in 
the popular discourse of the 1990s.    
It is a matter of future discussions whether or not the  Black Wave echoes in later 
cinematic works in Serbia. For the purpose of this study, however it is important to 
consider  this  historical  frame  for  further  discussions  of  1990s  cinema  and  for 
considering  whether  it  was  influenced  by  different  trends  and  movements  in 
Yugoslav cinema. For this reason it is important to include the  Black Wave in this 
discussion  and  draw  attention  to  the  tradition  of  politically  engaged  cinema. 
Although I am not doing comparative analysis  between the films from these two 
periods,  I  consider  the  historical  frame  as  important  for  further  discussion  on 
cinematic developments.  
In this regard, Dusan Bjelic's study on the cinema of the 1990s was beneficial for my 
research.  Bjelic,  relying  on  Frederick  Jameson's  theory,  made  an  important 
distinction between  resistance and  subversiveness  (my italics) in film, recognizing 
resistance as a characteristic of the national cinema, as for example the Black Wave 
was, while subversiveness, which takes place within certain ideological discourse, 
Bjelic finds in the 1990s cinema. This means, for example, that national cinemas can 
adopt global aesthetics, stereotypes and so-called Hollywood style and then subvert 
them. In this case we no longer speak only about national cinema but about “global 
cinema”,  as  Jameson suggested.  Stereotypes  deployed  in  global  cinema can thus 
frequently be subverted. Scholars such as Dina Iordanova and Frederick Jameson, in 
their studies on contemporary Serbian film, gave significant space to the Black Wave 
and its directors, because of its aesthetic uniqueness and the socio-political criticism 
expressed in it.  
2.3.2. Studies of the 1990s Serbian Cinema
Literature on the cinema of the 1990s includes work both by Serbian and foreign 
scholars who wrote on this topic. My research also includes a number of different 
53
articles written by film critics, interviews with directors, and film reviews. In this 
section I will discuss the scholars who dealt with different aspects of Serbian cinema 
of the 1990s and that were the most useful for my research, for example Igor Krstic, 
Nevena Dakovic, Ivana Kronja, Dusan Bjelic and  Tomislav Z. Longinovic. 
Ivana Kronja considered the Serbian film of the 1990s as a part of the culture of 
violence.104 She  argues  that  Serbian  film  makers  were  strongly  influenced  by 
American film genre, from classical gangster films and film noir, to “contemporary 
classics” of Coppola and Tarantino.105 In her discussion on violence in contemporary 
Serbian cinema she finds that the film makers failed in representing the causes of 
violence but depicted it more as a consequence. She makes an exception in the case 
of  Wounds, which  as  she  admits  “deals  with  media  manipulation”  that  was 
responsible for “hate and violence promotion.”106  Kronja, however, did not find that 
films criticized violence, but rather they were “a pale reflection of the real violence 
in  society.”107 The  film  Wounds is  the  one  I  selected  for  my  analysis  of  the 
representation of ideology, and I will suggest exactly the opposite, that this film did 
in fact point to the causes of the society's violent culture. It interrogated in a subtle 
way an ideology of violence. 
How the nationalist-religious ideology was an ideology of violence and a call to arms 
is a part of the discussion in Chapter 4 particularly but it is also discussed in other 
chapters  as  a  part  of  the  film analysis.  What  is  important,  however,  is  Kronja's 
question whether “we can fight the violence with the scenes of violence”108 or not. 
This question stands for all films that deal both with the war and street violence, and 
has been a matter of wider debates.109 The responses would certainly depend on the 
audience.  My intention is  to suggest  that  Serbian films, specifically  Wounds,  did 
104 Kronja, Ivana: Violence as a Cause of and a Response to Frustration: Serbian Cinema and 
Violence Culture, 1990-2004, http://www.interdisciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/kronja%20paper.pdf
105 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
106 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
107 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
108 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid. 
109 See Mitchell, Jolyon: Media Violence and Christian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
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depict street violence and brutality of youngsters as a consequence of the specific 
culture of the 1990s that was shaped by pro-war ideology. 
Igor Krstic framed his discussion of Serbian cinema with the question of “politically 
correct cinema”110, choosing in his own words to deal only with films which took a 
clearly “Serbian perspective.”111 Krstic approaches films as “cultural text” in order to 
provide  a  “psychoanalytic  reading  of  Serbian  cultural  self  reflection.”112 Krstic 
explores the construction of “self” and “other”113 related to collective identification in 
three Serbian films,  Underground,  Pretty Village,  Pretty Flame,  and  Wounds.  By 
using “Lacanian categories of subject”114, Krstic explores psychological themes in 
the films. Krstic argues that the films were “highly controversial” due to the fact that 
“they position the viewer unconsciously to identify with those who raped women and 
burned villages...” 115 Krstic further provides discussion on films' iconography and its 
symbolism. Although he is using a psychoanalytic reading of the films to discuss 
cultural conflicts and issues of identity, his study highlighted several important issues 
for this thesis. First, Krstic considers films' mise-en-scene116 as an important element 
in his analysis, and symbols and images make an important part of the discussion on 
Serbian films. He does not separate the film text from the visual, but studies them as 
equally important. This is the approach that I use in this study, considering the film 
text, context, image and the sound, as equally important in my analysis and for the 
purpose of fuller understanding of the films. 
Second,  Krstic  considers how the film communicates  to  the audience,  giving the 
viewers  a  “Serbian  perspective”117,  a  problem  that  other  scholars  such  as  Dina 
Iordanova discussed,  and which certainly caused the diverse interpretation of  the 
110 Krstic, Igor: Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and 
Identity through Popular Culture, Other Voices, V.2, N.2, (March 2002), 
http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/index.html 
111 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
112 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
113 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
114 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
115 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
116 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
117 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
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films, including the stances that films represented clearly pro-Serbian propaganda. 
This positioning of the audience to identify with perpetrators at the time when the 
war was still going on became an issue and caused wide spread debates on films, 
opening political  questions of  politically  correct  and incorrect  films.  Drawing on 
Krstic's ideas, I will try to demonstrate that the films I analyse in this thesis, are 
indeed  providing  a  Serbian  perspective  which  actually  represent  a  form of  self-
reflection,  through  the  representation  of  the  local  myths  and  ideologies,  but  not 
necessarily for propaganda purposes. 
Third, Krstic argues that the ideological discourse promoted by the regime through 
their  media,  and with support  of the Church and other  important  institutions  and 
politicians, imposed  “fantasies of ethnic nationalism so effectively...that the people 
passionately  took  up  these  ethnic  identities  and  reconstruction  of  previous 
neighbours as blood enemies.”118 This claim of Krstic is  a significant point.  This 
thesis points to the significance and importance of nationalist-religious ideology. By 
looking at its representation in the films I look at how “cinematic representations 
play a vital role in constructing, reflecting or subverting those narratives.”119 I look at 
how the films depicted ideology and how in this sense they inform us about popular 
religion and nationalism of the 1990s. It is a matter of further discussion whether the 
film subverted or simply reflected this ideological discourse.  
Looking at  the representation of the civil  war  in Serbian films,  Nevena Dakovic 
argued that  the films offered a  mythical  view of the conflict.120 By this  Dakovic 
considers  representation  of  the  Balkans  as  the  keg  of  gunpowder  that  has  the 
potential  to explode at  any time into  the conflict  in which everyone is  a  victim. 
Mythical concept also includes the concept of “Balkans destiny” in which people are 
“doomed”  and  as  such  prone  to  eternal  conflict.121 This  argument  was  actually 
conceptualized in the ideological discourse  of the 1990s, which I discuss in chapter 
118 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
119 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
120 Dakovic, Nevena: Yugoslav wars: Between Myth and Reality, 
http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/mpi/Activities/Media%20Practice%20Spring%202002/dakovic.htm.
121 Dakovic, Nevena: Ibid. 
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3. Dakovic finds similarity between the official ideological justification of the war 
(which I discuss in Chapter 4) and cinematic explanation of the war. This is due to 
the “metaphorical appearances”122 that she identifies in some of the films and that in 
her opinion have the function of showing the war stereotypically as a consequence of 
the Balkans' destiny. Such representation on the other hand, according to Dakovic, 
gives to the story a universal character that can be related to any part of the world. 
Dakovic however did not explore enough the function of such metaphors in films, 
which can be differently interpreted depending on whether or not we read the “sub-
context of the film.”123 
Mythical  representation  of  Yugoslav  wars  can  be  considered  a  part  of  larger 
discussion of stereotypical representation of the Balkans, which has been discussed 
by different scholars such as Maria Todorova, Dina Iordanova, Frederick Jameson 
and Tomislav Longinovic.  This problem that  exists  within Balkan cinema can be 
identified as depicting the Balkans through the Western gaze. As Iordanova argues it 
is hard to find subversion within Balkans cinematic representation of itself among 
contemporary film makers, who “feel obliged to be apologetic”124 in their dialogue 
with  the  rest  of  Europe  and  thus  their  work  reflects  rather  a  “voluntary  self-
disintegration.”125 According to her this is a consequence of a “Eurocentric construct” 
which  opens  a  possibility  for  “positioning  the  Balkans  as  geographically  part  of 
Europe, but conceptually excluded from the European cultural space.”126
Tomislav Longinovic described this problem as: the symptom of internalized culture 
of “self-Balkanization” articulated by the authors as a response both to the exclusion 
of  their  native  locations  from the  Western  vision  of  civilization  and  an  implicit 
critique of the domestic glorifications of righteous uses of violence.127 Unlike other 
scholars, Longinovic argues that the foreign audiences were unable to escape “the 
122 Dakovic, Nevena: Ibid.
123 Dakovic, Nevena: Ibid.
124 Iordanova, Dina: Cinema of Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 67
125 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p.67
126 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p.58
127 Longinovic, Tomislav: “Playing the Western Eye: Balkan Masculinity and Post-Yugoslav War 
Cinema” in Imre, Aniko, ed.: East European Cinemas, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 46
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ethnological approach to the lesser-known area of the world” and that as such they 
often took “one or the other moral stand.”128 
 
This  thesis  contributes  to  this  discussion  that  exists  among  the  scholars  who 
identified  some  of  the  major  problems  within  Balkan  and  Serbian  cinema,  by 
providing a  different  approach to  the  analysis  of  the  films.  Regarding Dakovic's 
argument on the mythical representation of the wars, I investigate this problem as a 
part of an exploration of ideology. First I investigate the socio-political context and 
its ideological discourse, in which local mythologies such as the Kosovo Myth played 
a crucial role in representing the conflict as a part of an eternal cycle.  Second, I 
explore how such ideology was depicted on the big screen, and how and to what 
extent the cinema informs us about ideological discourse in Serbian society. Third, I 
explore  whether  this  depiction  was  subversive  or  whether  the  films  were  just 
reflecting regime's  ideology.  In this  sense,  as an important  part  of my research I 
consider Bjelic's argument that the national cinema can deploy stereotypes in order to 
subvert them129, and Krstic's suggestion that cinema representations can often reflect 
or subvert the existing narratives of society. For example, in Chapter 5 (analysis of 
the film Pretty Village, Pretty Flame), as a part of the analysis of the characters, I 
will consider the character of an American journalist, who is kind of a mirror for 
Serbian  self-perspective  in  their  dialogue  with  the  West  where  they  are 
communicating their own identities.  
Frederick  Jameson  in  his  work  “Thoughts  on  Balkan  Cinema”,  discussed  the 
problem of stereotypical representations of the Balkans, considering the concept of 
the “the wild man of the Balkans,”130 the stereotype which determines that “the South 
Slavs are naturally violent  and aggressive.”131 Jameson also notices,  as  Iordanova 
does, which we will see in the later discussion, that the Balkans authors considered 
128 Longinovic, Tomislav: Ibid, p. 37.
129 Bjelic, Dusan: “Global Aesthetics and the Serbian Cinema of the 1990s” in Imre, Aniko, ed.: East  
European Cinemas, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 104.
130 Jameson, Frederick: “Thoughts on the Balkan Cinema” in Egoyan, Atom and Balfour, Ian ed.: 
Subtitles, On the Foreignness of Film, Cambridge, Massachussetts, London, England: The MIT 
Press, 2004: Ibid, p. 233.
131 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 233.
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the Western,  stereotypical  gaze on this part  of the world to be a consequence of 
alienation. This alienation, he argues, comes as a result of “the Other's” view on the 
Balkans, which is reducing people of this area to a stereotype.132 The stereotypical 
vision  of  Balkans  and Serbs,  brings  frustration  that  we  can  find  in  the  work  of 
authors from this area, including film directors. Jameson's argument was helpful to 
my  analysis,  especially  of  the  characters  in  films  such  as  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  
Flame, where the group of people trapped in a tunnel is, metaphorically, not only in 
the trap of their own beliefs in local mythologies shaped by different ideologies but 
also trapped in exclusion from the rest of the world. Inspired by Slavoj Zizek's view 
on identities issues in former Yugoslavia, Jameson proposes a wider historical frame 
when  discussing  this  area,  rather  than  confining  ourselves  to  “the  short,  violent 
and...stereotyped memory of Bosnia and the Kosovo war.”133  
Similarly  to  other  scholars  Jameson  considers  the  importance  of  historical 
contextualization  whether  we  speak  about  the  Balkans  itself,  wars,  or  cinematic 
representations of these issues. In this work I contextualize the discussion on Serbian 
cinema in the specific socio-political and historical frame, which has the importance 
of  explaining  the context  that  was  surrounding these  films,  in  the first  place  the 
1990s ideology and its historical background. In his further discussion on national 
cinema of the 1990s Jameson singles out two Serbian films, Keg of Gunpowder and 
Wounds.  Although  he  admits  that  these  films  can  be  observed  as  ones  which 
correspond to  some extent  to  the  American  tradition,  he  finds  specific  forms of 
expression in representing violence. In Wounds “the wild man” is subordinated to the 
caricature of itself134, while in Keg of Gunpowder he represents a powder keg, who 
instead of providing expected anger provokes sympathy135 and he is “uncivilized...in 
the sense that  he doesn't  want to  be alienated or imprisoned by other  people.”136 
Jameson  also  argues  that  Wounds introduced  media  as  a  generator  of  violence, 
132 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 234.
133 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 236.
134 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 253.
135 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 255.
136 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 255.
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“which in this case is the same as violence itself.”137 The notion of media influences 
on the escalation of violence is an issue that has already been mentioned and will be 
discussed  in  chapters  5  and  6  of  this  thesis.  Jameson  concludes  that  both  films 
represent “extraordinary testimony to the ongoing vitality of cinema from the former 
Yugoslavia.”138 Jameson's  work  considerably  influenced  my  research  on  the 
representation of characters that are on the border of what Jameson called “grotesque 
comic book figures.”139
One of the major studies on the Serbian cinema of the 1990s is Dina Iordanova's 
Cinema of Flames.140 Iordanova's work was pertinent for this research for several 
reasons.  She  provided  a  rich  review  of  Serbian  films  produced  over  the  1990s, 
focussing upon the most controversial ones. Iordanova framed the most important 
issues emanating from these films and the discussions that surrounded them. Her 
methodology is based on contextual analysis, not only of Serbian film as a part of 
what she calls the Balkan Cinema, but primarily of Serbian film as a part of a very 
particular  socio-political  context  of  the  1990s.  Her  exploration  of  Serbian  film 
focuses  on  specific  films  and  directors  and  on  the  controversy  that  usually 
surrounded these films. Since Iordanova is focused more upon contextual analysis, 
her  reading of  films is  inseparable  from the discussion of  the socio-political  and 
cultural  context of Serbia.  In Chapter ix of her book, which is  devoted to media 
representation of victims and villains,  Iordanova for example discusses  turbo-folk 
(my italics), and the phenomenon and media glorification of war criminals.141  
Iordanova also provided a rich discussion on the film production and the connections 
of the directors to certain political  structures.  More importantly,  Iordanova draws 
attention to the diverse reception that films, such as Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, had 
among  the  audiences  and  film  critics.  The  diverse  and  often  contradictory 
perceptions of this film reveal its  ambiguity,  which encouraged me to investigate 
137 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 254.
138 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 256.
139 Jameson, Frederick: Ibid, p. 254.
140 Iordanova, Dina: Cinema of Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001.
141 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid. 
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different  layers  of  the  film  that  were  overlooked  in  existing  studies  on  Serbian 
cinema, including the work of scholars such as Iordanova. For the purpose of my 
research Iordanova's  discussion of Srdjan Dragojevic's  film  Pretty Village,  Pretty  
Flame was useful. This discussion is basically framed by the question whether or not 
this  film  was  Serbian  propaganda,  and  whether  the  film  took  sides  in  the 
representation  of  the  conflict.  Iordanova,  however,  identified  important  issues  in 
Serbian films, such as the representation of the war, stereotypes, identity and political 
criticism (or the lack of it). Although she notices that the film is telling the story from 
the Serbian perspective, Iordanova does not analyse this perspective, rather she gives 
an insight into the diverse discussions that were surrounding this film.  
Iordanova  did  not  take  the  approach  of  textual  analysis  nor  did  she  analyse  for 
example religious and national images in the film and its relation to the text of the 
film. The Serbian perspective, that she correctly identified particularly in the film 
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame (but what was also a commonly identified issue in other 
films), is not analysed, and therefore Iordanova overlooks the important elements of 
such a perspective. A Serbian perspective in this sense, can mean depiction of local 
myths and ideologies rather than simply a justification of the war. In other words, I 
argue  that  for  example  myths  represented  in  the  film  can  inform  us  about  the 
ideological discourse of the 1990s, and that their function in the film is far more 
complex which is an issue that needs to be further explored. Even in the case of 
Wounds, a film certainly less complicated than Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, and that 
Iordanova briefly discusses, little space is devoted to the detailed film analysis. With 
such an approach she fails to identify in which particular way the film represented 
criminalization,  was  this  criminalization  shown  to  be  connected  to  the  war  and 
political structures, were there any national and religious symbols in the film that 
inform us about the ideological background of these criminals, who after all were 
recognized, as she says, as Serbian heroes.142 She does not analyse the film narrative 
or  film language to  get  these  answers  and therefore  she  overlooks the important 
elements in the film that are of key importance for her broader discussion on the lack 
142 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 143-147.
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of political criticism in the films, stereotypical representation of the war in Serbian 
films,  and stereotypical  representation of  the  Balkans  and its  people.  As  I  noted 
earlier the stereotypes, which were discussed by Bjelic and also by other scholars 
that will be mentioned later in this text, can have a subversive function. Stereotypes 
in this sense are not investigated in Iordanova's study, but are an important element 
of  her  discussion  on  “the  other  Europe”,  the  Balkans  itself  which  adopted  the 
Western gaze in its self representation.143 This problem will not be discussed in detail 
in this thesis. Rather the issue of stereotypes and their function is integrated into my 
film  analysis.  Apart  from  the  rich  material  and  contextual  analysis  of  Serbian 
cinema, Iordanova's work did not provide detailed analysis of the films themselves, 
an analysis that would focus more upon the film text and iconography equally, rather 
than emphasizing only the context. This approach would provide more of an insight 
into the ideological problems of Serbian society and its cinematic representation. The 
fact that critics were divided in reading the films, shows that both cases could prove 
to  be correct,  that  the films did show ideologies  critically  but  that  also the  film 
narrative  was  shaped  by  the  ideological  frame  of  the  society.  My  intention  is 
precisely  to  fill  the  gap  in  this  existing  analysis  of  Serbian  film that  Iordanova 
provided in her study, which I use as a form of a framework of my study. I intend to 
deconstruct  what  exactly  “Serbian  perspective”144 means  by  analysing  the 
representation of national and religious ideology in the selected films, and then to 
discuss its possible political subversiveness.
   
2.4. Conclusion 
In  this  chapter  I  surveyed  the  studies  from a  wide  range  of  literature  that  was 
pertinent to my research. Since this is an interdisciplinary study my resources were 
from different  fields  but  nonetheless  of equal  importance  for  the purpose of  this 
thesis. In the first part of this chapter I reviewed the field of film and religion in 
which I position this study.  From the rich body of literature I further focused on 
those works which informed my research. My aim was to consider how these diverse 
143 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p.143-147.
144 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p.143-147.
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discussions  enriched  my study  and  at  the  same  time  to  suggest  how this  thesis 
contributes to the field. 
In this study I am applying a cultural studies approach, which combines the analysis 
of text and context, film narrative and images and symbols. My analysis of the films 
which is combined with the analysis of the socio-political context of the 1990s, can 
be also considered as an approach to the film as a “social artefact.”145 My study of 
films is more focused upon how film reflects certain socio-political contexts and how 
films transmitted a specific ideological premise of that context. In this sense, I look 
at  how Serbian films construct  or  subvert  these ideological  contexts.146 I  analyse 
specific films which “fit the final aim of the project.”147 In this study I thereby further 
develop the “multi-dimensional” approach that Wright proposed. The field of film 
and religion in general lacks studies which focus on Eastern European, Balkan and 
Serbian cinema. None of the scholars have yet looked at how the films from this area 
inform us about religion and national identity,  how the cinema communicates  its 
cultural and socio-political contexts and whether these cinematic representations are 
critical and subversive. With this thesis I aim to bridge this gap.
Besides  the  literature  in  the  film  and  religion  field  in  this  chapter  I  reviewed 
literature  on  the  socio-political  background.  Besides  the  studies  on  Yugoslavia's 
downfall and the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, a useful source for my exploration 
on ideology were theologians and Church leaders  whose work represents a  vivid 
example  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  formed  within  the  Church.  Among  the 
literature  surveyed  I  have  not  found  any  systematic  study  on  this  issue,  which 
certainly deserves more attention. This thesis partially fills  this gap and proposes 
further investigation on nationalist-religious ideology in the Serbian contemporary 
context. 
In this chapter I also surveyed literature on Serbian cinema. Among the rich body of 
145 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
146 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 30.
147 Wright, Melanie: Ibid, p. 19.
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studies  which dealt  with different  aspects  of  the films and brought  up important 
questions I framed and summarized the most important ones for the purpose of this 
thesis.  The  work  of  scholars  such  as  Dina  Iordanova  were  a  foundation  of  my 
research  and  helped  me  in  identifying  the  most  important  issues  and  thus 
understanding the complexity of films and importance of considering the production, 
for example, in reading the films. Iordanova's approach based on contextual analysis 
aims to discuss the political connotation of Serbian films of the 1990s. Although her 
study  was  useful  and  inspiring  to  my  research,  I  find  that  this  approach  is  not 
sufficient for the exploration of the political nature of Serbian films. By looking at 
the  film  text,  context  and  the  visual  representation  of  the  nationalist-religious 
ideology I further develop the research in this area.
Among all the works that I discussed in this chapter I found a lack of analysis of 
cinematic representation of nationalist-religious ideology, and religious images and 
national  symbols  that  are  embedded  in  the  film text  and which  were  frequently 
overlooked. In this sense this thesis is contributing to film studies on Serbian cinema. 
I demonstrate that this approach can shed light on many issues that these scholars 
raised, from those on stereotypes, on Jameson's wild man of the Balkans to the one 
that  Iordanova  identified  as  “resistance  to  togetherness”  that  “has  become  an 
essential part of the concept of balkanisation.”148 This resistance of togetherness, as I 
demonstrate in this study, is rooted in the problem of the specific ideology employed 
by the specific political structures.
To sum up, by applying a cultural studies approach I extend the ways of reading and 
understanding  Serbian  films  and  their  context,  which  can  contribute  to  further 
understandings of the nationalist-religious ideology and its impacts. By looking at 
the cinematic representation of the nationalist-religious ideology in Serbian films of 
the 1990s, I extend the existing analysis, and I discuss this issue for the first time, in 
the field of film and religion, but also in the area of film studies in general.  Before I 
turn to the analysis of the films, in the next chapter I first discuss the socio-political 
148 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 8.
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context of the 1990s, which is important for the further discussion of Serbian cinema 
of the 1990s. 
  Chapter 3
The Socio-Political Context of the Milosevic Regime
3.0. Introduction
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the socio-political background in Serbia 
from  the  1980s  to  the  1990s  which  is  the  time  when  a  new  national  ideology 
appeared. The aim of this chapter is to explain the socio-political context in which 
the selected films of my case study were made. Serbian films depicted the socio-
political  context  of  Serbia,  and  portrayed  the  impact  and  consequences  that  the 
political ideology of the Milosevic regime had on the Serbian society, such as the 
escalation of the civil war, the change in the ideological discourse, and the growth of 
violence and crime in society. Many problems that I describe in this chapter were 
represented in the films, and critical  observation offers an insight into the social, 
economic and political collapse of one society trapped in a political ideology that 
lasted  for  more  than  a  decade.  This  brought  nothing  more  than  destruction  of 
previously known norms and values. My aim is not to identify the causes of the civil 
war, which would be not just an over - ambitious goal but would provide a rather 
simplistic  view  on  Yugoslavia's  disintegration.  I  look  rather  at  the  role  that 
nationalist-religious ideology had in promoting the Milosevic political ideas, as well 
as the impacts that this new ideological discourse had on Serbian society in general. 
I identify the main characteristics of the ideological discourse promoted in Serbia 
through selected socio-political events. The growing wave of Serbian nationalism in 
the late 1980s was enforced and exploited by Slobodan Milosevic, who at this time 
centralized his power and established his leadership. In the first section I look at the 
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period of the 1980s directly connected to the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic. 
Slobodan Milosevic was elected president of the Belgrade League of Communists 
City Committee in 1984. In 1986 he became president of the Central Committee of 
the Serbian League of Communists and in 1989 the first president of the Republic of 
Serbia. This is also the period of the formation of the political ideology embodied in 
nationalism, which characterized Milosevic's politics throughout the 1990s. Serbia 
embraced a new national ideology promoted by Milosevic's political apparatus, and 
which was an introduction to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the civil war. The main 
premises on which Yugoslavia was established, such as the one of brotherhood and 
unity, were undermined by the rise of nationalism.1 To provoke national tensions in 
Yugoslavia,  atrocities from the Second World War were brought back into view, 
which had previously been a forbidden theme and aggression was not so difficult to 
incite.  As Igor Krstic argues:
 When Tito died and European Communism fell, Serbian and Croatian nationalist 
narratives started to emerge, drawing strength from those memories that were  
pushed aside but  not  forgotten.  Like  individuals,  nations  must  confront  and  
understand past traumatic events before they can leave them behind and live  
normally. Too often, the ways of remembering traumatic memories of war have 
helped propagate historical cycles of violence instead of countering them.2 
Since I am looking at the function and role of the nationalist-religious ideology in the 
Milosevic  regime,  including  its  impact  and  consequences,  in  the  first  section  I 
discuss  the  very  beginnings  of  the  contemporary  Serbian  nationalism  and  its 
promotion in public discourse for the purposes of the regime, which contributed to 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the escalation of the war. Here I provide some 
1 Yugoslavia, established in 1918 as a Kingdom, collapsed in the last decades of the 20th century. 
Yugoslavia as the socialist country ruled by president Josip Brzo Tito was one of the founders of the 
non-aligned movement. The country  consisted  from several ethnic and religious groups. With the 
collapse of communism the Yugoslav ideal of brotherhood and unity was abandoned. In Serbia it was 
replaced with the new nationalist ideology which successfully imposed stereotypes of Serbs as 
Orthodox, Croats as Catholics and Bosnians as Muslims, a traditional and historical division that 
could not be overcome. 
2 Krstic, Igor: Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and Identity  
through Popular Culture,  http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/
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information  on this  period in  the  mid 1980s  and the  institutions  involved  in  the 
creation of a nationalist discourse for example, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts. 
I look at the role of the religious and mythological discourse in the new political 
ideology, with particular emphasis on the most misused cultural myth, the  Kosovo 
Myth. I discuss the main ideas of the Kosovo Myth,  which represented a blend of 
nationalist and religious ideology.  Important elements of the ideological discourse 
were national-religious myths, whose role and impact are a part of my analysis of 
nationalist-religious ideology as a political ideology of the regime. I discuss how the 
Serbian  Orthodox  Church  adopted  similar  mythological  language  in  its  public 
discourse  and how the Church positioned  herself  regarding the  so-called  Serbian 
national question.  I provide some information on the celebration, in 1989, of the six 
hundred years of the Kosovo battle as the event that united for the first time in the 
recent  history,  the Church and the  state.  A part  of  this  chapter  is  devoted to an 
explanation  of  the  development  of  the  nationalist-religious  ideology  within  the 
Church. I discuss  Svetosavlje ideology3, and its importance for determining national 
goals. Here I rely mostly on the definitions provided by the 20th century theologian 
Nikolai Velimirovic. In the second part I discuss how the ideas of Svetosavlje were 
reinterpreted  in  the  1990s  by  the  Church  leaders.  The  aim of  this  section  is  to 
demonstrate the close bond between religious institutions and the role the Church 
had in raising the nationalist awareness of the Serbs, which was used for the political 
purposes of the regime.
The  politics of the 1980s was characterised by the awakening of Serbian national 
identity and was imposed by the new Serbian elite which consisted of politicians, 
academics, writers and the church leaders. The discussions about the historical past 
of  Serbia,  its  religious  and  cultural  heritage  that  was  seen  as  suppressed  in 
Yugoslavia, drastically increased in the media in parallel with the  increase of a type 
of  national hysteria. The idea of expansion of Serbian territories to the areas where 
3 Svetosavlje refers to a specific form of the Serbian Orthodoxy, and is based on the work of Saint 
Sava.
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Serbs lived was represented first as a fight for the maintenance of Yugoslavia but 
later with the escalation of the Yugoslav civil war, as a national programme.4 As in 
the 19th century the Serbian national programme became a major theme in Serbian 
society.  This  issue  was  widely  exploited  in  the  media.  With  the  break-up  of 
Yugoslavia  and  the  beginning  of  the  conflict  in  the  1990s,  nationalist-religious 
ideology  was  continuously  promoted  both  by  the  regime's  and  the  church's 
representatives.
I consider the impacts and consequences of the regime's ideology on the media and 
Serbian society. A brief discussion on the mediascape in Serbia gives an insight into 
how nationalism and religion were propagated in a populist manner. Populism in the 
media was characteristic of the increase of a pseudo-historical content, both religious 
and  superstitious,  all  wrapped  together  in  the  discourse  of  local-patriotism.  The 
criminals whose lifestyle  was often promoted by the media, were  represented as 
Serbian patriots. In this way the criminalization of Serbian society was completed 
and justified under the umbrella of the ruling ideology. In the conclusion, I explain 
the importance of this chapter for the following analysis of the selected films.  
3.1. People against Liberals
In this section I briefly draw attention to the two dominant political ideas that seem 
to have overshadowed different political systems of former Yugoslavia and Serbia. 
4 The idea of all Serbs in one state or in other words greater Serbia existed in the 19th  century at the 
time  when  Serbs  were  struggling  for  liberation  from the  Ottoman Empire.  The  document  which 
outlines the aims of the Serbian national state was named Nacertanije and written by Ilija Garasanin 
(Outline, 1844). In this document he proposed “the expansion of Serbian territories to all areas in 
which Serbs lived.” Bennet, Christopher: Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, London: Hurst & Company, 
1996, p. 22.
Although this document should be observed and understood in the historical context of its time, some 
scholars drew parallels to the political situation of the 1980s.  A reference to medieval Serbia and the 
glorious past common for the 19th  century, aimed to lift the spirits of Serbs in the occupied territories, 
was also applied in the 1980s in the new political context, with the aim of completing homogenization 
of Serbs for the political purposes of the regime. Also the 19th century idea of the unification of all 
Serbs  was  now  renewed  in  the  concept  of  a  Greater  Serbia.  Greater  Serbia  was  a  demand  for 
independence  of  the  Serbian  areas  in  Croatia  and  Bosnia  and  their  possible  integration  into  the 
republic of Serbia. Some argued that both concepts were taken from Garasanin, while others historians 
such  as  Milan  St.  Protic  considered  it  as  a  consequence  of  Serbo-communism.  The  process  of 
homogenization required first the promotion of the idea of Greater Serbia.
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These  two  ideas  are  commonly  expressed  as  so  called  pro-liberal  and  people's 
ideology. My intention is not to provide in depth political analysis of these ideologies 
but rather to point out the basics of  the concept of the prevailing people's ideology. 
This is for two reasons. First, I believe that this discussion can shed  light on some of 
the crucial problems of  Serbian society at the end of the 20th century, in the first 
place the emergence of the nationalist-religious ideology which happened after the 
collapse  of  socialism  and  that  is  a  matter  of  further  discussion  in  this  chapter. 
Second,  this  additionally  helps  the  reading  of  the  films,  such  as  Premeditated 
Murder,5 which paints these ideological conflicts within the Serbian society. 
With no intention to over simplify this issue I briefly outline what the concept of the 
people's  option meant  in  the historical  and cultural  context  of Serbia  at  different 
periods of time. Serbia was a patriarchal society and the first attempts to create a 
modern state,  at  the end of the 19th but also throughout  the first  part  of the 20th 
century, were characterized by “the conflict between patriarchalism and modernity.”6 
The Church contributed to this process by supporting the concept of patriarchalism, 
and of the strong nation state based on its historical heritage, the so-called ideals of 
Svetosavlje and  the Kosovo Myth,  ideologies which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. These ideals, according to the Church, shaped a specific ethos of the Serbian 
nation to which Serbs should return rather than embrace the principles of the modern 
European state, which was in local terminology also named the Western concept. 
The 19th century was characterized by the conflict between the liberal and patriarchal 
stream, through “the conflict of Slavophils (Socialists and Radicals) with Westerners  
(Liberals).”7 According to Latinka Perovic, the Radicals’ politics embodied the idea 
of  the  people’s  state  rather  than  the  civilian  state  introducing  traditional 
collectivism.8 Serbia kept its traditionalist view of “political monism as an expression 
of  a  homogenous peasant  society,  inseparability  of  the Church and the state,  the 
military  influence  on  politics,  elements  which  were  integrated  into  the  new 
5 This film will be discussed in chapter 4.
6 See Perovic, Latinka: Izmedju anarhije i autokratije: srpsko drustvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-
XXI), Beograd: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Ogledi Br. 8, 2006, p. 71. 
7 Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 21. 
8 Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 43-44. 
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Yugoslavian state.”9  
The introduction of communism with the establishment of Tito's Yugoslavia, brought 
out another form of collectivism embodied in communism, diametrically opposed to 
the  concept  of  Western  capitalist  individualism.  Communism represented  the  so-
called people's option, and successfully carried out the ideal of collectivism. This 
susceptibility  came  as  a  result  of  the  influence  of  Orthodox  faith,  as  Berdyaev 
argued: 
    Individualism  is  foreign  to  Orthodoxy,  to  it  belongs  a  particular  
collectivism…but  the authentic  freedom of  religious  conscience,  freedom  
of the spirit, is made evident not in an isolated autonomous personality, self-
asserted in individualism but in a personality conscious of being in a super 
personal spiritual unity, in a unity with a spiritual organism, within the Body 
of Christ, i.e. the Church.10
In the same fashion, and similarly to politicians of the so called people's option11 of 
the  19th century,  Serbian  theologians  of  the  20th century  argued  against  the 
individualism  (my  italics)  of  Western  society,  claiming  that  Orthodoxy  had  an 
important role in Serbian society that should not be neglected, as this would mean 
separation from Serbian tradition, culture and identity. This tradition, in the opinion 
of the Church, should be integrated into the socio-political life in a way distinct from 
Western democracies, which are more anthropocentric.12 This idea, supported equally 
by the Church and some political parties, remained as one of the political concepts 
that lived the longest political life in Serbia. Despite changing political parties,  it 
survived in its basics, constantly opposed to what is known as the concept of the 
9 Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 24. 
10 Berdyaev, Nikolai: The Truth of Orthodoxy,  http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/Philosophy/Sui-
Generis/Berdyaev/essays/orthodox.htm
11 Latinka Perovic wrote about narodnjacka opcija, people's option as a political concept. For details 
see Perovic, Latinka: Ibid.
12 “There is less of Trinitarian expression in Western Christianity, it is more Christocentric and 
anthropocentric. This difference is noted in Eastern and Western patristic, where the first theologises 
from the Divine Trinity and the second, from the human soul.” See Berdayev: Ibid. 
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modern  Western  state.  This  political  form  survived  many  turbulent  events  and 
systems in Serbia and returned in a new form in the 1990s. In the socio-political 
context of the 1990s it was conceptualized through the idea of a people's national 
state  in  which  this  new national,  so-called  people's  spirit  finds  its  expression  in 
national  hegemony.  Some  of  the  basic  postulates  of  this  people's  option  were 
reintroduced in the 1990s, when the Church proposed the above-mentioned ideas, 
such as unity of the church and state, based on the concept of Svetosavlje ideology. 
At the same time politicians embraced the return to 19th  century collectivism and 
adopted the populist discourse of the people's option. A reinforced people's option 
was fully developed by former communists and by Milosevic's apparatus, to become 
a new form of expression of the modern Serbian  nationalism. The main concept of 
this idea can be found in the nationalist-religious ideology of the 1990s, as a new 
form of  'people's  option'  at  the  end of  the  20th century.  Liberals  in  this  context 
represented all Milosevic's ideological opponents in Serbia, who were struggling at 
the same time against the regime and for the concept of the modern, democratic state 
based on the Western European model.13  In the next sections I discuss in more detail 
the period of formation of the political ideology of the 1990s, its main characteristics, 
and the events that determined the socio-political future of Serbia. 
3.2. The Rise of Serbian Nationalism
     
 “Mother Nation: 
     I revoke your right to bear first names, the right to a surname and a family 
tree. All as one, all unanimously, at once, in the blink of an eye, because they 
have been chosen; because they wish to ascend, the whole nation as one  
notion, one craft, one space station. I revoke the verb “want” and I urge you 
to “have to”! I order everyone to share the same destiny, and to be uniform, I 
order the women to grow beards, the men to grow hair, order everyone to  
13 The ideological opponents of Milosevic should not be confused with his political rivals. Political 
rivals, such as Vojislav Kostunica, leader of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) for example was 
opposing Milosevic's politics but ideologically supported this people's option  helping nationalist-
religious ideology to survive even after Milosevic's downfall in 2000. 
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look  alike,  I’m  endorsing  collective  facial  surgery,  cancelling  unique  
fingerprints,  and forbidding the brain from functioning as an independent  
organ; forbidding diversity in blood pressures and mentalities! I demand from 
all people to breathe in at the same time, and breathe out when I say so, no 
differences will be tolerated!
I introduce death as a historical obligation and life as a matter of choice,  
completely, definitely and irrevocably: I REVOKE!”14
Biljana Srbljanovic, Pad (The Fall, 1999)
Political tensions in Yugoslavia increased in 1987. After the Eighth Plenum of the 
Central  Committee  of the Communist  Party of Serbia  it  was  clear  that  Slobodan 
Milosevic directed a new political discourse. Milosevic discredited his political rivals 
and took over the political apparatus and the media which,  from this time, he held 
firmly  for  more  than  a  decade.15 Nevertheless,  in  the  years  to  come,  Slobodan 
Milosevic  for  some  Serbian  analysts  represented  not  so  much  a  nationalist  as  a 
ruthlessly ambitious person prepared to use any possible ideological concept to gain 
and save his power.16 
Milosevic's politics, embodied in nationalistic discourse, were presented to the public 
as  a  fight  to  maintain  Yugoslavia.  The  nationalistic  rhetoric,  also  recognized  as 
populism (my  italics),  was  based  on  re-interpretation  of  Serbian  and  Yugoslav 
history, glorification of the Serbian nation through the revival of national mythology, 
and on an introduction of pseudo-historical facts, which included a so-called “hate 
14 Biljana Srbljanovic: Pad (The Fall, 1999), http://pescanik.net/content/view/860/129/; Last 
accessed: 1/01/2009. My translation.  
15 Among the first political rivals that Milosevic discredited were Ivan Stambolic, Dragisa Pavlovic 
and federal prime-minister Ante Markovic. Ivan Stambolic (Serbian president from 1986 to 1987) was 
a mentor of Milosevic but became his opponent. He was assassinated in 2000 by the Special 
Operation Unit of the Milosevic regime, which also assassinated Serbian Prime-minister Zoran 
Djindjic (2003).  Dragisa Pavlovic, for example, opposed Milosevic's politics regarding Kosovo and 
he was expelled in 1987. See Traynor, Ian: Ivan Stambolic, 
www.guardian.co.uk/serbia/article/0,,926742,00.html; 
http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/258/t258-1.htm,; http://www.b92.net/specijal/stambolic/, 
Also Bennet, Christopher: Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, London: Hurst & Company, 1996, p. 90-96. 
16 Bennet, Christopher: Ibid, p. 83. 
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speech”, an exclusive language against other nationalities of former Yugoslavia. The 
first  document  that  introduced  the  public  to  this  new  national  ideology  was  a 
Memorandum of  the  Serbian  Academy  of  Sciences  and  Arts.  The  fact  that 
institutions like this were involved in this political process shows that Milosevic had 
the  support  of  academics  and  intellectuals  in  Serbia.  One  of  the  most  important 
remained  Dobrica  Cosic,  academic  and  writer  with  a  communist  past,  who  is 
recognized as a 'father' of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. Dobrica Cosic was also 
president  of  the  Serbian  Academy  of  Sciences  and  Arts  at  the  time  when  this 
institution  actively  participated  in  the  creation  of  a  new  political  consciousness 
aligned  with  Milosevic's  political  programme  and  when  the  Memorandum was 
written. 
In the Memorandum,  published in 1986, for the first time after the Second World 
War,  the  position  of  the  Serbian  nation  in  Yugoslavia  was  discussed.  Recent 
Yugoslav history was reinterpreted and presented as unjust to Serbs. For example, 
Tito's Yugoslavia was seen as an anti-Serb state in which Serbian national identity 
was  continuously  suppressed.17 Furthermore,  Serbs  were  recognized  as  the  most 
suffering nation in Yugoslavia, from World War II to the latest events.18 Ongoing 
problems in Kosovo were also marked as “genocide” of the Serbian population. The 
Kosovo problem that appeared in the 1980s was widely discussed by the Serbian 
politicians, academics and Church representatives, and represented the turning point 
in Milosevic's career.  The Albanian population, which acquired more independence 
within Yugoslavia, was labeled as separatist. Problems that were arising throughout 
the 1980s, including the migration of Kosovo Serbs from this province to other parts 
of Serbia, were characterized as an “exodus”, although some analysts considered this 
17 See the whole text of Memorandum: 
http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/memorandumSANU.htm. Last accessed: 10/10/2008.
18 “In less than fifty years, over two successive generations, the Serbian nation has been exposed to 
such severe trials: twice exposed to physical extermination, to forced assimilation, to religious 
conversion, to cultural genocide, to ideological indoctrination, and to the denigration and renunciation 
of their own traditions beneath an imposed guilt complex, and thereby disarmed intellectually and 
politically, that they could not but leave deep spiritual wounds that cannot be ignored as this century 
of the great technological takeoff draws to a close...No other literary and artistic heritage is so 
disordered, ravaged, and confused as the Serbian heritage. The political criteria of the ruling ideology 
are imposed on Serbian culture as being more valuable and stronger than scientific or historical 
criteria.” http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/memorandumSANU.htm
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as  an  “economic  migration”.19 Socio-political  circumstances  in  Yugoslavia  after 
Tito's death and the Kosovo crisis were used by the authors of the Memorandum for 
introducing the Serbian national programme and a demand for the solution of the 
Serbian national question.20 “The Memorandum also proposed rationalization of the 
political system and the opening of a political crisis.”21
The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was one of the institutions that supported 
the process of the mythologization of the nation, a process justified by the Kosovo 
Myth, one of the major nationalist-religious myths of Serbs. Its reinterpretation in the 
late 1980s provided a new perception of the historical vocation of the Serbian nation 
supporting the official political stance.
3.3. The use of the Kosovo Myth in the Formation of the Political Ideology
Nationalism was strongly connected to the Orthodox religion. National identity has 
strong bonds with religious identity and therefore the nationalist discourse in Serbia 
was inseparable from religiosity. Serbian Orthodoxy was suitable for the political 
purposes of the regime: in the first place it offered a new sense of identity instead of 
brotherhood and fraternity.  We may say that  in  the late  1980s national  ideology 
replaced the previous communist one. Religiousness was politically included in the 
process of homogenization. In fact it was a precondition for this process as “Serbian 
nationalism was grounded in religious mythology and symbolism.”22 The national 
myths most exploited for political purposes were the Kosovo Myth and  the ideology 
of St Sava called Svetosavlje. 
The Kosovo Myth was strongly present in the public discourse, especially in the late 
19 Bennet, Christopher: Ibid,  p. 93. 
20 The politicians and Serbian intelligentsia frequently repeated this phrase in the media. The Serbian 
national question pertains mainly to the question of Serbian territories but also to national identity, 
culture, religious identity, territories and political attitude towards pro-Western ideas.
21 Milosavljevic, Olivera: “Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke” in Popov, Nebojsa (ed.): Srpska strana 
rata, Beograd: BIGZ, 1996, p. 313-314.
22 Duijzings, Ger: Religion and the Politics of the Identity in Kosovo, London: Hurst & Company, 
2000. p. 177.
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1980s.  Already  mentioned  in  relation  to  the  Kosovo  crisis,  representation  of 
Albanians in the media as separatists, and discussions of Serbian suffering foreran 
Milosevic's political actions such as replacement of the Albanian leaders with new 
appointees and a change of the Constitution. The new amendments opened a political 
crisis  in Kosovo which resulted in demonstrations and bloodshed, but also in the 
establishment of Milosevic's power. The problems and actions in Kosovo province 
were justified by drawing parallels with the  Kosovo Myth, or in other words they 
were represented as a  fight for the renewal  of Serbian integrity  on this so-called 
sacred land, where historically Serbs had been exposed to suffering and persecution. 
There follows an outline of the main characteristics of the Kosovo Myth reinforced in 
the 1980s. 
The myth is based on the epic reinterpretation of the historical event that occurred on 
the 28th of June 1389 on the Kosovo field (Kosovo polje). The battle between the 
Serbian army, headed by the Serbian Duke Lazar Hrebeljanovic, and the Ottoman 
army,  headed  by  Sultan  Murad,  ended  with  the  death  of  both  leaders  and, 
consequently,  Serbia  soon  lost  its  independence.  The  battle  was  seen  as  a  clash 
between two civilizations and religions, Christianity and Islam, and it remained one 
of  the  most  famous  battles  preserved  in  Serbian  national  epics  and culture.  The 
tragedy in Kosovo and a legend of Duke Lazar are described in the epic song The 
Fall of the Serbian Empire, which became the basis for the Kosovo Myth. The main 
character,  Lazar,  is  described  as  a  Christ-like  figure,  while  the  events  have  a 
supernatural character. According to the legend, Lazar receives a glorious message 
from God, who confronts him with two possible choices, of the “kingdom of earth” 
and the “kingdom of heaven.” If he chooses the first one, he will win and if chooses 
the  second  one,  he  will  die  along  with  his  whole  army  but  will  gain  Christ’s 
kingdom. Before the battle Lazar has his last supper, where the tragedy to come is 
revealed  by  betrayal  by  one  of  his  knights,  Vuk  Brankovic.  Vuk  Brankovic’s 
character represents Judas' character. Lazar chooses the “kingdom of heaven”, which 
represents his acceptance of martyrdom for Christ. 
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This acceptance is the central moral message that an unknown storyteller emphasizes 
throughout the song. It suggests Christ-likeness as an ideal; and many theologians 
referred  to  Lazar’s  decision  not  as  an  individual  act,  but,  rather,  as  an  act  that 
embodies the orientation of the Serbian nation towards Christ. The story depicts a 
strictly  ethical,  moral  concept  of  the  battle  rather  than  dealing  with  concrete 
historical facts. Its central motif is the idea of Christian suffering and martyrdom for 
Christ. Before the battle Lazar calls all Serbs to come to Kosovo, and those who do 
not come will be cursed by the Duke's curse (Knezeva kletva).23 The words that Lazar 
supposedly said on this occasion are engraved in the monument of Gazimestan where 
the battle took place. The words of Knezeva kletva were used in the 1980s as a form 
of political message which was a call to the new national battle for Kosovo, through 
which Serbs will regain their lost national integrity. In this way, the battle of Kosovo 
is moved into the “extra-temporal conflict that stands outside the sphere of politics, 
economics and history.”24 
Just war, in the context of the Kosovo Myth, is understood as a defensive war. The 
definition of a just war according to the Kosovo Myth was successfully transferred to 
politics in the 1980s and 1990s, and the civil war was represented as a defensive war 
of Serbian territories and culture. The political use of the  Kosovo myth created an 
illusion that the interests of warlords and political leaders were identical with the 
interests  of  the  nation.  The  interests  of  the  nation  were  defined  by  the  same 
mythological language and by the premise that Serbs are a Christ-like nation which 
suffers for Christ and as such has a unique place and importance in human history. 
This  is  the  reason  why the  phrase  Kosovo  testament25 (my  italics)  appears  as  a 
popular  reference  to  Lazar’s  decision.  The  Kosovo  testament is  interpreted  as  a 
covenant between God and the Serbs, which is analogous to the covenant between 
the Hebrews and God in the Old Testament. Within the Church, the Kosovo battle is 
perceived  as  it  is  in  the  epic  song:  Serbian  defeat  has  mysterious,  supernatural 
23 “Whoever does not fight at Kosovo, may he have no children born to him...may nothing give fruit 
that his hands sows, neither the white wheat, nor the red wine, his blight rot all his brood while it 
endures”.
24 Duijzings, Ger: Ibid, p. 196.
25 In Serbian: Kosovski zavet. My translation. 
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reasons; It is a mystery that reveals the true meaning of the battle as an orientation 
towards Christ. The Serbian nation is perceived as the nation historically faced with 
the choice between the “kingdom of heaven” and the “kingdom of earth.”26 
Suffering became  a  synonym  for  Serbian  post-Kosovo  history. The  use  of  the 
Kosovo  Myth resulted  in  the  glorification  of  nationhood,  emphasizing  Serbia’s 
suffering and historical injustice, followed by a particularly misused phrase during 
the 1980s, “heavenly Serbia.”27 The revival of the Kosovo myth represented a blend 
of  nationalist  and religious ideology which,  as  such,  had the aim of determining 
Serbian  political,  cultural  and  spiritual  life.  Ethnicity  and  religiosity  are  equated 
through the image of Lazar. Lazar’s orientation towards the “kingdom of heaven” 
embodies both Serbian nationalist and religious ideas. In the 1990s both the Church 
and the state insisted on a martyr-like image of Serbs. The suffering of the Church 
and clergy during and after the Second World War was recognized as a continuous 
martyrdom and the suffering of the Serbian people was perceived as a Christ-like 
suffering.  The  idea  of  martyrdom  has  strong  religious  roots.  However,  Lazar's 
orientation towards the “kingdom of heaven” in the context  of the 1990s was to 
legitimize the civil war as the just battle for revenge over Kosovo and other so-called 
historical injustices committed against Serbs. 
 
3.4. The Church and the National Question
Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church adopted this mythological language 
in their public appeals in the 1980s. After fifty years of suppression, the Serbian 
Church returned into the public sphere regaining its social voice. During the 1980s 
the Church that was coming out of its marginalized position saw in this new situation 
a chance to restore the Church's integrity within society, from the restoration of its 
public voice to the negotiation of property issues. On the other hand, the Serbian 
Church was historically always closely connected to the state.  The connection of 
26 See: Velimirovic, Nikolaj and Popovic, Justin: The Mystery and Meaning of the Battle of Kosovo, 
Illinois: The Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese of the United States and Canada, 1989.
27 This term was frequently used in Milosevic's media throughout the 1990s. 
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Orthodoxy to national identity and their preserving each other in times of crisis had 
an important impact not just on the perception of Christianity as such but also on 
theological thought in Serbia, characterized by the close link between religion and 
the nation. The adjective Serbian as a name in the Orthodox Church was introduced 
in 1920, which was a result of the long historical  connection of the Church with 
nationhood.28 The historical circumstances after the fall of Serbian lands under the 
Ottoman  Empire  and  the  hard  position  of  Serbs  caused  the  Serbian  Church  to 
embrace the role of a keeper of nationhood and its culture. “The  Serbian question, 
became an element and form of religion.”29 This brought Serbian Orthodoxy close to 
the problem of εθνοφιλια30 but also influenced Orthodoxy in the late 1980s causing it 
to  receive  more  of  a  shape  of  religious  ideology,  which  may  be  observed  as  a 
consequence of the above mentioned historical experience of the Serbian Church and 
a tradition of participation in the national struggles for liberation and preservation of 
cultural identity.31
New political attitudes towards the Church in the 1980s overlapped with growing 
nationalism in the public sphere, and this overlapping is one of the pointers to the 
way in which the politics of Serbia started changing drastically as compared with the 
previous, communist period. The Church at the same time becomes more concerned 
with the Serbian national question and consequently, later on, with the question of 
territorialism.  From 1984,  for  example,  genocide  became a theme in  the  Church 
press, especially after the mass graves of the Serbian victims from World War II 
were  opened.  The  opening  of  these  mass  graves  was  politically  manipulated,  to 
remind Serbs of their historical suffering, especially those who lived on the territories 
of Croatia and Bosnia. In the media, both Milosevic's and the Church press, Serbs 
were  portrayed  as  a  heroic  nation  who  suffered  at  the  hands  of  fascists  and 
28 Paraphrased. See Radic, Radmila: “Crkva i srpsko pitanje” in Popov, Nebojsa: Srpska strana rata, 
Beograd: Bigz, 1996, p. 268.
29 Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 24. My translation.
30 The Greek word which can be translated as ethnofiletism. It is used to mark a heresy when the 
Church puts the nation above Christ.
31 The Serbian Orthodox Church was a kind of a substitute for the state in  times of crisis. For 
example, during the Ottoman Empire Church leaders often participated in the struggles for liberation. 
Petar I Petrovic Njegos (1747-1830)  who was bishop of the Orthodox Church and the ruler of 
Montenegro, began a liberation war and defeated the Ottoman army in 1796 in the battle of Krusi. 
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communists more than any other nation of former Yugoslavia, as was also expressed 
in  the  Memorandum  mentioned  earlier.  Suffering  is  strongly  emphasized. 
Reinterpretation  of  history,  growing  nationalism after  the  period  of  communism, 
sudden clericalisation of society, all resulted in the sacralization of the nation, based 
on a populist interpretation of history and religion. In this way a nationalist-religious 
ideology was formed in the public discourse, and was mainly used to support and 
justify political actions of the Milosevic regime. The contribution of the Church to 
this process in the 1980s was needed too, and this is probably one of the reasons why 
Milosevic's populists exploited religion to this extent. 
On the other hand the Church press also expressed its concern for the position of the 
Serbian  nation,  and  published  a  number  of  articles  in  its  official  newspaper 
Pravoslavlje on the themes of genocide, the Kosovo Myth and the importance of the 
restoration of national  and religious identity  among Serbs.  Representatives  of the 
Serbian Church started to create public petitions about the Kosovo crisis. An appeal, 
signed by three of the most eminent theologians (later bishops), strongly demanded 
protection  of  Serbs  and  Serbian  culture  in  Kosovo.32 “In  1983,  Pravoslavlje 
published selections from the book by the bishop Atanasije Jevtic  Od Kosova do 
Jadovna (From Kosovo to Jadovno), which listed the sufferings of Serbs from the 
Second World War to the current Kosovo crisis.”33 Many others who published texts 
aimed  to  explain  a  mystical  meaning  of  the  Kosovo  Myth for  Serbs,  and  its 
importance for preserving Serbian identity and a specific Christian ethos. In one such 
article Kosovo is described not just as a territory but as a “metaphysical creation...on 
a higher existential level.”34  “In 1987, the Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
for  the  first  time  used  the  term  genocide  to  describe  the  position  of  Serbs  in 
Kosovo.”35  The arguments of the Serbian Orthodox Church had strong connotations 
similar  to  those  of  the  Serbian  Academy  of  Sciences  and  Arts  seen  in  the 
Memorandum: Serbs were perceived as victims of the Yugoslav state and as a nation 
32 “Twenty one priests and Bishops Atanasije Jevtic, Irinej Bulovic and Amfilohije Radovic signed 
this appeal.” See Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 269-270. 
33 Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 271.
34 Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 271.
35 Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 271.
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that had been exposed to cultural, social and spiritual suppression and discrimination, 
including genocide. 
3.5.  The Celebration of  the Kosovo Battle  and the Cooperation between the 
Church and the State in the Creation of Political Ideology
How the two ideologies found the same path was evident in the celebration of the 
600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle in 1989. The Serbian Church took an active 
part in preparations for the celebration. As a part of these preparations during 1988 
the relics of St Lazar of Kosovo were carried throughout Serbia. On this occasion, 
“Bishop  Jovan  introduced  the  phrase  “heavenly  Serbia”  in  the  context  of  the 
suffering of the Orthodox Serbs from the Kosovo battle till the present day.”36 This 
term was later exploited both by the politicians and the Church throughout the 1990s. 
On the 24th of June, just four days before the celebration, Politika newspapers, at this 
time already in hands of the regime, published the speech of future-bishop Atanasije 
Jevtic, which was delivered in the Gracanica monastery on the 19th of June in front of 
the relics of Prince Lazar. This speech reflected not just an ecclesiastical greeting to 
the martyr but also many of the attitudes of the church that were in accordance with 
official politics. The strong emphasis is on the martyrdom of the Serbian people, but 
it also provides good news of the national renewal after a period of suffering and 
persecution. Bishop Atanasije greeted Prince Lazar with the following words, which 
recall a possible answer to the aforementioned  Knezeva kletva  (Duke's curse) and 
certainly signify a new age in Serbian socio-political life:
       You have come to us now when we are upright again…Thank God and you, 
now we are on the right way not to revenge but to protect our honour; Tt  
protect not just the Constitution but the noble position of Serbia…we promise 
you here in Kosovo, in Gracanica, today and tomorrow on the field of the  
battle in Gazimestan, that we will answer your call – to fight, continuing the 
Battle  of  Kosovo:  for  the  return  of  the  lost,  for  the  resurrection  of  the  
36 Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 278. 
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insensible, for the rise of the overturned, for the restoration of the destroyed.37
The Kosovo event in 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle, represented 
the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and the  state,  as  this  was  the first  time that  Church representatives  and political 
leaders appeared together, unified in the first public broadcasting of the Liturgy. This 
unity  was  based  on  “Serbian  national  interests.”38 The  Kosovo  celebration  was 
recognized by the official media as the biggest gathering of Serbs in the century, and 
represented a visual introduction into a decade of civil wars and destruction of the 
country.  This  event  had  tremendous  political  and  ideological  importance  for  the 
victory of  pro-nationalist  forces  and at  the same time for  the introduction of the 
Church  into  the  political  scene  of  Serbia.  It  had  a  symbolic  meaning  as  the 
awakening of Serbs after half of a century under communism where their national 
identity was perceived to have been suppressed.  The nation elected a new leader, 
Milosevic, who established his power in Serbia and over the primary Serbian media 
centres.  The  hate  speech  that  emerged  at  this  time  against  other  nations  of 
Yugoslavia, spread by the state media through the populist discourse, was a call to 
arms.  Milosevic’s  appearance  at  the  celebration  of  the  600th anniversary  of  the 
Kosovo  battle,  on  the  28th of  June  1989,  turned  into  political  triumph,  and  was 
probably the highest point of Milosevic’s popularity among Serbs. On this occasion 
Milosevic stated: “After many centuries we stand again before the battles which are 
not armed, although armed battles are still not excluded.”39   
The Church neglected Milosevic’s communist orientation and embraced the offer of 
public space. The extent to which the whole Church supported the idea of a greater 
Serbia is arguable, but certainly her leaders, with their participation in the war issues, 
contributed to the image that the state and the Church had a tendency towards the 
37 Jevtic, Atanasije: Pred mostima Kneza Lazara u Gracanici, Politika, 24.6.1989, p.12.
38 The most common attitude of the Serbian elite is probably best reflected in the words of Slobodan 
Milosevic: “ In this Europe we will enter not as lackeys who ridicule their own state and its 
institutions…but we will enter this Europe as equals and in our own socialist way”.  Politika, 
24.05.1989 Quoted in Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p. 41.    
39 Tanjug vest: Gazi Mestan, 28. jun 1989, Politika, 29.6.1989, p. 8.
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same ideal of the nation-state, and the same political goals. The cult of the nation 
prevailed in the Serbian theological notion that to be Orthodox meant to be a Serb 
and vice versa. Similarly to the intellectuals of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, some Church representatives saw Yugoslavia as a grave of Serbian national 
interests. 
3.6. Development of the Religious-Nationalist Ideology within the Church
Religiousness represented one of the essential elements of the nationalist ideology, 
and this is the reason why I call the ideology of the 1980s and 1990s nationalist-
religious ideology.  Nevertheless from the 1980s,  the relationship between Church 
and  the  state  varied,  sometimes  resulting  in  open  conflicts  between  the  two, 
especially after Milosevic’s political failure regarding Serbs in Krajina (Croatia) and 
Bosnia.  Despite the existence of political  misunderstandings on crucial  questions, 
Church  representatives  supported  the  creation  of  a  religious  ideology  within  the 
Church and  used a rhetoric based on national mythology in their communication 
with the public. For the Church leaders, the nation represented a religious category. 
For example, the term “heavenly nation” was promoted by the Church to associate 
Serbian nationhood with Orthodoxy. Such an attitude supported the conflict between 
modernity  and  patriarchalism,  on  which  Latinka  Perovic  wrote,  and  the  Church 
expressed a natural tendency towards patriarchal society. In this sense we may argue 
that the period from the 1990s represents re-traditionalization and clericalization of 
Serbian society.  
3.6.1. Historical Background, Religious Ideology expressed through Svetosavlje 
From the  perspective  of  Serbian  Orthodoxy,  this  process  was  strongly  based  on 
Svetosavlje ideology, which bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic tried to define. Svetosavlje, 
expressing  the  ideological  concept  of  the  uniqueness  of  Serbian  Orthodoxy,  was 
intended to provide a strong basis for the foundation of the nation state and cultural 
values. The concept of nationalism embodied in this term, however, confronted the 
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Church and the popular perception of Orthodoxy with the aforementioned problem of 
ethnofiletism. Velimirovic’s work, as well as the work of later Serbian theologians, 
reflected the conflict between the liberal view and the idea of a people’s state. 
The  ideals of Svetosavlje in the ideological and pro-national context appeared in the 
1930s. This term derives from the name of Saint Sava, the first Serbian Archbishop.40 
Svetosavlje  is  a  synonym  for  Serbian  Orthodoxy,  a  specific  form of  Orthodoxy, 
which does not  have any liturgical  or canonical  differences from other Orthodox 
churches. It also preserved strong ideological connotations by representing political 
views on the  organization  of  the  state  and its  core  values.  The main  ideological 
assumptions of Svetosavlje were presented for the first time in the work Nationalism 
of St Sava written by Bishop Nikolai Velimirovic.41 His definition of Svetosavlje is 
directly connected with the idea of nationalism. Velimirovic here elaborated Serbian 
nationalism  through  the  “St  Sava  nationalism.”42 Before  Velimirovic  nobody 
characterized St Sava’s work by explicitly using this term. The St Sava nationalism 
certainly reflects the political aspirations of that time in Serbia, and Velimirovic’s 
work should also be read in this context.  One aim of Velimirovic’s work, we may 
argue,  was  to  provide  a  theological  justification  and  to  legitimize  the  national 
programme43 based on the Orthodox heritage. Here Velimirovic expresses his faith in 
the religious-nationalist vocation of Serbia both in the Balkans and in the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. Apart from descriptions of the virtues of St Sava, it was recognized as 
the  basis  for  personal  and  national  enlightenment.  Velimirovic  defined  St  Sava 
nationalism, as “multiple and fruitful activity and the effort that St Sava expressed, as 
40 Rastko Nemanjic,  St  Sava, (1171-1236) was the son of the founder of the Nemanjic  Dynasty, 
Stefan Nemanja (1109-1199). St Sava organized the Serbian Orthodox Church and became its first 
Archbishop in 1219. Sava also restored the abandoned monastery Hilandar on  Mount Athos, which 
became the centre of Serbian Christian monastic life. St Sava is also considered the father of Serbian 
independent literature. His most important works are the Kareya Typicon and Hilandar Typicon, both 
guides for ascetic life, and  Nomokanon, the first Serbian Law Codex. Serbian Orthodox Christians 
celebrate Sava as patron saint of education and medicine since the 1830. See Bogdanovic, Dimitrije: 
Sveti  Sava,  http://www.rastko.org.yu/knjizevnost/liturgicka/svsava-sabrana/svsava-sabrana_01.html; 
Last accsessed: 19/3/2007.
41 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Nacionalizam Svetog Save,  
http://www.verujem.org/savremeni_teolozi_azbucni.htm 
42 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
43 National programme is translation from Serbian and means political programme for one nation.
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a real European, for his people.”44 St Sava’s nationalism, according to Velimirovic, 
includes “the people’s national church, the people’s national dynasty, the people’s 
national culture, and the people’s defense.”45 
To elaborate these ideas I discuss Velimirovic’s definitions. The first two reflect his 
belief in the Church as a liturgical organism which is in συμφωνια46 with a dynasty of 
people who are bonded by the same blood, language, morals, customs, and faith.47 
“The people’s state” is perceived as a national state. The boundaries of that national 
state,  interestingly,  can  spread  to  the  areas  where  that  same  nation  lives,  while 
anything  beyond  these  boundaries  he  classifies  as  an  act  of  imperialism  and 
alienation from St Sava’s ideal. This political claim escalated in the 1980s and 1990s, 
when the church on many occasions, re-introducing a specific form of Svetosavlje as 
its programme, repeated it in more direct ways. In that sense, if the boundaries of the 
national state spread to the territory where “the people” live, then Serbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia ought to unite under their country of origin, Serbia. This Serbian national 
question returned as a central political question for the Serbian Church in the 1990s. 
Further, according to Velimirovic, national culture as an expression of “the people’s 
mind”, was shaped by St Sava’s work.48 The main virtue of education Velimirovic 
finds in “restraint from the misuse of knowledge.”49 The “misuse of knowledge” is a 
reference  to  contemporary  Europe,  as  “Velimirovic  believes  that  the  West  was 
alienated from Christ.”50 This criticism of the West is evident in the work of other 
Serbian theologians of the 1990s which I briefly discuss later. “The People's national 
defense”  on  the  other  hand  he  defines  through  the  people’s  army,  based  on  a 
voluntarily  principle of patriotic  and moral  obligations.  The only aim of national 
44 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
45 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
46 Greek word that can be translated as symphony. Refers to the harmony and unity between the 
emperor and the church.
47 See Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
48 Translated from Serbian. The term “people's mind” Velimirovic uses deliberately to suggest that 
the nation has a form of single, spiritual mind. SeeVladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
49 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
50 Nedeljkovic, Sasa: Mit, religija i nacionalni identitet: Mitologozacija u Srbiji u periodu 
nacionalne krize, http://web.f.bg.ac.yu/download/33nedeljkovic,%20mitologizacija.pdf, p.4.
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defense is to protect its own people and national state, not to lead conquering wars 
nor to destroy other nations and countries. Although Velimirovic considers the use of 
the military only when all other political solutions are exhausted, this concept again 
found its echo in the 1990s. Not only does Velimirovic suggest the definition of a 
‘just war’ but also he provides a basis for the later perception of the Yugoslav civil 
war as a war of protection of the Serbian people, their lands and culture.     
These  are  the  main  ideas  in  which  St  Sava's  nationalism  is  rooted  according  to 
Velimirovic. Velimirovic provided a theoretical model of a strong nation-state built 
on Svetosavlje. The basis and centre for St Sava's nationalism is the people’s national 
church.51 Velimirovic  also  defined  this  type  of  nationalism  as  “Evangelical 
nationalism.”52  He argues that this evangelical nationalism is not racist, but protects 
the nation from both imperialism and internationalism.53 The nationalism elaborated 
in  this  work  provided  a  solid  ground  for  the  expression  of  a  new  religious 
nationalism in the 1990s, enabling the union of national and religious ideology. At 
this  time  the  work  of  Nikolaj  Velimirovic  which  overlapped  with  the  crisis  in 
Yugoslavia and the beginning of the civil war, also was revived; Velimirovic's work 
became a basis for the understanding of Svetosavlje and in Church circles his ideas 
were frequently applied and reinterpreted as St Sava's original ideas. 
3.6.2. Religious Ideology in the 1990s and the Reintroduction of Svetosavlje 
The  return  to  St  Sava’s  ideals  and the  Kosovo  Myth  in  the  1990s  represented  a 
politicization  of  religion.  Politicization  remained  as  one  of  the  major  problems 
throughout the 1990s. For example, in one of the books published by the Orthodox 
Metropolitan  of  Montenegro  in  1996 called  The  Philosophy  of  War,  a  group  of 
authors considers the question of war from a theological point of view and in order to 
justify the Yugoslav conflict.54 This book embodies the main postulates on which the 
51 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
52 Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
53 Paraphrased, see Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic: Ibid.
54 One of the authors published in the book is Radovan Karadzic, currently a fugitive indicted for war 
crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.
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religious ideology was based. The writers use phrases such as “heavenly orientation”, 
“self sacrifice”, “war as sacrifice for the most sacred”, “crucifixion of the nation”, 
and “false peace and defensive war.”55 Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic are at 
the same time recognized as mythical heroes.56 The civil war is here perceived as a 
“defensive  war”  that  Serbs  waged  for  the  protection  of  their  sacred  lands  and 
identity, while the intervention of the West in the Yugoslav conflict is seen “on the 
geopolitical plan, as the war that post-Christian civilizations headed by the United 
States (piedmont of the new Western world), are leading against the vestiges of the 
Euro-Asian Christian civilization.”57 In this context, the role of the Serbian people is 
to defend their Christian national heritage, not just from the communists, who started 
the civil war, in Jevtic’s opinion, but also from the “new world order”, a populist 
slogan used equally by the state media and the Church representatives to describe the 
Western political attitude towards the Balkans. For example, Western Europe is often 
described as a single, undifferentiated region, which has abandoned Christ and has 
became a source of evil, turning humans into slaves of material things.58 In populist 
language,  the  church  leaders  called  democracy  “demonocracy”59 and  “ironically 
compare  it  to  Stalinism.”60 The  solution  that  they  proposed  was  rejection  of  the 
Western concept of the democratic state and a return to St Sava’s ideal “that will help 
us to shape our own future.”61
According to some sociologists of religion in Serbia, the Church was continuously 
expressing  her  stance  against  secularization,  introducing  at  the  same  time  a 
55 See Group of Authors: Jagnje Bozije i zvijer iz bezdana, 
http://www.mitropolija.cg.yu/duhovnost/jagnje/
56 Zurovac, Mirko: “Sta nam se stvarno dogodilo ili “Prozivodnja lazi” u sluzbi militarnog 
imperijalizma” in Group of authors: Ibid.
57 Jevtic, Atanasije: “Najgori od svih mogucih ratova”, in Group of Authors: Ibid.
58 Perovic, Latinka: Ibid, p.40. 
59 In the Church press and speeches of Church representatives ‘Western’ democracy was often called 
‘demonocracy.’ “The lie was proclaimed as truth, demonocracy was proclaimed as democracy, 
tyranny was proclaimed as freedom.” Metropolitan Amfilohije: Bolje nam je s Hristom pljuvan biti i  
krst njegov nositi,
http://mitropolija.cg.yu/dvavoda/besede/mit_bs-niksic_99_l.html
60 Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva i  novi srpski identitet, 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/srp/Studija-Kupres.pdf, p. 5. 
61 Metropolitan Amfilohije: Ibid, http://www.mitropolija.cg.yu/duhovnost/m-amfilohije-
prosvetno_predanje.html
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retrograde concept of the state that is not grounded in a multi-confessional or a multi-
national society, but, rather, organized on the principle of “God-king-householder.”62 
This principle reflected how the Serbian Church was always more in favour of the 
idea  of  the  people's  state  and against  the  liberal  views.  During the  19th and  20th 
centuries,  there  was  a  strong  sense  of  resistance  within  the  Church  against 
“modernism” which was seen as the westernization of Serbia. Among many reasons, 
the strongest argument that leading theologians provided was that Serbia would lose 
its cultural identity in this process. They held that the Serbian national state should be 
established on ideals and principles based on Orthodox Christianity.
Territorial questions remained a concern of the Church: the borders of the republics 
of former Yugoslavia were seen as a communist division of territories, and as unjust 
towards  these  Serbs  who  lived  in  Croatia  and  Bosnia.  This  discourse  certainly 
enabled, if not supported, the nationalistic claims of the Serbian elite, and was one of 
the  rhetorical  pillars  of  the  Milosevic  regime;  Serbian  wars  were  presented  as 
“always defensive wars.”63 The description of Milosevic as a traitor reflects again the 
claim that the Church remained as the one and only defender of nationhood, accusing 
Milosevic,  not  of  actually  causing  the  war,  but  of  betraying  Serbian  national 
interests.64
Svetosavlje  and  the  Kosovo  Testament became  a  form  of  ecclesiastical-national 
programme and became an ideology of the leading Serbian theologians. In spite of 
their  conflict  with  Milosevic,  the  Church  leaders  never  abandoned  the  national 
programme of the unity of Serbs under the umbrella of Orthodoxy and the ideology 
of Svetosavlje.65 The anti-western attitude also supported a sense of self-isolation and 
xenophobia,  elements  on  which  the  Milosevic  regime  fed.  The  regime  used  the 
62 See Milan Vukomanovic in Zasto se u Crkvi sapuce, Insajder, B92, 19. maj 2005. 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?nav_id=167819&yyyy=2005&mm=05
63 Jevtic, Atanasije: Ibid 
64 “...this was a heroic war, at least in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina. These people 
honorably sacrificed their lives, suffering at the hands of their neighbours and the NATO bombing...to 
be betrayed by a traitor, the biggest in our history, the president of Serbia, Milosevic, whose betrayal 
has not finished yet.” Jevtic, Atanasije: Ibid.
65 See Vukomanovic, Milan: Ibid, http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/eng/Studija-Vukomanovic-
eng.pdf
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Church to secure its  political  legitimacy.  The Church leaders,  on the other  hand, 
came into conflict with Milosevic at the time when it appeared to them that he had 
abandoned  Serbian  interests.66 “The  Serbian  Orthodox  Church  did  not  treat  the 
‘national  question’  as  a  separate  political  problem but  as  a  form and element  of 
religion, which therefore represented national and not just religious institutions.”67 
The impact of the frequent use of mythological  language in the public discourse, 
promoted equally by the church leaders, media, academics and politicians, created an 
illusion of close bonds between the present and the past.68 
The so-called glorious past was used to give meaning and explanation to Serbian 
politics, and its ideological premise was that Serbs are “protectors of the most rare 
civilization  values”  and  against  the  “modern  materialism”  of  the  West.69 
Reinterpretation of national history and the use of the national myths were common 
among both the politicians and the Church leaders. Religion had an important role in 
this process. As Ivan Colovic argues, “national myths become cults”, “pre-military 
training” and therefore “suitable for war propaganda.”70 Therefore, we may conclude 
that from the 1980s, a specific form of nationalist-religious ideology was formed in 
the public discourse of Serbia. By supporting and participating in this ideological 
discourse,  Serbian  theologians  estranged  themselves  from traditional  teaching  on 
unity  in  Christ,  since  the  “ecclesiastical  perception  of  a  community  of  people  is 
opposite to any ideology of domain and blood.”71
66 See Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 295-296.
67 Radic, Radmila: Ibid, p. 302.
68 Paraphrased Colovic, Ivan: Politika simbola, Beograd: Fond za otvoreno drustvo, 2000, p. 11-12.
69 Colovic, Ivan: Ibid, p. 15.
70 Colovic, Ivan: Ibid, p. 109.
71 Peno, Zdravko: Hriscansko rodoljublje po Svetom Apostolu Pavlu, Beograd: Teoloski pogledi 
1/03, 2003, p. 33. 
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3.7. Ideological Impacts on the Media and the Serbian Society
In  the  1990s,  this  nationalist-religious  concept  became  a  folding  screen  for  the 
nationalists whose political actions were justified as a continuous fight for Orthodoxy 
and Serbdom. In parallel with the rise of nationalism and the escalation of the war, in 
Serbian society organized crime and violence increased. Criminalization of society 
was completed through the legitimacy given to criminals, who became leaders of 
different  paramilitary  formations  or  worked  for  the  state.72 Apart  from  their 
participation in the battlefield, they were also famous for political murders ordered 
by  the  regime.  Milosevic's  State  Security  unit  was  connected  to  crime  and  was 
behind assassinations of the journalists of independent media.73 Although Milosevic 
never  officially  banned  independent  media,  their  work  was  under  continuous 
suppression, and they were marked as “domestic traitors” and “foreign solvents” by 
the regime's media.74  The journalists of the independent media were under constant 
pressure or threats to their lives. The state media was at the same time continuing its 
political propaganda whose aim was indoctrination of its citizens. Nevertheless, the 
existence of the independent  media was an excuse for  the regime to support  the 
picture of Serbia as a democratic state.  
The economic sanctions and growing poverty caused by the galloping inflation in the 
1990s  was  the  time  when  tycoons  appeared.  In  order  to  distract  citizens  from 
corruption and the crime, the regime transmitted reports from the battlefields. The 
regime's media were using the war to justify the total economic and moral collapse of 
the society. The nationalist-religious ideology was required to promote a politically 
72 For example, the paramilitary formation “Tigers” was headed by a criminal Zeljko Raznatovic 
Arkan. Arkan worked for the state and was closely bound to Milosevic's regime. He was also famous 
as a leader of fans of the football club “Red Star.” Fans of the “Red Star” were well known in the 
1990s for their nationalism. Arkan was assassinated in 2000. 
73 Among the journalists whose murders are still not solved are Slavko Curuvija, assassinated in 1999 
and Dada Vujasinovic, assassinated in her flat in 1994.
74 One of the independent Serbian media that were under continuous attack by the regime was 
Belgrade located Studio B and B92. The first played an important role from the demonstrations of the 
opposition in 1991 until 1996, when it was taken under the regime's control. Studio B was liberated in 
2000. B92, was first Radio station and later TV, played an important role throughout the 1990s. This 
station also had important roles in the October revolution in 2000 and in Milosevic's downfall. See 
Masic, Dusan: Talasanje Srbije, knjiga o radiju B92, Beograd: Samizdat, 2006, p. 460-479.
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suitable image of the war and its warlords. The state media were silent about the war 
profiteers  and  focused  on  the  ideal  of  a  Serbian  warrior  as  an  honorable  hero. 
Colovic discussed this concept as the myth of the Serbian warrior who has “manly 
courage” and “the soul of a maiden.”75 Criminals were participating in TV shows 
which frequently presented ordinary people with ideals and values, but with slightly 
different paths in life.76 The villains were often represented in the media as national 
heroes, glorified and compared to the Serbian generals from the First World War. A 
criminal life style was variously promoted and violence in the media became a part 
of every day life. “Television talk shows, films, the daily news, boulevard magazines 
and newspapers were flooded day in and day out with these spectacles of past and 
present public violence.”77
Entertainment programmes promoted the symbols of Milosevic's culture, a culture of 
isolation which had its own values and rules. Television Pink, one of the new TV 
stations established in the 1990s and mainly made for entertainment, was under the 
control  of  Milosevic's  wife,  Mirjana  Markovic,  whose  political  party  was  called 
Jugoslovenska Levica (Yugoslav Left). This TV station, nowadays a media giant in 
the Balkans, introduced turbo-folk music and false glamour in an economically and 
politically weakened Serbia. Folk-singers were often connected with criminals and 
criminal life styles.78 TV Pink was dictating new values, and became a synonym for 
the Milosevic culture of the 1990s. 
75 See Colovic, Ivan: Ibid, p. 66-67.
76 The TV show Crni Biseri(Black Pearls) was one of the most popular shows on TV Politika in the 
1990s. The journalist Vanja Bulic hosted many criminals, people with a 'suspicious past' and those 
connected with them. 
77  Krstic, Igor: Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and 
Identity through Popular Culture, Other Voices, V.2, N.2, (March 2002), 
http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/index.html
78 One of the turbo-folk icons and celebrities of TV Pink was Svetlana Raznatovic-Ceca, also well-
known as a wife, now widow, of the aforementioned criminal and warlord Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. 
Her lifestyle was represented in the media as a modern Serbian fairytale crowned with her marriage to 
the most famous Serbian “patriot” Arkan. Like her husband, who wore a big Orthodox cross around 
his neck on special occasions, Ceca also “posed” with Orthodoxy. In one of her concerts she had a 
church choir and a big Orthodox cross as scenery while she was singing to Jesus. Their glamorous and 
problematic celebrity images promoted new values of an easy money and no ethical boundaries 
lifestyle in an economically exhausted Serbia, where ordinary citizens were struggling for the basics 
of life. 
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Some of the TV and radio stations were transmitting national songs, which were 
glorifying heroes from the First World War and anti-heroes, such as  chetniks from 
the  Second  World  War.  This  increased  historical  content  in  the  public  media 
prevailed in Serbia, which was overwhelmed with figures from the so-called heroic 
past, who had been neglected during the Tito era, but who were now in the service of 
the new regime's ideology.  From the 1990s,  on the streets  of Serbia there was a 
whole market of historical and religious symbols that street-salesman were offering 
to  the  nationally  awakened  consumers.  Isolation  of  Serbia  from the  international 
community  through  the  sanctions  and  embargo  only  strengthened  the  Milosevic 
regime in various ways, supporting xenophobia and nationalism.  
Throughout  the  1990s,  Orthodox  symbols  were  widespread  and  increased  in  the 
public  sphere.  Symbols  such  as  Orthodox  crosses  and  icons  became  a  form  of 
modern iconography which was exploited by many, from folk singers to paramilitary 
formations.79 Criminals  and  paramilitaries  were  demonstrating  their  belonging  to 
Orthodox Christianity  usually wearing big golden crosses, but also asking blessings 
from the church leaders for the war operations.80 Orthodoxy was presented in the 
media,  which devoted a significant space to religious customs, celebration of the 
saints, church gatherings and so-called TV catechism. In parallel with the increase of 
the Orthodox content, the number of so called media prophets increased. The goal of 
these prophets was not just to read the destiny of the interested viewers but also to 
predict the future of Serbia. They were giving optimistic prophecies in which they 
79 Many organizations with clear pro-nationalist and even pro-fascist programmes embraced 
Orthodox symbolism on their web sites. Often their programme was represented as a fight for “moral 
resurrection” of Serbs. The notorious brigade JSO (Special Operations Unit) also known as Crvene 
Beretke (Red Berets), whose leader was recently convicted for the assassination of the Serbian Prime 
Minister Dr Zoran Djindjic in 2003, have on their web-site links to the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate 
and to other web pages of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Their hymn also included a verse  which 
invoked the glorious past of the medieval Nemanjic dynasty. One of their songs posted on the same 
site called “ Christ Oh God” represents a song of the soldiers who are leaving for the battle of Kosovo. 
The same song is used in the film of Zdravko Sotra The Kosovo Battle (1989). See 
http://www.crveneberetke.com. For other organizations see also http://www.svetijustin.cjb.net/, 
www.nomokanon.org.yu, http://stari.dverisrpske.com/, http://www.obraz.org.yu/, 
http://www.vidovdan.org/.
80 On the video clip of paramilitary formations Scorpions, we see this paramilitary troup gathered 
around an Orthodox priest who is giving them a blessing before they go to Srebrenica. See Serbs 
Tried over Srebrenica video, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4544498.stm 
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saw a prosperous future only with president Milosevic at the head of Serbia. 
Pseudo-history,  religion,  myths  and superstition were a part  of mediascape of the 
Milosevic  regime.  Combined  with  glamorous  TV  Pink  entertainment  and  war 
propaganda they created a  public  opinion in which every voice  of  diversity  was 
threatened to be persecuted if not terminated. Serbian independent media, writers and 
intellectuals were under continuous different threats, and as the rest of the opposition 
in Serbia was constantly under the attack. The massive protests of the students and 
citizens in Serbia were ignored and numbers of participants underestimated by the 
state TV RTS, popularly also called “TV Bastille.” In the late 1990s the continuous 
propaganda  of  “TV Bastille”  caused a  wave  of  protests  in  Serbia:  citizens  were 
coming out on their balconies hitting pots at the time when the national news started, 
which  produced  a  synchronized  sound  in  the  cities,  as  a  symbol  of  a  changed 
perception of the Milosevic media. 
The  populist  perception  of  Orthodoxy  imposed  by  the  regime's  media,  its 
contemporary  connection  to the  rise  of  nationalism,  and the  interpretation  of  the 
religious-nationalist myths are some of the problems depicted in the selected Serbian 
films of my case study. The modern iconography of Orthodoxy is strongly connected 
to the criminalization of society and the new life style promoted in the media. How 
the  films  depicted  the  connection  of  Orthodoxy  and  nationalism  to  the  social 
problems and the war will be analyzed in the following chapters.  
3.8. Conclusion
 
In this chapter, I considered the concept of the political ideology of the 1990s, its 
formation and emergence into the public sphere. I discussed some of the important 
socio-political events which are connected to the creation of the political ideology of 
the Milosevic regime and its public affirmation. My aim was to shed light on the 
development  of  the  nationalist-religious  ideology,  both in the  political  scene  and 
church circles, and its populist promotion in the public discourse, which left long 
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term consequences on Serbian society. I first considered the period of the 1980s, the 
time of  formation of  the national  ideology and the  time when Milosevic  rose  to 
power.  This is the period of the change of political discourse which now shifted 
towards nationalism. The  Memorandum of  the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, as the first document which stated these new political premises, is discussed in 
this chapter since it provides the best insight into the new political ideology.  
I also considered the reintroduction of national myths into public discourse and their 
political use. In parallel  I analyzed how the Serbian Orthodox Church,  politically 
revitalized,  considered  the  Serbian  national  question  and  responded  to  the  new 
political challenges of the 1980s. Consequently, with changes in the political course, 
the introduction of nationalism into the public sphere and a return to Serbian tradition 
and Orthodoxy, at the end of the 1980s the nationalist-religious ideology became part 
of  the  Milosevic  regime.  The  emergence  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  as  a 
political program is demonstrated in the analysis of the celebration of the Kosovo 
battle in 1989. I emphasized the political importance of nationalist-religious myths 
which were now used for the purposes of hegemonization of Serbs, the emergence of 
nationalism,  and  justification  of  the  war  to  come.  At  the  end  of  this  chapter  I 
discussed  the  main  impact  and  consequences  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  in 
Serbian society and media.  
The reason I introduce readers to the socio-political background is because it deepens 
reading and understanding the Serbian films. First contextualization of Serbian films 
only enriches discussion on whether and to what extent a film can be subversive 
when  it  is  communicating  within  a  certain  ideological  frame.  Understanding  the 
political context provides us with information regarding the extent to which films 
communicated within the ideological discourse of the 1990s and how it influenced 
their potential criticism. Also the content analysis makes more sense if it is done in 
parallel with a context analysis.
 
Second, Serbian films dealt with the Serbian society of the 1990s and depicted some 
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of the main problems that occurred during the Milosevic regime. To understand what 
the  films  described  and  more  importantly  whether  they  accurately  expressed  the 
criticism  of  the  socio-political  problems  or  they  were  just  taking  sides  requires 
understanding of the main  issues  in  Serbia  at  that  time.  In other  words it  is  not 
possible  to  understand  the  potential  subversiveness  of  the  film  text  without 
understanding the socio-political background and the ideology that stood behind the 
war and the regime. Whether or not the Serbian films were subverting ideological 
premises of the regime cannot be considered without firstly understanding the main 
characteristics  of  this  political  ideology and its  impacts,  which led  to  a  changed 
perception of the social, political and cultural issues in the Serbian public sphere. 
Therefore  to  consider  how  the  films  subverted  the  premises  of  the  nationalist-
religious  ideology  it  is  necessary  first  to  know  and  understand  this  ideology. 
Subversion of the populist ideology that was still widely accepted in Serbia in the 
late 1980s and during the 1990s, represented not just disclosure of the regime and 
revelation of the real truth about the regime's machinations but also a serious blow to 
the  political  structures  and  main  Serbian  institutions,  Academy,  media  and  the 
Church  for  whom  this  ideology  embodied  what  was  at  that  time  considered  as 
Serbian identity. To attack Serbian identity at this time meant to attack the regime's 
ideology  and  many  journalists,  artists  and  writers  who  dared  to  do  so  where 
commonly  seen  as  domestic  traitors  and  were  threatened  or  assassinated  by  the 
regime.  
Selected  films  depicted  the  national  ideology  of  Serbian  society.  Religious 
symbolism,  for  example  as  we  will  see  further  in  the  analysis,  stands  often  in 
connection  to  nationalism.  Therefore  we  can  read  them and  understand  only  by 
contextualizing them. Serbian films paint the impact that these two ideologies had on 
Serbian  society.  Films  also  portrayed  a  shift  from  one  ideological  discourse  of 
Yugoslavia to the new, nationalist one which also resulted in the reinterpretation of 
recent history.  This common view of Yugoslav history in the 1990s, expressed in the 
aforementioned Memorandum is transfered into the films, as a part of their portrayal 
of the characteristics of the ruling ideology. All this shows that not only did the films 
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depict an emergence of the new ideology but also they provided some of its main 
characteristics. In this sense, many Serbian films of the 1990s dealt in different ways 
with the question of Yugoslav history, such as Yugoslavia as an artificial state or the 
revival of Serbian history, from the medieval period to World War II. This issue will 
be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.   
The  films  also  dealt  with  the  criminalization  of  society,  growth  of  violence  and 
media  propaganda,  the  issues  highlighted  in  the  last  section of  this  chapter.  The 
media  was  a  mechanism  through  which  the  ruling  structures  imposed  political 
ideology on society,  and the great impact of media influence is represented in the 
films. The problem of media propaganda, depicted in the films, remains one of the 
main  characteristics  of  Milosevic's  regime.  Serbian  media  did  not  work  as  for 
example Rwandan media did, which openly called people to genocide, but the “hate 
speech”  spread  by  the  regime's  media  together  with  the  lists  of  undesirable 
journalists  were nevertheless  in  the service of  war  propaganda and persecution.81 
Criminalization of society and violence were supported and shaped by the media. 
“Violence and destruction as a way of life found its expression in the whole cultural 
domain, from popular music and culture, music videos and tabloid press, to theatre 
drama and  cinema.”82 The  authors  of  the  selected  films  offered,  to  a  significant 
extent,  a  picture  of  Serbia  of  the  1990s,  defined  by  ideological  propaganda,  a 
populist  form of  Orthodoxy,  the  increase  of  crime  connected  to  the  break-up of 
Yugoslavia,  and  the  civil  war.  To  understand  the  socio-political  background  is 
crucial for the reading of the selected films. The socio-political discourse created in 
the late 1980s, outlined in this chapter was depicted in the films, and was one of the 
criteria for the selection of these particular films.
81 Paraphrased from Serbian, see Marko Milanovic in Pescanik: Savrsena oluja, 1. February 2008, 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/pescanik.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&nav_id=283597; Last accessed: 
5/02/2008.
82 Kronja, Ivana: Violence as a Cause of and a Response to Frustration: Serbian Cinema and 
Violence Culture, 1990-2004, http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:5Coonc6ecZ8J:www.inter-
disciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/kronja%2520paper.pdf+do+koske+critique&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&g
l=uk&client=firefox-a; Last accessed: 15/12/2008.
95
Chapter 4
Cinema as Socio-Political Critique
4.0.Introduction
In this chapter I discuss a range of different Serbian films produced during the 1990s. 
I focus upon films which dealt with the break-up of Yugoslavia and the civil war but 
also  with  the  consequences  of  the  Milosevic  regime  on  Serbian  society.  In  this 
chapter first I briefly focus on the Black Wave, the specific cinematic tradition that 
developed within Yugoslav cinematography, and which is important for the further 
discussion of the cinema of the 1990s. 
There are several reasons why I discuss the  Black Wave movement in this chapter. 
First my aim is to point to this specific tradition of politically engaged (my italics) 
cinema  that  influenced  later  directors  in  this  region.  Black  Wave had  particular 
importance for its socio-political criticism of society because of which some scholars 
recognized it as “cinema of resistance.”1 Second this discussion provides a historical 
context of Serbian cinematography. The term Serbian cinematography here refers to 
the films made after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and by directors located in Serbia. 
The history of Serbian cinematography was however hard to discuss separately for a 
long period of time as it was a part of the Yugoslav film industry.2 In this sense this 
discussion  is  important  for  contextualization  of  later  cinematic  developments  in 
former Yugoslavia and Serbia.3 
1 See Bjelic, Dusan: “Global Aesthetics and the Serbian Cinema of the 1990s” in Imre, Aniko, ed.: 
East European Cinemas, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p.105.
2 Serbian  film  to  a  great  extent  developed  in  Yugoslavia.  What  Serbian  cinematography  really 
represents,  its  historical,  political  and cultural  specifications  is  a  matter  of  further  studies  on the 
Balkan  and  Yugoslav  film.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  analyze  the  focus  that  Serbian 
cinematography had on war and historical themes from its early beginnings. This is certainly because 
of  the  specific  historical  circumstances  in  which  Serbia was,  but  also shows the  attention of  the 
filmmakers gave to socio-historical events rather than to other themes. 
3 The critical voice that cinema had during the socialist era can be good ground for future analysis of 
Balkan cinema and new and different  forms of  socio-political  criticism in the post-war period in 
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The next  reason for  considering the  Black Wave is  in  the  fact  that  some of  the 
auteurs continued their work in the 1990s, providing important reflections on the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. My intention is not to compare these two periods but rather 
to identify the most important aspects of this movement at the time. In the discussion 
of Serbian cinematography of the 1990s the influences of the Black Wave should not 
be  overlooked,  as  the  filmmakers  were  strongly  engaged  with  the  socio-political 
situation and as I will demonstrate, subverted some of the ideological premises of its 
time. In order to understand the films that I further analyse it is vital to put them 
within their specific cinematic context. To understand the 1990s cinemascape it is 
important  to  know  different  traditions  that  possibly  influenced  Serbian 
cinematography.
In the second part of this chapter I explore the Serbian cinema of the 1990s. The 
discussion  of  the  cinemascape  starts  with  a  film  that  was  made  just  before  the 
Yugoslav break-up at  the end of  the  1980s,  The Kosovo  Battle (Boj na Kosovu, 
Zdravko Sotra, 1989) because of its distinctive propagandist aspect and connection to 
the ideological discourse of the Milosevic regime. I then discuss the range of films 
produced during the 1990s. I  narrow my discussion according to the themes that 
prevailed in the film narrative: violence, civil war and the depiction of ideologies.  I 
discuss different perspectives that filmmakers bring to the same subject, which is the 
tragedy of  Yugoslavia  and the establishment  of  the  new ideological  discourse  in 
Serbia,  which  gradually  led  to  the  break-up  of  Serbian  society  in  an  economic, 
cultural  and moral  sense.  In this  chapter  I  identify  several  films for their  unique 
approach in depicting the regime's ideology and its consequences on Serbian society. 
I  analyze,  for example,  Keg of Gunpowder for its  specific  cinematic  portrayal  of 
violence and  Premeditated Murder  for its depiction of ideologies and their impact 
on society and the people. 
Finally in my conclusion I also briefly outline why in the next chapters I further 
analyse two specific films,  Pretty Village, Pretty Flame and Wounds. This chapter, 
Yugoslav region.  
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therefore,  together  with  chapters  5  and  6  represent  one  coherent  piece  on  the 
exploration  of  the  cinematic  representation  of  nationalist-religious  ideology,  the 
socio-political and cultural issues that the films depicted and the subversive aspects 
of these representations.
4.1. Historical Context: The Black Wave Movement
In this  section I  consider  the  Black Wave movement  that  emerged in Yugoslavia 
during the 1960s.  My aim is to point to the tradition of politically engaged films in 
Yugoslav cinematography whose strongest example is the  Black Wave movement. 
This  movement  represented  the  beginning  of  the  new  era  in  the  Yugoslav 
cinematography. In the first place the  Black Wave demonstrates how film can be a 
good platform for social-political criticism. A brief review of this movement explains 
the  importance  that  films  had  in  contemporary  society  but  also  shows  their 
interdependence upon official policies in the region of former Yugoslavia. 
 
Yugoslavian  film  critics  claimed  that  the  approach  to  film  making  in  Tito’s 
Yugoslavia  differed  from  the  social  realistic  approach  established  in  other 
communist  countries.4 Yugoslavia  had  an  open  market  for  so-called  Western 
cinematography  and  at  the  same  time  developed  film  schools,  including  the 
institutions  such  as  the  Yugoslav  Film  Archive,  now  Film  Archive  centred  in 
Belgrade, all of which  influenced the creation of a strong film culture in this region.5 
It  was  in  these  specific  socio-political  and  cultural  circumstances  that  the  most 
famous auteurs of the Yugoslav cinematography developed their skills. Film auteurs 
were inspired with the French New Wave and the Italian Neo-realism, especially by 
authors  such  as  Goddard  or  Truffaut,  and  the  Black  Wave movement  may  be 
4  Pop Trajkov, Igor: In Search of Happiness, Zelimir Zilnik Interviewed, 
http://www.kinoeye.org/02/03/trajkov03.php; Last accessed: 15/03/2008. 
5 Yugoslav Film Archive  is the national film library of the Republic of Serbia, founded in 1949 as 
The Central Film Archives of the Yugoslav Film Library. Its status varied during the years; according 
to the Law on the Protection of the Monuments of Culture it  is ranked today as an institution of 
special importance for the Republic of Serbia. Yugoslav Film Archive is one of the founders and a 
permanent member of FIAF, http://www.kinoteka.org.yu/eng1.htm; Last accessed: 19/09/2008.
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considered as a part of the New Wave.6 
4.2.1. Auteurs and Their Films
In the 1960s with the appearance of auteur film the conventions of social realism in 
the  arts  were  completely  abandoned.  The  1960s  auteurs did  not  pay  too  much 
attention  to the  cosmetic  representation  of  socialist  life  but  instead turned to the 
exploration of reality. They had no interest in demagogy but expressed intellectual 
criticism of different social and political deviations, which no one had spoken about 
before in the world of cinema. This cinematographic movement remained famous as 
the  Black  Wave.  The  group  of  filmmakers,  such  as  Aleksandar  Petrovic,  Dusan 
Makavejev,  Zivojin  Pavlovic,  Kokan Rakonjac,  Marko  Babac,  Zelimir  Zilnik,  or 
Purisa Djordjevic, explored themes from ordinary life and revealed many negative 
aspects  of socialism. This  broke existing socio-political  taboos.7 Such ideological 
criticism, where artists spoke freely on the most sensitive issues, was too much for 
the  establishment.  While  the  state  bureaucrats  were  puzzled  by  the  political 
correctness of this new cultural appearance, a wave of similar films swept across the 
cinema world. 
Zivojin Pavlovic's masterpieces, such as Awakening of Rats (1967) and When I am 
Pale  and Dead (1968),  provided completely  new perspectives  on the ideological 
premises  of  Socialist  Yugoslavia  since  “Pavlovic  did  not  accept  any  thematic 
limitations and his criticism was often transformed into cynical naturalism.”8 This 
film,  as  other  films  of  the  Black  Wave,  reflected  the  auteurs'  personal  gaze  on 
ongoing issues in society.  Alexandar Petrovic is one of the Black Wave filmmakers 
whose  films  gained  international  reputation.  His  film  Three  (1965)  received  the 
6 Paraphrased from the Serbian language: Alexandar  Petrovic was inspired by Antonioni,  Zelimir 
Zilnik by Godard while Dusan Makavejev was more influenced by Soviet avant-garde films. Tirnanic, 
Bogdan: Tajna istorija Jugo filma, www.profil.co.yu/prikazitekst.asp?Tekst=62; 
Last accessed 15/06/2007.
7 The new film auteurs were usually divided into the Belgrade, Zagreb or Ljubljana group according 
to the film centres and experimental styles they practised. See Goulding, Daniel: Liberated Cinema:  
The Yugoslav Experience, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 72-77.
8 Volk, Petar: Srpski Film, Beograd: Institut za Film, 1996, p. 88.
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award at the Karlovy Vary Film Festival, and Feather Gatherers (1967), won Palme 
D’Or at the Cannes Film Festival. Petrovic's success was not enough to protect him 
from the pressures from the top. His open criticism of the state dogmatism was seen 
as rebellion.9 Finally, after the affair around the film Plastic Jesus  (1973) made by 
his student Lazar Stojanovic, Aleksandar Petrovic had to leave his post at Belgrade 
Film Academy.10
The next film of the  Black Wave,  Early Works (Rani radovi, Zelimir Zilnik, 1969) 
won a  Golden Bear  at  the  Berlin  Film Festival.11 Zilnik’s  personal  sensibility  in 
dealing with the failures of socialist doctrine was viewed as an attempt to undermine 
basic principles on which Yugoslavia was established. It was hard to prove all the 
charges against Zilnik’s film, especially when the film became very popular with the 
so-called “liberal  audience” and was recognized as “an alternative cinema.”12 The 
issue of freedom of artistic expression became a subject of debates. Tributes to Zilnik 
could not stop the criticism that was coming from the Government which resulted 
with  the  persecution  of  the  Black  Wave filmmakers.  Zilnik’s  film  was  the  first 
Serbian film against which a court case was held. After controversial debates that 
this film produced in public, Early Works was in the end not officially forbidden.13 
Dusan Makavejev, one of the most internationally famous Black Wave auteurs was 
also a target  of state  criticism based on similar  arguments.  His  WR Mysteries  of  
9 Volk, Petar: Ibid, p. 92.
10 Aleksandar Petrovic, www.answers.com/topic/aleksandar-petrovic-writer-director-
cinematographer-drama; Last accessed: 10/06/2007.
11 Zelimir Zilnik is one of the prominent Serbian directors. His film opus includes feature films and 
documentaries. Some of the films for which he is remembered is his first feature film Rani Radovi 
(Early Works 1969), Nezaposleni ljudi (The Unemployed, 1968), Lijepe žene prolaze kroz grad 
(Pretty Women Walking Through the City, 1985), Tako se kalio celik (How Steel Was Tempered, 
1988), Tito po drugi put medju Srbima (Tito for the Second Time Amongst the Serbs, 1993), Dupe od 
mramora (Marble Ass, 1995), Kud plovi ovaj brod (Wanderlust, 1998), Tvrđava Evropa (Fortress  
Europe, 2000). Since 1980 he has been formulating a specific language of docu-dramas. He founded 
the Teresianum production company in Budapest in 1993. The following year he helped in initiating 
video and television production for the most radical and independent media in Yugoslavia at that time 
- B92 in Belgrade. His feature and documentary dramas are regarded as cult films not only in former 
Yugoslavia’s alternative scene. Zelimir Zilnik, http://www.isolacinema.org/05e/?page_id=195; Last 
accessed: 15/06/2007.
12 Volk, Petar: Ibid, p. 91.
13 Volk, Petar: Ibid, p. 91. 
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Organism (1971) raised many debates on the moral and political aspects of the film. 
The film had great success at international festivals and at the same time was banned 
in Yugoslavia.  The power structures perceived the content and symbolism in this 
film as “counter-revolutionary and unacceptable.”14 “WR” in the title of film was 
associated with Wilhelm Reich, a controversial imprisoned psychologist. Makavejev 
refers to Reich to express “his own disgust of both communism's hatred of creativity 
and  capitalism’s  idolatry  of  consumerism.”15 The  film  represented  a  call  for 
liberation, both political and sexual, which is a common theme in all his works. At 
the same time the story remains “a satire on communism.”16 The affair raised by the 
film resulted in the end in Makavejev’s leaving the country.17
In spite of the success at international festivals, in Yugoslavia the auteurs and their 
films were subjected to political persecution. The positive reception of films abroad, 
was  considered  in  Yugoslavia  as  a  “conspiracy  of  world  imperialism  against 
socialism.”18 The criticism that  films expressed  and  new cineaste  style  were  too 
much for political structures and the films were banned. 
4.2.2. Ideological Criticism
The  appearance  of  auteur  film  brought  a  new  approach  and  perspectives  into 
cinematic expression. The criticism expressed through these films was clearly stating 
the need for social and political  changes. Because of their controversial character 
films were perceived by the political structures as a threat to the existing order and 
state establishment. The bureaucratic system overlooked the larger perspective that 
the films provided. Their criticism was not aimed only at communism but also at 
capitalism. In spite of political repercussions, the films of the Black Wave represent 
the golden age in the cinematography of Yugoslavia.  One of the famous  auteurs, 
14 Volk, Petar: Ibid, p. 92. 
15 Morris, Gary: Sweet Movies: Four Films by Dusan Makavejev, 
www.brightlightsfilm.com/33/makavejev.html; Last accessed: 13/08/2007.
16 Morris, Gary: Ibid. 
17 Morris, Gary: Ibid. 
18 Tirnanic, Bogdan: Ibid.
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Zelimir Zilnik has stated about his colleagues and their profession that they were 
aware that “the entire atmosphere of society could have been changed.”19 According 
to  Zilnik,  he  and  his  colleagues  followed  major  changes  in  Eastern  communist 
ideology  and  western  capitalist  ideology.  Their  critical  angle  and  reflections  on 
humanity  captured  an  existing  division  in  the  world  developed  from  these 
observations.20 Being aware of the errors of the ideological system in which they 
lived, their intention was not just to bring changes into the film making system but 
also  to  express  the  necessity  for  changes  in  society.  The  Black  Wave  auteurs 
successfully developed a unique approach in film making style, which was new and 
revolutionary in Yugoslavian cinematography. 
The symbolism and themes of the Black Wave could be applied to many issues in the 
1990s. For example, Makavejev’s magician, a man who hypnotizes the masses in 
Man is Not a Bird symbolizes the power of a leader. The fascination with a leader 
and his capability to hypnotize the masses can be read as a reference to Milosevic.21 
Makavejev defined this “fascination with leadership and the inability to escape from 
this mentality as a mass inductive stage where faith in a big leader, inherited from 
tribal mentality, predominates in times of crisis.”22 This ideological criticism had a 
prophetic  connotation,  since  Makavejev's  depiction  of  a  leader  was  not  just  a 
caricature of Tito's cult of personality of the time, but a reflection on the people and 
the culture capable of embracing such an ideological concept. 
Realism  remained  an  important  characteristic  of  the  movement.  Realistic 
representations of life were a result of  auteurs resistance to embracing the political 
dogmatism of the time. Progressiveness and freedom of socialist  Yugoslavia,  that 
were  not  supposed  to  be  questioned,  were  undermined  in  these  films  as  a  false 
picture of reality.  The  Black Wave therefore represented a critique of the political 
19 Pop Trajkov, Igor: Ibid.
20 See Pop Trajkov, Igor: Ibid.
21 See Roganovic, Vesna: Razgovori sa Dusanom Makavejevom: Srbija, od kanabeta do katarze (1),  
Ispali smo iz vremena, hocemo li se iskobeljati? www.danas.co.yu/20030405/vikend6htm; Last 
accessed: 13/08/2007.
22 Roganovic, Vesna: Ibid.
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ideology of its time. This is one of the reasons why the political structures wanted to 
eliminate the independent voice that was coming from the cinema. 
The Black Wave was also considered  by some scholars to be a product of the system 
as it “derived from the system itself” and therefore its filmmakers were not “true 
dissidents, but the system's own “built-in” critics.”23 This movement, often simply 
taken as a form of capitalist critique of communism, can also be considered as a left 
wing,  Marxist  critique  of  the  corrupted  ideas  of  socialism.  The  Black  Wave 
nevertheless,  as  a  politically  engaged  cinematic  movement,  offered  significant 
criticism of the system representing “an aesthetic resistance to the regime's cosmetic 
view of social reality.”24 The universality of the stories and the exploration of diverse 
political issues, social taboos, and ideological blindness,  gives Black Wave  films a 
contemporary dimension.25
4.2.3. The Importance of the Black Wave Movement
The  Black Wave movement had tremendous importance in the cinematography of 
former  Yugoslavia.  The  auteur unique  aesthetic  style  and  innovative  ideas 
introduced new forms of cinematic expressions in Yugoslav cinema. The provocative 
and controversial style which was breaking established norms  gave them the epithet 
of  films of resistance.  Zelimir  Zilnik describes  this  time in the following words: 
“cinematography existed  because  some really  big questions were  supposed to  be 
asked through films – like: How would it be to change this world?”26 Directors such 
as Zelimir Zilnik, Zivojin Pavlovic or Lazar Stojanovic continued their work in the 
1990s with politically engaged films.27 The recently made documentary  Censored 
without Censorship (Zabranjeni bez zabrane, Milan Nikodijevic, Dinko Tucakovic, 
23 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p.105.
24 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p.105.
25 They can be seen as a study in human behavior, taboos, personal and social limitations and the 
complexity of life in the 20th century. See: http://www.dssound.com/black_wave.html 
26 Pop Trajkov, Igor: Ibid.
27 Lazar Stojanovic directed a documentary Scorpions (Skorpioni, 2007) film about the paramilitary 
group and the war crimes committed in Bosnia. The film was produced by the Fund for Humanitarian 
Law in Belgrade. The film received great attention and caused various discussions in Serbia. 
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Serbia, 2006) highlights the socio-political context in which the  Black Wave arose, 
how and why the authors and their films, master-pieces of Yugoslav cinematography 
were  persecuted and banned in  the  end.  Yugoslav  authors  who refused  to  adopt 
politically correct language, which would mean denying their critical point of view, 
were exposed to a form of, in words of one of the authors,“soft dictatorship's political 
methods.”
Some  scholars  claimed  that  after  the  Black  Wave came  the  period  of  so  called 
“Hollywoodization”  of  the cinema.28 After  the  Black Wave movement  in  the late 
1960s  and  the  1970s,  Yugoslav  cinema  returned,  to  some  extant,  to  so-called 
ideologically  correct  films,  which  depicted  partisans'  struggle  against  Germans 
glorifying Tito as a leader, while Tito was played by Hollywood celebrities such as 
Richard Burton (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Josip Broz Tito and  his wife Jovanka with Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor
http://www.ilustrovana.com/tekst.php?broj=2590&tekst=02
28 See Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 105.
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This Hollywoodization, as Dusan Bjelic claims, was never abandoned and influenced 
filmmakers in the 1990s. Therefore some Serbian films of the 1990s were often seen 
as  Hollywood  style  movies.  Srdjan  Dragojevic,  the  director,  on  the  other  hand 
claimed  that  his  films  were  auteur films,  wrongly  labelled  as  Hollywood  style 
cinema. The filmmakers in Yugoslavia however were exposed to influences from 
both traditions.  Other  scholars claimed that  Yugoslav cinema “never  managed to 
develop  the  industrial  dimension characteristic  of  Hollywood  and the  rest  of  the 
West.”29 
In  a  period of  “apolitical  cinema”30 in  the  1970s and 1980s,  Prague  film school 
directors  such  as  Goran  Paskaljevic,  Goran  Markovic  or  Emir  Kusturica,  gained 
international success.31 In the 1980s the black comedy genre developed, and films 
such as  Ko to tamo peva (Who's That Singing Over There, Slobodan Sijan, 1980), 
Maratonci  trce  pocasni  krug (The  Marathon  Family,  Slobodan  Sijan,  1982)  or 
Balkanski spijun (Balkan Spy,  Dusan Kovacevic,  Bozidar Nikolic,  1981) received 
cult status, leaving an impact on generations of audiences.32  Black comedy however 
became a form of cultural phenomenon that provided a  kind of “psychological valve 
in troubled times.”33  Elements of black comedy can be found in many 1990s films.
It is important to say that Yugoslav cinema was influenced by different cinematic 
traditions that overlapped in this region of Europe.  In considering the cinematic style 
and subversiveness of 1990s film, comparison to the  Black Wave  often comes as 
inevitable. My intention is however not to compare  these periods but to emphasize 
29 Longinovic, Tomislav:“Playing the Western Eye: Balkan Masculinity and Post-Yugoslav War 
Cinema” in Imre, Aniko, ed.: East European Cinemas, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 35
30 Longinovic, Tomislav: Ibid, p. 36.
31 For example, Otac na sluzbenom putu (When Father Was Away on Business, 1985) by Emir 
Kusturica won Palme D' Or and FIPRESCI Prize at the Cannes Film Festival in 1985, Golden Arena 
at the Pula Film Festival of Yugoslavian films, and was nominated for Golden Globe and Oscar in 
1986.
32 Phrases from these films emerged into daily speech in Serbia, they were quoted randomly and 
phrases and jokes from these films remained for a long time in local jargon. See Milana Vujkov 
unpublished MA Dissertation: Black Humour in Serbian Films of the Early Eighties and Its Cultural  
Consequences: The Cinema Of Slobodan Sijan and Dusan Kovacevic, October 2005. MA History of 
Film and Visual Media, Birkbeck College, University of London.
33 Milana Vujkov: Ibid. 
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the importance of this specific cinematic tradition. The fact that Serbian cinema has 
such  pre-history  enables  us  to  contextualize  it  within  a  very  specific  cinematic 
culture  that  produced  politically  engaged  films.  This  contributes  to  the  later 
discussion on the cinematic subversiveness of the 1990s films. 
4.3. Serbian Cinema of the 1990s 
In  this  section  I  discuss  the  cinemascape  of  the  1990s,  focussing  upon  several 
specific Serbian films produced during this period of time. Due to the new socio-
political  circumstances  in  the  country,  with  the  escalation  of  the  war,  economic 
collapse  and  international  embargo,  Serbian  cinematography  entered  a  difficult 
period after the “national cinema financing had collapsed.”34
In these new circumstances Serbian cinematography,  compared to earlier  periods, 
was not so prolific in its productivity because “cinematogeraphy was in a large part 
marginalized due to the country's deep economic crisis, and cultural strategies of the 
regime.”35 In  spite  of  the  difficulties  some  significant  films  were  produced,  and 
directors  had  to  turn  to  independent  financial  sources,  often  relying  on  foreign 
assistance. My intention is to explore the extent to which film directors were engaged 
with ongoing changes in Serbian society, how they represented the ideological frame 
of the 1990s and the outbreak of the civil war.   
In the first section I discuss how the cinema was used to promote the new ideological 
discourse of the Milosevic regime discussed in chapter 3. Next I survey the dominant 
cinematic themes in Serbian films of the 1990s. My aim is to explore the extent to 
which the film directors were engaged with the socio-political reality of their time 
and to briefly discuss the different views that they provided on the ongoing crisis. I 
also focus upon three major themes that prevailed in Serbian films, violence, civil 
34 Longinovic, Tomislav: Ibid, p. 37.
35 Kronja, Ivana: Violence as a Cause of and a Response to Frustration: Serbian Cinema and 
Violence Culture, 1990 – 2004, p.1,  http://www.inter-
disciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/kronja%20paper.pdf  
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war,  and  the  representation  of  ideology,  and  I  discuss  them  separately.  My 
conclusion is devoted to the discussion of Serbian film as a social-political critique, 
in which I consider how the films represented the ideological context of the 1990s.
4.3.1. 1989: Screening the Myth 
The discussion on the cinemascape of the 1990s starts with a film made in 1989, The 
Battle of Kosovo (Boj na Kosovu, Zdravko Sotra, 1989). I discuss this film because it 
embodied the nationalist discourse of the late 1980s and as such represented a sort of 
cinematic introduction into the war. The production of the film overlapped with the 
nationalist-religious revival in Serbia and the film to a significant extent represents a 
form of expression of this political discourse.36 The film is based on a drama written 
by  the  academic  Ljubomir  Simovic.37 Although  the  drama  was  written  on  the 
initiative  of  the  Yugoslav  Drama  Theatre,  it  was  not  put  on  the  stage.  Radio 
Television of Serbia, RTS, preparing for the celebration of the 600th anniversary of 
the Kosovo battle, in 1989, was interested in the text, but instead of the planned TV 
series they decided to make a film. The writer, Ljubomir Simovic, based the plot on 
the  Kosovo  Myth emphasizing  the  nationalist-religious  and ethical  aspects  of  the 
legend of Lazar.  To a great extent this film reflected political stances of the late 
1980s. 
As Serbian historian Olivera Milosavljevic argued, the messages of the film certainly 
speak more about the political context of the 1980s than about the time of the actual 
Kosovo battle in 1389.38 Simovic published a new version of his drama in 2003, in 
which he excluded many parts that previously served as political slogans suitable for 
the  context  of  Milosevic's  mythological-nationalist  discourse.  For  example,  the 
words that Milica, Lazar's wife says, and the speech of Lazar's son Stefan echo the 
36 See chapter 3 and the discussion on the importance of this myth in the creation of the 
mythological-nationalist discourse in section 3.3.The Role of the Kosovo Myth in Formation of the 
Political Ideology. 
37 Ljubomir Simovic, a dramatist, writer  and a poet, became a member of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and  Arts  in 1988. 
38 Radio B92, Pescanik: Srpska državnička mudrost i sokački patriotizam, 15. novembar, 2003. 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/pescanik.php?yyyy=2003&mm=11&nav_id=125533
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political propaganda of the late 1980s. Milica speaks about a Serbia which always 
stands  silent  while  others  are  determining  her  destiny,  and  Stefan  prays  for  the 
Serbian people  to  finally rise  and stand again united “under  one wreath.”39 Both 
represent  official  political  stances  based  on  a  discourse  of  the  aforementioned 
Memorandum  and the idea of historical injustice against Serbs40, which has to be 
ended  through  the  reunion  of  Serbs  under  the  political  umbrella  of  Milosevic. 
Milica's speech expresses the ideas exposed in the text of Memorandum, while Stefan 
expresses the political determination of Serbs to fight injustice and “be resurrected”41 
again through the national program embodied in nationalist-religious ideology.  In 
fact Kosovo Battle is a film that speaks within the ideological context of its time and 
as  such  it  clearly  expressed  the  contemporary  nationalist-religious  ideology  that 
emanates from the  Kosovo Myth.  In this way the mythological content of the film 
was suitable for using as a folding-screen for the affirmation of the new political 
course. Kosovo Battle therefore can be considered not only as a historic-epic saga but 
as  a  propagandist  film  of  the  regime.  With  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  the 
cinemascape changed and the film directors became more critically engaged with the 
socio-political situation in the country.  
4.3.2. Mapping the Films: Dominant Cinematic Themes
The films that were produced during the 1990s abounded with themes such as the 
break-up of  Yugoslavia,  the  destruction  of  Serbian  society  and  the  escalation  of 
violence. Many films offered different perspectives on the recent Yugoslav history 
and the  Tito  era (1945-1980).  Discussions  of  Yugoslav history emerged into  the 
public sphere and eventually in films. Occasionally as in the case of  Underground 
39 See Radio B92, Pescanik: Ibid.
40 See chapter 3.
41 The term “resurrection” was often used in populist discourse. It does not refer to Christ's 
resurrection but means primarily the revival of the Serbian nation. Populist discourse of this time was 
strongly using mythological language to describe political plans, and the use of the term resurrection 
is a good example of this political trend. During the NATO aggression on Serbia in 1999, the Church 
leaders in their speeches emphasized that the Serbian suffering has great Christian meaning and that 
death is a “pre-condition of  resurrection”. See: We will not deny sanctity of Kosovo and  Metohija, 
The Metropoliten Amfilohije in the Monastery Djurdjevi Stupovi, 
http://www.mitropolija.cg.yu/dvavoda/besede/mit_bs-stupovi_99_l.html
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(Podzemlje,  Emir  Kusturica,  1995),  which  will  be  discussed  later,  films  took  a 
perspective which proved controversial. Tito and I (Tito i ja, Goran Markovic, 1992) 
dealing  with  Tito's  image  in  a  humorous  way  spoke  about  a  darker  side  of 
Yugoslavia's political system and the cult of a leader. Besides feature films there was 
a number of documentaries produced in this period, such as Dusan Makavejev's Hole 
in the Soul (Rupa u dusi, 1995) a personal perspective on the Yugoslav war. 
A number of films produced in the 1990s show the thematic diversity that existed 
within  the  world  of  cinema.  Films  like  Goran  Paskaljevic's  Tango  Argentino 
(Yugoslavia,  1992),  that  represented problems of  elderly  people,  Someone Else's  
America (Tudja  Amerika,  France,  UK,  Germany,  Greece,  Yugoslavia,1995)  an 
immigrants' saga, or  Virdzina (Virgina, Srdjan Karanovic, 1991) a story about the 
custom of a girl being raised as a boy in the family with no male offspring, received 
domestic and international attention. Srdjan Dragojevic's comedy We are Not Angels 
(Mi nismo andjeli, 1992) screened at the dawn of Yugoslav wars, recognized also as 
so  called  “pink  comedy”  became a  blockbuster.  In  1994  Aleksandar  Petrovic,  a 
Black Wave director, made his last film  Seobe (Migrations) based on the book by 
Milos  Crnjanski.42 This  epic-historic  spectacle  was  made  with  foreign  co-
production.43 One of the films made in the early 1990s, that remained a weak attempt 
at cinematic engagement with socio-political changes in Serbia was Darko Bajic's 
Black Bomber (Crni bombarder, 1992). Set in Belgrade, in the year 1999, the film 
tells a story about a police state and rock 'n' roll rebels who fight against the system. 
The film makes many parallels to reality. For example, the main character works for 
the underground radio station, in the film called “Boom 92”, which recalls the name 
of the independent Radio B92, which was a symbol  of anti-regime struggle.  The 
name of the radio station was inspired by reality, the demonstrations showed in the 
film remind the audience of the first big demonstrations against Milosevic held on 9th 
42 Milos Crnjanski (1896-1977) was one of the most prominent representatives of modern literary 
expressionism. He was a poet, writer and diplomat.  
43 Petrovic was rehabilitated in 1991 after persecution during Tito's time. Seobe was an old project 
where filming had been postponed for more than two decades. Although this was supposed to be the 
first Serbian historical spectacle in recent history, it cannot be contextualized in the same manner as 
Kosovo Battle, that will be discussed later, and that  had direct and important political messages in the 
context of the regime. In this sense these two films represent completely different projects. 
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of March 1991. When the main character sends a call to rebellion through the radio 
station he starts demonstrations that nevertheless fail in the end. Bajic's attempt to 
emphasize the power of rock 'n' roll life style against the state provided no substantial 
criticism  of  the  state's  politics  nor  did  it  show  the  significance  of  1991 
demonstrations. 
Many film directors throughout the 1990s dealt with the socio-political themes of the 
time, showing the disintegration of Serbian society. Here I mention some of the films 
which were inspired by the dramatic changes in Serbian society, known to the wider 
Serbian  audience.  What  they  all  have  in  common,  as  Dina  Iordanova  argues,  is 
depiction of a “depressing atmosphere, the ruined lives of this younger generation 
and their growing desperation and madness.”44 The films portrayed the consequences 
of  the  new political  system  on  Serbian  society.  A  dark  picture  of  Belgrade,  so 
common  in  many  of  the  films  mentioned,  is  not  a  result  of  auteurs vision  but 
represents a depiction of the reality of that time. It is important to bear in mind that 
these films were not made in a time of peace, after a certain passage of time that 
would  allow  an  objective  view  and  analysis  of  what  has  happened,  but  on  the 
contrary they were all produced at the actual time of the crisis, the war and turbulent 
years,  which  affected  the  film  industry  and  certainly  influenced  filmmakers  in 
choosing the themes for their films. 
Films  such  as  Between  Heaven  and  Earth (Ni  na  nebu  ni  na  zemlji,  Milos 
Radivojevic,  1994),  or  Boulevard  of  Revolution  (Bulevar  revolucije,  Vladimir 
Blazevski, 1992) depict the atmosphere of Belgrade changing after the collapse of 
the communist system, the emergence of new values and their impacts on the so-
called lost generations.  Dragan Kresoja's  Dark is the Night (Tamna je noc, 1995) 
on the other hand depicts the impacts of the civil  war and economic collapse on 
ordinary people.  The film describes Belgrade of 1992, the  escalation of the war and 
student protests. 
44 Iordanova, Dina: Cinema of Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 267. 
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Goran Markovic's Tragedy Burlesque (Urnebesna tragedija, 1995) provides a unique 
critical  aspect  on Milosevic's  Serbia.  The director  uses black humour to paint  an 
isolated society and its citizens. The story about a psychiatric hospital that needs to 
be shut down because of the unbearable conditions caused by the economic collapse 
is  a  parable  for  Serbian society,  while  patients  who are  abandoned represent  the 
citizens. The film describes Serbia under the Milosevic regime as a place “where the 
normal  ones  are  depressed  and  incapacitated,  while  the  deviant  ones  thrive  on 
chaos.”45 
The director  investigates  the  question  of  normality  and insanity  in  contemporary 
Serbia on the edge of absurdity. One of the rare films which specifically dealt with 
the economic collapse and the stratification of society is a social drama Diary of  
Insults,  (Dnevnik  Uvreda,  Zdravko Sotra,  1993).  The film explores  Serbia  under 
economic embargo, the melting of the middle class and the collapse of the system of 
values. It provides the same dark picture of an isolated Serbia, characteristic of other 
films of  that  time,  in  which  ordinary  people  are  left  on their  own to survive  in 
extraordinary conditions. The film is set in 1993, the time of galloping inflation that 
contributed to the growth of poverty and the stratification of society. The story of 
Ana and Stefan, a retired, educated and once respected couple shows how as the 
economic  crisis  deepens  they  at  the  same  time  get  estranged  from  each  other, 
handling the collapse in their own different ways: Stefan is protecting his dignity by 
pretending he is still living a normal life while Ana struggles to provide bread every 
day.  A tragic  denouement  takes place when police find Ana frozen on the street 
where she was selling home made hats. The film reveals several important social 
aspects  of the 1990s such as the destruction of families  caused by the economic 
collapse, every day starvation and the difficult position of women in this economic 
situation. Through Ana's character,  the film shows the effects of the crisis on the 
female  population  which  during  the  1990s  became  a  significant  generator  of 
economic income for the families by doing various kinds of jobs.46  
45 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 268.
46 See Radovic, Milja:  Images of Women in Serbian media, 
http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/regions/europe/european_articles/images_of_women_in_serbian_media
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A major number of the films however dealt with the theme of the consequences of 
the regime's  politics  on Serbian society.  These consequences were represented in 
various ways,  from depiction of the growth of violence and economic collapse in 
Serbia, to the revival of national mythology and the escalation of the civil war. In the 
next section I focus on the cinematic portrayal of violence and crime, which came as 
a direct result of the war and the regime's politics.  
4.3.3. Violence in Films: Cabaret Balkans
In this section I discuss the films which focused specifically upon the issues of crime 
and violence. Rage (Do Koske, Boban Skerlic, 1997) is a case in point as a film about 
the escalation of violence and crime in Belgrade in the 1990s in which street murders 
and gun shooting became a part of everyday life. The film shows the clash between 
the generation of so-called old criminals faced with new young gangsters who have 
no idea of  their bosses' connection to the police and state structures. The film depicts 
the growing problem of crime in Belgrade, the atmosphere of everyday shootings, 
and the state of mind of young criminals. To be a criminal, violent and destructive, 
was a form of fashion among youngsters many of whom were still in high school. 
The popularity of a criminal life style in Milosevic's culture is a problem depicted in 
the film Wounds, which will be analyzed separately in Chapter 6. Rage explores the 
culture  of  violence  of  the  1990s  as  the  consequence  of  “society's  corruption.”47 
According  to  some  scholars,  like  Ivana  Kronja,  the  Serbian  directors  in  their 
depiction of violence identified with American cinema “the stereotypes of typical 
genre  films  could  not  express  the  complexity  of  the  situation.”48 Anti-heroes  in 
Serbian films offer no catharsis for the audience, their ending is not a happy ending, 
good does not defeat evil, and brutality wins, all of which are elements that mirror 
the reality  of  the 1990s.  In  this sense,  “the reality  precedes the style.”49 Rage is 
therefore a story about specific violence in a specific place, whose causes are to be 
47 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
48 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
49 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
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found in regime's politics:  violence is  organized,  controlled and derives from the 
system itself.   
An  important  film  that  deals  with  the  problem  of  violence  and  which  gained 
international reputation is a film of a famous Yugoslav and Serbian director Goran 
Paskaljevic:  Keg of Gunpowder (Bure Baruta,) also translated as  Cabaret Balkans. 
The story takes place within one night in Belgrade, at  the time when Serbia was 
under the international embargo. The night time, in which events are set, portrayes 
the dark atmosphere of Serbia of the 1990s, as a metaphoric picture of the place 
where  “time does  not  flow.”50 Excluded  from the  international  context  Serbia  is 
depicted as an isolated space in which the people are estranged from each other. In 
such circumstances, where violence developed as a cultural model,  characters use 
violence as the only means to communicate with each other. Comparisons to Bob 
Fosse's Cabaret are inevitable, since Paskaljevic uses cabaret as a backstage and for 
the interconnection between the main stories.51 
A strong reminder of Foss's portrayal of the Nazi atmosphere in prewar Germany 
comes out of the fact that Paskaljevic paints the decadence and brutality of a society 
blinded by the ideology of the regime in power. This introspective portrayal of an 
isolated  Serbia  and  its  citizens  provides  a  depressing  picture  of  a  disintegrated 
society which Paskaljevic paints as Cabaret Balkans. While Rage shows more of the 
street  crime  and  sadistic  behaviour  of  Belgrade's  youth,  Paskaljevic  is  more 
concerned with so-called ordinary people, who in exceptional circumstances, become 
“kegs  of  gunpowder”  ready  to  explode.  The  film  investigates  how  people  were 
“pushed  into  practising  violence  which  used  to  be  a  previous  cause  of  their 
frustration.”52
Keg of Gunpowder is a film that functions on both universal and local level. The 
universality is in the very subject of violence,  which is represented “aesthetically 
50 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p.111.
51 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 269.
52 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
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rather  than  ideologically.”53 The  absence  of  nationalism  resembles  anonymity  of 
global power54, for which reason the story could be set in any city of the world and 
therefore recognized by audiences in any part of the world. Yet, at the same time the 
film is a local story about everyday street violence, triggered by ethnic violence and 
the war. Ethnic violence as classless conflict, as Dusan Bjelic argues, “opened the 
door  for  fragmentation  and  globalization  of  the  Balkans.”55 In  this  way the  film 
provides both global and local perspectives on the Balkans violence and conflict at 
the end of the 20th century. 
Belgrade is used as a setting for four parallel stories about violence in which the 
main protagonists are perpetrators or victims of violence. The film follows a “non-
linear narrative” to “challenge pastoral semiotics of Serb national unity.”56  Therefore 
I argue that when we speak about the representation of violence in Serbian cinema, 
which was inspired by the escalation of violence in reality, we should speak about it 
as a form of “holy aggression.”57 Holy aggression becomes a cultural model and a 
way of communication and represents a direct consequence of the regime's ideology. 
Cabaret  Balkans is  therefore  not  a  story about  an exotic  place  in which  violent 
people dwell, but a story about the isolated Serbian society ruled by a violent regime. 
The  aggression  was  introduced  and  justified  through  the  nationalist-religious 
discourse, discussed in chapter 3, which legitimated violence for sacred purposes. 
This was done in various ways, including the media promotion of war criminals as 
patriots.58 “Noir journey”59 through Milosevic's Belgrade of the 1990s paints also the 
consequences of the war although the war is absent in the film.  How the war and 
conflict were represented in other films of the 1990s will be discussed next.
53 See Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 107.
54 See Bjelic Dusan: Ibid, p. 108-109.
55 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 108. 
56 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 107-108.
57 See Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Ibid, p. 132.
58 “The crime wave on the ground of Serbia only followed the killings, robbery and even 
genocide in the warfare in Croatia and Bosnia committed by paramilitary forces, whose 
bosses were pronounced patriots in Serbian media.” Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
59 Goulding, Daniel: “Liberated Cinema”, p. 204 quoted in Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 108.
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4.3.4. The War in Films  
During the 1990s a number of films produced dealt with the escalation of the war in 
former Yugoslavia. War scenes became a background for cinematic stories which 
dramatized themes such as friendship, love and deception in the light of real death 
and  collapse.  Ordinary  human  stories  in  such  a  way  provided  material  for 
contemplations on existential  issues of life and death, frequently asking questions 
such as: who is my neighbour? (my italics) The following three films that I mention 
here dealt with the tragedy of Vukovar, one of the most devastated cities during the 
civil war, whose tragedy in the opinion of many critics, and as we will see later, was 
never  properly represented on the big screen. 
Vukovar's destruction was the most depicted in Boro Draskovic's  Vukovar: Poste  
Restante (Vukovar jedna prica, Cyprus, Italy, Yugoslavia, 1994). The love story of a 
young couple is set in the site of the destroyed city. The marriage of Ana and Toma 
is shaken and finally destroyed through the rise of  national intolerance and the war. 
At the same time as Vukovar is being destroyed, Ana and Toma's marriage distorts to 
the extent that they become complete strangers. Although the story reflects many 
mixed marriages of former Yugoslavia whose “faith” was determined by the war, the 
film provoked a great  deal of controversy. Although Draskovic tried to paint  the 
horrors of the war through the story of ordinary people, his attempt was to some 
extent played down by critics. The film was perceived by some audiences and critics 
as not being objective towards those who were responsible  for the destruction of 
Vukovar.60 Imagined to be a story of destroyed human lives in the midst of a bloody 
war, the film actually opened up the question of politically correct films and whether 
it is possible to deal with such a delicate theme from a temporal distance without 
making a strong political statement at the same time.  
In a similar fashion, Oleg Novkovic's film  Say Why You Left Me  (Kazi zasto me 
ostavi, 1993) use the town of Vukovar as a symbol of destruction. Novkovic explores 
60 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 141-143.
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the interconnection between external and personal destruction, painting a story of 
people whose lives were irreversibly changed by the war. The story focuses on a 
young man who ends up on the Vukovar front. This experience changes him to the 
extent that even a love with a girl, who also went through the horrors of the war, is 
not  sufficient  to  erase  the  final  impacts  of  the  destruction  around  them.  Their 
devastating experience alienates them from the outside world which is finally and 
inevitably lost for them.  
Besides these two films, another film that depicted Vukovar's tragedy was a film of 
Black Wave director Zivojin Pavlovic.  Deserter  (Dezerter, Zivojin Pavlovic, 1992), 
filmed in Belgrade and Vukovar, was considered as one of the most “moving films 
that came out of Yugoslav wars.”61 The film based on Dostoevsky's short story, deals 
with theme of destroyed friendships, love and deception in the light of the civil war. 
Pavlovic provides a strong cinematic picture of destruction and death. Being one of 
the  most  devastated  cities  in  the  Yugoslav  conflict,  Vukovar  in  films  became a 
metaphor for destruction and death itself. Due to its tragedy,  the city of Vukovar 
which together with Sarajevo and Srebrenica became a symbol of crimes, civilian 
suffering and complete destruction, became one of the most cinematically exploited 
sites. The ruins of Vukovar had two significances, of physical destruction and the 
destruction of personal lives of people of Yugoslavia. The transmission of the first 
into the symbolism of the second appeared to be hard, since the tragedy of Vukovar 
was still a real and painful experience for its citizens. Therefore it is not surprising 
that  reactions  were  diverse  and  negative,  as  in  Draskovic's  case,  and  that  the 
metaphor  for equal  suffering  in the war  was not  appropriate,  since in reality  the 
aggression on Vukovar was preformed on Milosevic's instructions. The problem of 
these films, as perceived by some critics, was in their lack of direct message against 
Milosevic's politics.   
The Yugoslav war remained one of the main topics in the cinema of the 1990s. One 
of  the  films  that  caused  the  greatest  controversy  and  was  at  the  same  time 
61 The film was not available to foreign audience due to the economic embargo.  
http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117908263.html?categoryid=31&cs=1; Last accessed 26/07/2008
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internationally successful was a film made by famous, and no less controversial, ex-
Yugoslav director  Emir  Kusturica:  Underground  (Podzemlje,  France,  Yugoslavia, 
Germany,  Hungary, 1995).62 In this film Kusturica provided his own view of the 
Yugoslav break up, contemplating historical events from the Second World War to 
the 1990s. The majority of the main characters dwell in a cellar, an underground, 
which became a metaphor for the ideological blindness of Tito's time. The film starts 
with the Second World War and ends with the break up of Yugoslavia. The events 
take place in the years, 1941, 1961, and 1990. It is a story of friendship between two 
men, communists, and their love for the same woman, Natalia, which overlaps with 
historical events in Yugoslavia. At the very beginning of the film, one of the two 
friends, Crni, hides from Germans with a group of people in the cellar. Their only 
connection with the outside world is through Marko, who after getting rid of his rival 
Crni, marries Natalia and gets a high position in Tito's party. In the mean time, the 
people in the underground live their lives convinced that the Second World War is 
still going on. After they finally break out from the cellar, they learn the truth, but 
this is not the end of the tragic events, as Crni loses his son on this occasion. The end 
is set in the 1990s, when the civil war started in which all three characters took part. 
Their final reunion ends in bloodshed. In the last scene all the protagonists are taken 
on  the  piece  of  land  down  the  river  Danube,  which  symbolizes  the  end  of 
Yugoslavia. 
This  imaginative  story with symbolic  meanings brought  international  attention to 
Kusturica,  while  the music  from the film,  composed by Goran Bregovic became 
internationally popular. The extent to which  this vox populi celebration of the war, 
such as in the song like Kalashnikov, is a separate matter for discussion. This song 
62 The fact that he never appealed openly against the war in Bosnia, contributed to the controversy 
around this director as did his political attitudes. Kusturica, originally a Bosnian Muslim raised in a 
socialist-atheist system, was a few years ago baptized in the Orthodox Church in Serbia which he 
recognized as a returning to his roots. In spite of this he also declares himself as an anti-globalist. In 
Film Festival, which he started in the town of Mokra gora in Serbia, Kusturica performed `funeral' of 
the film Die Hard 2,  which was his `symbolic' homage to  Hollywood commercial films. In recent 
demonstrations against Kosovo independence held on 21 February 2008 in Belgrade, Emir Kusturica 
in his speech reminded Serbs of the importance of the Kosovo Myth and belonging to a “heavenly 
nation.” See Skrozza, Tamara: Portret savremenika-Emir Kusturica: Gazda od Drvengrada, Vreme 
856,  http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=500496, also: 
www.politika.co.yu/rubrike/Politika/RECH-JE-DATA-DOK-ZIVIMO-KOSOVO-JE-SRBIJA.lt.html 
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creates a cultural stereotype of Balkans people as inevitably irrational, but the extent 
to which foreign audiences recognize this music as such is debatable.
Kusturica's view on the break-up of Yugoslavia includes reinterpretation of recent 
Yugoslav  history.  Although  the  film  received  Palme  d  'Or  at  the  Cannes  Film 
Festival in 1995, it caused diverse reactions and received a lot of criticism. Besides 
the disappointment with Kusturica by his fellow Sarajevo citizens for his ignorance 
of the suffering in Bosnia, the film raised many issues.63 There are problems in the 
debates around this film that are worth noting here. The film not only dealt with the 
communist system of Tito's era, which the people in the cellar represent, but also 
from the very beginning it problematized the whole Yugoslav history. This stance 
that even the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as a union of South Slavs was an artificial 
state is signified in the opening sequence where it is shown that while Belgrade was 
bombed by Nazis, Zagreb and Maribor for example are celebrating the arrival of the 
Nazi troops. The causes of Yugoslavia's collapse in the 1990s, as the film suggests, 
are  to be found in 1918. On the other hand the Serbs are portrayed as anti-fascists, 
devoted to Tito's ideology, who as we see from the opening scene suffered the most 
from Germans  in  World  War  II,  for  their  anti-fascism.  These  ideas  express  the 
cultural matrix of the 1990s and certainly they are one of the reasons why Kusturica's 
film remained highly controversial for both former Yugoslav and foreign viewers. 
Contemplations on Yugoslav history were strongly represented in other films as well, 
and some of them will be discussed later. The aforementioned comedy Tito and I, is 
one of the films where the director provides an insight into some of the controversies 
on Yugoslavia. Markovic gives just a hint of the darker side of Tito's state, through 
the  representation  of  secret  services,  Goli  Otok  camp  for  political  prisoners,  or 
portraying in a comical way the hidden anti-Titoism not only among the members of 
the family of the main character but also in Tito's birthplace Zagorje. At the time 
when this film was made, which was just at the dawn of the Yugoslav wars, the 
63 Dina Iordanova devoted a significant part of her book to this director and discussed the main 
problems related to  Underground, from the main theme of the film, its message, interpretation, 
different critiques to the production affairs. See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid,  p. 122.
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political climate was suitable for questioning  Tito as a leader and the Yugoslav state 
in general. Yugoslav history was reinterpreted and became one of the motifs in a 
number  of  Serbian  films,  including  the  selected  films  for  my  case  study.  The 
preoccupation with historical themes and formation of pseudo history is also one of 
the phenomenons of the late 1980s and the 1990s, which was depicted in the films 
such as Pretty Village, Pretty Flame that will be analysed in the next chapter. I will 
discuss  this  subject  further  as  a  part  of  my  analysis  of  the  films,  because  the 
cinematic representation of history also connects to the representation of the ideology 
of the 1990s.
Zelimir Zilnik,  a  Black  Wave director,  in  his  provocative  Marble  Ass (Dupe  od 
mramora, 1995) through the story of marginalized groups investigates a masculinity 
myth,  the  myth  that  was  popularized  through  Milosevic's  media.  Zilnik  as  an 
“outspoken critic  of nationalism”64 previously made a comedy,  half-documentary, 
Tito among the Serbs for the Second Time (Tito po drugi put medju Srbima, 1993) 
where he satirically deals with the impacts of the lost father-icon of Tito, and Serbs' 
perception of Tito's image. Zilnik, who later dealt with the problem of immigrants 
and their life on the borders of Europe, in both of his films explores and  subverts 
iconic images, the cult of the leader, typical of communist systems, and the cult of 
the warrior.
Zivojin  Pavlovic's  last  film  The State  of  the  Dead (Drzava mrtvih,  2002)  whose 
filming started in 1997, waited for several years for its final release, as the director 
died in 1998. The film was completed by Dinko Tucakovic, director, film theorist 
and critic who tried to finish the film in such a way that his work would remain 
“invisible” and preserve Pavlovic's personal touch.65 Pavlovic in  The State of  the  
Dead speaks both about the war and Serbian society. In fact his film shows these two 
problems, often disconnected in other films, as one: the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the war have irreversible consequences in Serbian society.  The film is based on 
64 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 96.
65 Georgijev, Slobodan: Premijera- Drzava mtrvih Zike Pavlovica: Temkovi, blato i bol, Vreme 622, 
http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=328682
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the drama of Sinisa Kovacevic, Janez, and follows the story of a Slovenian Yugoslav 
army  officer  and  his  family  who,  after  the  war  started  in  Slovenia,  ends  up  in 
Belgrade's refugee centre for Yugoslav army officers from former republics, which 
was common at the time. The break-up of the family starts when the son takes to 
organized crime, the mother has attacks of insanity and a father who faced with a low 
family income is forced to give up of his officer's honour and accept the humiliating 
position of door-keeper in a club owned by local criminals. Pavlovic connects the 
escalation of  the war and criminalization of  society to  nationalist  hysteria  of  the 
1990s.  In the next section I will discuss the film Premeditated Murder (Ubistvo s 
predumisljajem,  Gorcin  Stojanovic,  1996),  that  although  it  is  recognized  as 
belonging to the genre of melodrama,  also  provided a significant insight into the 
impact of ideologies on Serbian society and their role in the conflicts. 
4.3.5. Framing the Ideologies: Premeditated Murder
One film that draws attention to ideological clashes within Serbian society and points 
to national ideology as one of the reasons for the conflict of the 1990s, was Gorcin 
Stojanovic's  Premeditated Murder(1996).66 Premeditated Murder is a film that like 
other films of its time dealt with recent Yugoslav history and reconnected it to the 
conflict of the 1990s. In that sense the film tried to discuss the political ideology of 
the  1940s  by  showing  the  post  World  War  II  events  in  Tito's  Yugoslavia.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3,  Tito's Yugoslavia was strongly criticized in the late 1980s, 
by Milosevic's political apparatus, primarily the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, and by Church representatives.67 However, the film only depicts the ideological 
clashes after  the establishment  of Tito's  Yugoslavia  rather  than trying  to provide 
political answers.
66 The film was an independent production by the company Cinema Design whose founder Ljubisa 
Samardzic is the main producer of the film. Similarly to previous films, Premeditated Murder besides 
receiving financial help from independent sponsors, also received support from institutions such as the 
Ministry of Culture of Serbia, Avala film and Radio Television of Serbia, with participation of the 
Bulgarian National Television.
67 See Chapter 3. 
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4.3.5. (A) Plot
The film is based on a novel written by Slobodan Selenic, a famous Serbian writer 
and novelist, who also wrote a screenplay for the film. Selenic framed the ideological 
discourses  of  communist  fatalism  of  the  1940s  and  nationalism  of  the  1990s, 
stressing  their  impacts  on  the  life  of  ordinary  people  in  extraordinary  times. 
Premeditated Murder is a film that integrates two stories, set in the 1940s and 1990s, 
which put together in one coherent piece tell a story about the circle of the wars in 
the Balkans, the ideologies that drove them and the impacts they had on the people. 
The  main  narrative  is  set  in  Belgrade  in  1992,  the  year  of  student  anti-regime 
protests. A girl named Jelena finds in a park the soldier Bogdan, a Croatian Serb who 
was wounded in the battlefield and for whom there was no place in the hospital. She 
takes  him from the  street  to  her  house.  Bogdan is  recovering  at  Jelena's  house, 
helping her to write a story about her grandmother Jeja based on her old diary. Jelena 
and Bogdan fall in love but the tragedy starts when Bogdan decides to return to the 
battlefield. His decision is mainly a result of  pressure from one of Milosevic’s war 
profiteers. Bogdan dies on the battlefield and Jelena finds his body and buries him in 
Belgrade in her family tomb, next to her grandmother Jeja. At Bogdan's funeral in 
Belgrade she gives to her friend, a potential publisher, a completed book about her 
grandmother, as she promised to Bogdan she would do. In response to her friend's 
questioning about the end of the book she replies that there is no end. The tragic 
circle however is ended and broken at the same time with Jelena's decision to leave 
Belgrade and move to New Zealand. 
The story of Jelena's  grandmother  is  told through flashbacks and connects to  the 
main plot of the film. Her grandmother Jeja is portrayed as a wealthy and educated 
young woman from a bourgeois family.  In the new communist system established 
after the Second World War there was no place for the bourgeois class who were 
recognized as anti-communist and the collaborators of Germans. Their property was 
taken and they ended up in prisons or being executed. Jeja's step-father is one of 
these political enemies, also called 'class enemies' of the new system. The only way 
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for  Jeja  to  save  the  family  house  is  to  collaborate  with  communists  and  their 
powerful leader Krsman, who has strong affections for her. Her ill step-brother Jovan 
with whom Jeja  had a  love affair  refuses this.  Their  story has  a  tragic  outcome, 
Jovan kills Krsman and commits suicide, while Jeja soon dies after giving birth to 
Jelena's mother. 
 
4.3.5. (B) Depiction of the Ideology of “The People”
The story of  Jelena's  grandmother  throws  light  on  the  historical  events  after  the 
Second World War, while the main story about Jelena and Bogdan provides a picture 
of Milosevic's Serbia and the civil war.  Yet both stories make one coherent piece 
about  ideology.  The  film  investigates  the  most  recent  history  by  depicting  the 
ideologies that shaped it.  The main conflict however is not described through the 
depiction  of  the  war  between  Serbs  and  Croats,  but  through  the  cultural  and 
ideological clash within Serbian society. The film paints the conflict of the so-called 
liberal, pro-Western view versus the people's ideologies, or what is also known as the 
conflict  between  urban  and  non  urban  cultural  space.68 These  different  political 
options of Serbia are in the centre of the conflict,  which in the end results in the 
concrete  explosion  of  violence,  political  persecution  and  war.  Therefore  the 
representation of the 1940s in the film should not be read as a consequence of the 
director's embrace of the ideological concepts of the late 1980s. Rather the film is 
stating  that  whatever  was  done  in  Serbia  “in  the  name  of  the  people”,  in  the 
revolution of the 1940s or in the populist politics of the 1990s, resulted in atrocities 
and  suffering  of  the  people,  in  whose  name  both  ideologies  were  conceived. 
Premeditated Murder depicts this long clash that existed in Serbia between these two 
opposite  political  ideas.  Although  the  concept  of  the  people's  ideology  varied 
depending on the context of the time, some common ground can be identified, for 
example the rejection of so called pro-Western concepts of the democratic state. The 
film depicts the polarization of Serbia on two ideologically and politically opposed 
ideas. The first one veres more towards the modern concept of the state while the 
68 The ideological concept of a people's-national state versus the liberal concept is discussed in 
Chapter 3.
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second gravitates towards the people's state which is embodied first in socialism, and 
later in the re-introduced concept of a national state whose ideological principle is 
based on “God-king(ruler)-householder.”69 Both principles embody a strong idea of 
collectivism, which had dominated as a political issue for the whole century.70 
The  people is  a  Slavic  term  that  was  commonly  exploited  in  both  ideological 
contexts. In the film this term has  a negative connotation. The term the people as we 
see in the film stands for a hegemonic mass with a collective identity rather than a 
community of individuals. It was also a term commonly used in the former socialist 
Yugoslavia  which  was  defined  as  a  community  of  people  based  on  “equality, 
brotherhood and fraternity.” All political actions were usually done “in the name of 
the people”, and for example all courtroom verdicts would start with this phrase. In 
the 1990s the concept of the people was used in the same fashion,  to justify political 
actions as a result of the people's will. 
Unlike  in  the  1940s,  when  the  people referred  to  all  nations  living  in  socialist 
Yugoslavia, in the 1990s the term was now used to indicate primarily the Serbian 
nation. For example, Milosevic's media machinery described the gathering of Serbs 
in Kosovo in 1989, as an event of  the people.71 In this context Serbian people are 
described as one entity, and consequently from this populist concept of  the people 
phrases such as  narodna dusa (the people's soul) or  narodna mudrost (the people's 
wisdom) emerged into the public discourse. 
Krsman's character represents what was understood by the term  the people in the 
early  days of  socialist  Yugoslavia,  primarily  Marxists  or  partisans.  Krsman is  an 
uneducated peasant from Kopaonik, whose only guarantee for rising on the social 
69 See Chapter 3.
70 The idea of collectivism, as discussed in chapter 3, was opposed to the `western’ concept of 
individualism.  Collectivism as an idea was often connected to the Orthodox religion. As Latinka 
Perovic argued, Orthodoxy was not interested in the accumulation of capital, classifying work as the 
instrument for the satisfaction of basic needs, which was closer to the concept of socialism than 
capitalism. See Perovic, Latinka: Izmedju anarhije i autokratije: srpsko drustvo na prelazima vekova 
(XIX-XXI), Beograd: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Ogledi Br. 8, 2006, p. 24.
71 See chapter 3.
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scale is in belonging to the communist party. One of the characters describes these 
young revolutionaries, such as Krsman, as people from whose eyes were shining “a 
kind of unmerciful justice.” People are also described as bandits and unrefined mass:
“They kill their old fathers with shovels...they will kill for a plum...they will pick out 
the eye of a brother for Marxism, they will plough the Belgrade streets to remind 
them of their home...they respect cows more than women because cows are stronger 
and cheaper... they sing like wolves...they fart in Church...”72
The concrete results of this “people's will” are shown in the brutality of Krsman's 
character,  and in the atmosphere of political  proscription and imprisonment of all 
opponents to the new system. 
4.3.5. (C) Depiction of the Ideological Context of the 1990s 
The main protagonists of the 1990s story, Jelena and Bogdan, reflect the ideological 
conflicts of their time. Jelena's character represents the pacifist, pro-Western youth of 
Belgrade as opposed to the people, who are embodied in Bogdan's character. Bogdan 
is  portrayed as a naïve Serbian soldier  from Croatia who is  convinced that he is 
protecting his land by participating in the war, but whose patriotism vanishes at the 
end when he admits all the futility and absurdity of the civil war. Bogdan is shown to 
be affected by the populist political ideology, he believes in the idea of a “heavenly 
nation”73 and  therefore  does  not  question  the  rightfulness  or  reasons  of  the  war. 
Jelena on the other hand challenges his beliefs, to the point when Bogdan starts to 
question  it.  Although  Bogdan  expresses  criticism  towards  hardcore  nationalist 
Muzdeka, his neighbour and a war profiteer, he is nevertheless incapable of resisting 
these ideas completely and he returns to the battlefield. Bogdan's character represents 
the people in the context of the 1990s and he is a metaphor for the population who 
believed  in  the  concept  of  a  national  state  embodied  in  Milosevic's  populist 
discourse, and due to this he was manipulated. This problem is revealed through his 
conversations  with  Jelena,  when  Bogdan  continuously  refers  to  Serbs  as  “our 
people.”  Bogdan, coming from a rural  area also reflects the so-called traditional 
72 DVD “Ubistvo s predumisljajem”, Beograd: First Production, 2005. 
73 See chapter 3.
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values,  such as chastity and naivety, virtues that were supposed preserved by the 
people  and within  the  Serbian  nation.  In  this  sense  Bogdan's  character  does  not 
subvert the image of the Serbian warrior as honorable defender. The subversion of 
this image is given through the portrayal of Bogdan's neighbour, Muzdeka, which 
will be discussed later. Bogdan is at the same time shown as a victim of this political 
discourse, which suggests that the people, in whose name the war was waged, were 
ultimately the victims of populist and pro-war politics of the regime. 
As  previously  discussed  the  problems  of  cultural  differences  and  clashes  within 
Serbian society are shown through the representation of the clash between the so-
called people's option (my italics) versus a liberal concept of society. In the 1940s we 
see this through the clash of Jeja's  family with partisans,  while in the 1990s this 
problem is revealed through the relationship of Jelena and Bogdan. Jeja in the 1940s, 
being  from  the  bourgeois  family,  stands  as  a  metaphor  for  Western  capitalism, 
individualism and against the form of collectivism embodied in communist ideology. 
Jelena of the 1990s, represents the so called urban youth who have no interest in 
national mythologies. Jelena as a pacifist who strongly opposes nationalism, reflects 
more  the  internationalist,  cosmopolitan  spirit.  In  contrast,  Bogdan represents  the 
people whose convictions are shaped by populist ideology. He is portrayed as a Serb 
nationalist,  who although he  admits  that  “there  are  good Croats”  is  nevertheless 
unable to completely overcome his ideological beliefs and embrace Jelena's urbanity 
and pacifism. 
Muzdeka, Bogdan's neighbour and a war profiteer, on the other hand represents a 
hard core nationalist who has an interest in the war. Nationalist ideology is a folding-
screen for his criminal activities. Muzdeka expresses nationalism through hate for all 
Croats. He is portrayed as an uneducated, rough person of rural background, and he 
is similar to some extent to the aforementioned image of  the people represented in 
Krsman, who are described as “wolves.” Muzdeka does not speak English and he 
hates Jelena's sophisticated urbanity and Belgrade as such. In the the 1990s Belgrade 
was commonly pictured as a city that betrayed national interests, whose youth had 
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more or less no interest in the war and who were influenced by the Western ideas. 
Belgrade  as  one  of  the  biggest  cultural  and  political  centres,  both  of  former 
Yugoslavia and Serbia, was nevertheless accused of gravitating more towards pro-
Western ideas than being a real capital of the Serbian nation. The film points out 
these problems and cultural divisions. 
One element of the film that portrays this cultural and ideological clash is music. The 
music in the film is used to reflect this existing confrontation between two streams 
and ideas,  traditional,  which in this  context  connects  to nationalism, and modern 
which connects to liberalism, and which also has an anti-war connotation. In the two 
previously analysed films, we saw how music had a function to show a shift towards 
nationalism, with the emergence of so called patriotic folk songs in the 1990s public 
sphere.  The mythological  concepts  of nationhood and war,  that  emerged through 
music, included also a return to traditional Serbian instruments, such as the gusle.74 
The sound of the gusle appears in the opening scene of Premeditated Murder, which 
shows wounded Serbian soldiers from Croatia in Belgrade's hospital. The Gusle has 
the function of portraying the mythological concept of the war popularized through 
the  nationalist-religious  ideology.  In  this  sense  the music  not  only contributes  to 
“realize the meaning of the film” but also represents an autonomous statement and 
illustrates the political convictions of the characters. 
Gusle are contrasted to the rock sounds of the Belgrade punk rock band, who in 1992 
made a song “Peace, brother”, that was used in the student protests as the film shows. 
The song starts with a verse: “We don't want folk music to win”, which refers to the 
dominant turbo-folk music promoted by the regime media.75 The urban sound in the 
film  represents  the  Belgrade  pacifist  youth,  who  opposed  Milosevic.  The  song 
represents an anti war statement while the  gusle  in this context represents a call to 
74 This instrument was traditionally used in oral tradition for storytelling. Stories coexisted from very 
long texts about heroes from the Serbian distant historical past and described various historical  or 
mythical events connected to figures from Serbian culture.  They were commonly sung during the 
Ottoman  slavery.  The  return  to  this  instrument  marked  a  return  to  Serbian  tradition  that  gave 
participants a sense of contributing to a form of mythological battle for Serbdom, Orthodoxy and all 
other ideas that at that time were understood as determinative for Serbian identity.  
75 See chapter 4. 
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war. These two different types of music in the film suggest the separation of Serbs 
into two groups, those who supported Milosevic and those who opposed him.
The film makes reference to nationalist-religious ideology as the basis of the pro-war 
discourse.  The  portrayal  of  the  nationalism  of  some  of  the  characters,  such  as 
Muzdeka, shows that nationalism was in the roots of Milosevic's politics and was 
used to justify the war in Croatia, that is shown as very profitable for the regime. 
Information  about  the  ideological  discourse  of  the  1990s  is  nevertheless  given 
through the opponents of the regime. Bogdan does not say a single word about his 
beliefs but the director gives us a hint about his convictions through his arguments 
with Jelena. He quietly disapproves of Jelena's attacks on the Kosovo Myth and the 
image of Saint Lazarus.76 The connection of the idea of nationhood to the Orthodox 
religion is also shown in the scene in which Bogdan is listening to a tape with the 
Divine  Liturgy  that  he  switches  off  before  Jelena  enters  the  room.  Nonetheless 
Bogdan is not stereotyped as a complete outsider; rather he is a former student who 
also shows appreciation for some Western goods. He is thrilled for example when 
Jelena gives him a pair of “converse sneakers” as a gift. 
However, Bogdan's identity and beliefs are significantly shaped by the nationalist-
religious ideology of the time. Bogdan declares himself as a Serb first and foremost, 
which is shown in the opening scene, when replying to Muzdeka's question on his 
return to the battlefield, Bogdan states: “you will not teach me, you are not a bigger 
Serb than me.” This sentence introduces Bogdan from the beginning of the story as a 
person who believes in the concept of nationhood as introduced in the early 1990s. 
The  whole  scene  is  followed  by  the  sound  of  the  gusle in  the  background,  the 
instrument used for patriotic epic songs, to illustrate this new modern patriotism.  
The part of the film set in the 1990s provides a political criticism of the Milosevic 
era. It shows the corruption in the health service, sanctions and economic crisis that 
76 “Jelena: Screw heavenly people and Tzar Lazar...,
      Bogdan: Jelena! What are you saying?” 
DVD “Ubistvo s predumisljajem”, Beograd: First Production, 2005. 
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result from his rule. Depiction of war as a site of death and destruction but also of 
profit  provide a picture of Serbian moral, social, political and cultural erosion that 
came as a consequence of embracing  the regime's politics. The depiction of  war 
profiteers subverts the image of the civil war as a just war. The representation of the 
ideological concept of the 1990s shows that the nationalist-religious ideology was 
used for justification of atrocities. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have surveyed a large number of Serbian films produced during the 
1990s and focused upon several specific films. I narrowed down my discussion by 
categorizing films according to the themes that prevailed in the film narratives: the 
war, violence and ideology. I explored different perspectives that the film directors 
offered  upon  these  issues.  I  argued  that  the  Serbian  cinema  of  the  1990s  was 
politically  engaged  cinema which  provided  critical  perspectives  on  the  Yugoslav 
crisis and the Milosevic regime.  
The ambiguity of films allows different readings and different perspectives on the 
cinema of the 1990s. For this reason and as a part of my discussion I offered different 
perspectives  and  readings  of  film  scholars  on  certain  Serbian  films.  What  was 
commonly criticized in the films which dealt with specifically war themes can be 
summarized in the words of Nevena Dakovic who said that the films represented the 
war as a “chronicle of announced death which inflects linear time of reality into the 
mythical circle.”77 This means that Serbian films offered a stereotypical portrayal of 
the Balkan people as destined for conflict, rather than a depiction of the war as a 
result of concrete policies. One of the reasons for such a view can be found in the 
cinematic  reinterpretation  of  recent  Yugoslav  history  in  the  war  films.  The 
perception of the Yugoslav state as a false state was, as in Kusturica's case, often 
connected  to  the  escalation  the  war.  Nevena  Dakovic  discussed  “cinematic 
77 Dakovic, Nevena: Yugoslav wars: Between Myth and Reality, 
http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/mpi/Activities/Media%20Practice%20Spring%202002/dakovic.htm, 
approached: 16/07/2008. My translation.
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explanation of the wars”, and put these explanations into two categories, “historic-
critical  and mythical-fatalist.”78 Tito's  time,  was  in  this  sense  as  Dakovic  further 
argues, the “epoch of frustrating suppression of national identities” that led to the 
escalation of nationalism in the 1990s.79 This mythical concept applied in film texts 
provided “the mythical image of war – as a force of destiny or unavoidable evil to 
come.”80 In this way the Yugoslav conflict becomes a part of the cycle of “eternal 
Balkans conflicts.”81 One of the possible reasons for mythical representation of the 
wars and thus stereotypical portrayals of the wild Balkan man, according to some 
critics such as Tomislav Longinovic, can be found in the prehistory of Serbian film. 
In other words, it was a result of “Hollywoodization of Yugoslav cinema” that took 
place in the 1970s and that influenced later directors. In this way Yugoslav cinema 
was “doubly colonized”, meaning that the domestic filmmakers incorporated the so-
called Western gaze into their film making.82   
Some scholars argued that the absence of a direct portrayal of the regime does not 
necessarily mean that the films observed violence as an isolated phenomenon. On the 
contrary as  Bjelic  argued:  the  shift  from local  to  global  provides  an  insight  into 
ethnic  conflict  as  a  classless  conflict  which  he  recognizes  as  a  process  of 
fragmentation and thus globalization of the Balkans.
In the first part of this chapter I discussed the cinematic traditions that existed in 
Yugoslav cinema and that  influenced later  directors.  I  discussed the  Black Wave 
movement  because  of  the  particular  importance  that  this  movement  had  and  its 
engagement with social and political themes which remained a characteristic of the 
78 Dakovic, Nevena: Kinematografija raspada Jugoslavije: plamen na nicijoj zemlji, 
http://www.filg.uj.edu.pl/~wwwip/postjugo/files/262/raspad-u-filmu.pdf, p.3., Last accessed: 
16/07/2008. My translation.
79 Dakovic, Nevena: Ibid, Last accessed: 16/07/2008. My translation.
80 Dakovic, Nevena: Yugoslav wars: Between Myth and Reality, 
http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/mpi/Activities/Media%20Practice%20Spring%202002/dakovic.htm. Last 
accessed: 16/07/2008.
81 See Dakovic, Nevena: Kinematografija raspada Jugoslavije: plamen na nicijoj zemlji, 
http://www.filg.uj.edu.pl/~wwwip/postjugo/files/262/raspad-u-filmu.pdf, p.6, Last accessed: 
16/07/2008. My translation.
82 See Longinovic, Tomislav: Ibid, 2005.
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films of the 1990s. The films of the  Black Wave provided socio-political criticism 
that  scholars such as Bjelic  recognized as “resistance.”83 What  is  important  is  to 
acknowledge the distinction between resistance and subversiveness in film, as Bjelic 
discussed. The difference is to be found in “national and global aesthetics.”84 Global 
aesthetics that Bjelic finds in the films of the 1990s is in adoption of “Hollywood 
stereotypes” in filmmaking style that according to Frederick Jameson turned Serbian 
national  cinema  into  a  “global  cinema.”85 Global  cinema  provides  criticism,  by 
“adopting Hollywood stereotypes and aesthetic codes precisely in order to subvert 
them.”86 In  this  sense  Bjelic  defines  Serbian  cinema of  the  1990s  as  subversive 
cinema. This cinema “inherited Hollywoodization of domestic ideology that typified 
in the 1970s, and deployed the stereotype of the wild Balkan man, and ideological 
and global  media  cliché of  the  1990s,  in  order  to  confront  both nationalism and 
globalism at once.”87 
In Serbian films of the 1990s we find influences of the tradition of the Black Wave's  
socio-political  criticism,  but  also  influences  of  Hollywood  cinema,  with  strong 
elements of black humor that developed in the 1980s.  Films of the 1990s represent 
politically  engaged  cinema that  explored  the  socio-political  reality  of  their  time. 
Many  films  of  the  1990s  which  dealt  with  specific  themes,  such  as  violence, 
represented it as the consequence of the ideological context of the 1990s.  Keg of  
Gunpowder is not only a film about violence, it is a film about the Yugoslav war and 
the Serbian regime. An absence of portrayal of the war, and an absence of direct 
message against the Milosevic regime does not mean that the film does not point to 
these problems. In fact the film speaks about violence in a local context and as a 
direct consequence of the war and the regime. In this regard I suggested that when 
we speak about Serbian films of the 1990s we cannot speak about some uniform 
cinematic representation of the conflict as a “global human tragedy”88, but rather we 
83 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 105.
84 See Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 104-105.
85 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 104.
86 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 104.
87 Bjelic, Dusan: Ibid, p. 105.
88 Dakovic, Nevena: Ibid, Last accessed: 23/09/2008.
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need to look more carefully into the issues that each of these films discussed. 
It is important to say, for the sake of contextualizing Serbian cinema, that outside the 
world of cinema, as well as within the Serbian cultural milieu there existed strong 
criticism  of  the  nationalist-religious  ideology.89 The  films  never  provided  direct 
criticism as Biljana Srbljanovic for example did in her drama The Fall (Pad, 1999).90 
However films such as Pretty Village Pretty Flame or Wounds did offer a significant 
religious  symbolism  whose  function  will  be  explored  in  the  next  chapters.  The 
interconnection of these symbols to violence, crime and war can certainly inform us 
to a significant extent about the ideological discourse of the 1990s and religion as an 
inseparable  part  of  this  discourse.  The  mythological  concept  of  Yugoslav 
disintegration  in  the  1990s,  which  was  discussed  by  scholars  such  as  Jameson, 
Iordanova,  or  Dakovic,  is  a  subject  to  be  investigated  further  as  a  part  of  my 
exploration of the representation of local mythologies embodied in Orthodoxy and 
Serbdom.  
 
89 Criticism of Milosevic's politics and his ideology was present in the Serbian public sphere. One of 
the greatest critics of Milosevic among intellectuals from the “world of arts” was the Serbian 
playwright Biljana Srbljanovic. In her play Pad (The Fall, Biljana Srbljanovic, 1998) she criticized 
religious ideology that prevailed in Serbia and was strongly bonded to nationalism and the official 
regime's political ideology. In her play Srbljanovic made a parallel with bishop Nikolai Velimirovic, 
whose theology was reapplied in the 1990s for the purposes of the justification of the war. Nikolaj 
Velimirovic and his work are discussed in chapter 3. 
90 See chapter 3.
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Chapter 5
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame
5.0. Introduction
In this chapter I analyze the film Pretty Village, Pretty Flame (Lepa sela lepo gore, 
1995)  by  Srdjan  Dragojevic.  I  focus  on  the  cinematic  representation  of  the 
nationalist-religious ideology of the Milosevic regime. My intention is to explore the 
extent to which the film informs us about the ideology, religion and nationalism of 
the 1990s and whether these representations are subversive.  In the first part of this 
chapter, 5.1., I discuss the genre, the background of the film and the plot. The second 
part of this chapter, 5.2., is devoted to the critical reception of the film. The film 
provoked vigorous debates, and I summarize the main issues which both Serbian and 
foreign scholars and critics identified in the film. The next two sections are devoted 
to film analysis. In section 5.3. I analyze the main characters in the film within the 
specific socio-political and cultural context of the 1990s.  In section 5.4. I look at the 
cinematic  representation  of  nationalism  and  religious  ideology  in  the  film.  My 
analysis is divided into five parts. In the first one I discuss the religiosity of the main 
characters  and its  connection  to the rise  of  national  tensions.  Next  I  analyze  the 
cinematic representation of religious images and national symbols and their meaning 
in the context of the film.  My aim is to look at how these representations inform us 
about the cultural  iconography of the 1990s and its  political  implications.  Then I 
discuss the emergence of mythological language into everyday life, its function and 
role  in  raising  national  tensions.  I  then  focus  on  the  representation  of  media 
propaganda in the film. In the last part of this section and in order to discuss how the 
nationalist-religious ideology shaped the perception of  others (my italics) I look at 
how  the  film  depicts  other  nationalities  and  what  this  depiction  says  about  the 
Serbian characters in the film. The last part of this chapter, 5.4., is devoted to the 
conclusion, in which I discuss the results of my analysis. 
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The film is based upon a true story that first came out as an article in the newspapers. 
The film was made in the year 1995 by an independent group of artists gathered 
around “Cobra film”, who decided to “fight  the destruction around them through 
art.”1 This film became the most viewed film in the territory of former Yugoslavia at 
the  time,  and  has  received  seven  Grand-Prix  awards.2 As  we  will  see  later,  the 
debates  on  this  film were  diverse,  and  opinions  were  divided.  I  chose  this  film 
because of its unique depiction of the ideology of the 1990s. The film informs about 
the interconnection between the war in Bosnia and the ideological discourse of the 
Serbian regime.  
5.1. Pretty Village, Pretty Flame (Lepa sela, lepo gore, Srdjan Dragojevic, 1995)
This section includes same background information about the film. First I discuss the 
genre; second, I give a brief insight into how the film was made: where the initial 
idea for the film came from and how it was produced; and third, I outline the plot.  
5.1.1. Genre
For further discussion on this film it is important first of all to identify its genre. 
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame belongs to the so-called war-genre films. Since it was 
described by some critics as a war propaganda film, it is particularly important to 
identify  the genre,  or  rather  its  sub-genre  (my italics)  before discussing the  film 
further. The definition on this film as a war-genre film is not sufficient, especially 
because some critics, as will be discussed later, found this film to be a pro-war film. 
Diverse and divided opinions about this film show that we need to identify more 
1 “This is the biggest independent project in the history of the Yugoslav film industry. It was made in 
a country that has a hundred times less theatres than restaurants. At the moment it seems that culture 
in Serbia is definitely an item from the past. The communist regime (The Milosevic regime, my 
objection) channeled money into war activities, and film and theatre were in their darkest period…
Abandoned by the official institutions, artists gathered around “Cobra” decided to take matters into 
their own hands.” 
DVD Pretty Village Pretty Flame, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
2 The film was also the Serbian candidate for the Oscar in 1997. The film has been distributed in over 
forty countries by a French Company Canal +. DVD Pretty Village Pretty Flame, Beograd: Cobra 
Film, 2001.
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themes in the film. Gaye Ortiz suggested that war-genre films should be analyzed 
according to their specific themes and she proposed eight categories: “the ethics of 
killing,  patriotism, dehumanization of war, post-9/11 reality/terrorism, torture and 
detention,  desire/conditions for peace and non-violence,  the economy of war and 
anti-war black comedy.”3 Ortiz' definitions were a useful guide for this research on 
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame and definition of its sub-genre. In this chapter I argue 
that this film is an anti-war black comedy, in which subversive representation of the 
nationalist-religious ideology is to be explored. How the film deals with the themes 
of “patriotism” and “the ethics of killing” in order to subvert the ideological context 
of the 1990s will be investigated further in this chapter. As we will see further, the 
film depicts  Serbian  patriotism  as  an  aggressive  nationalism  while  the  ethics  of 
killing for example is explored through the subversive representation of the idea of 
the Serbian war as just war.  A detailed analysis of the film will contribute to a better 
understanding of the importance of identifying the film's sub-themes for the  fuller 
definition  of  the genre.  It  is  also clear that  the identifying  of  the  film's  sub-text 
contributes to the further exploration of cinematic subversiveness.
5.1.2. Making the Film 
The story was first published in the newspapers and caught the attention of Vanja 
Bulic, a journalist of the magazine Duga4 who then wrote a novel The Tunnel, which 
was strongly criticized by scholars such as Ivan Colovic, as a “pro-war propagandist 
novel.”5 However as Dragojevic stated he  was attracted to the story of soldiers set in 
a “claustrophobic situation” seeing it as good way to tell the war story.6 The film 
script had fourteen versions and the original text of the Tunnel was changed almost 
completely.7 
3 Deacy, Christopher and Ortiz, Gaye: Theology and Film: Challenging the Sacred/Secular Divide, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 162.
4 Duga was one of the magazines close to the Milosevic regime. See Iordanova Dina: Cinema of  
Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 143.
5 Colovic, Ivan: Politika simbola, Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2002, p. 231. 
6 Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Interview Srdjan Dragojevic: Shame, Anger, and Then – Nothing, 
July 20, 1996, Vreme News Digest Agency No 250, 
http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/250/t250-8.htm; Last accessed: 15/01/2009.
7 Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Ibid.
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Funds for the film were raised from different sources, Radio Television of Serbia, the 
Serbian  Ministry  of  Culture,  but  also  from a  number  of  state  firms  such  as  the 
Belgrade  Public  Transport  Bureau.  Dragojevic  did  not  hesitate  to  approach 
politicians,  from  Seselj  and  Radovan  Karadzic  to  Zoran  Djindjic.8 Radovan 
Karadzic's  help  was  turned  down mostly  due  to  the  vice-president  of  Republika 
Srpska, Nikola Koljevic, who saw the film as anti-Serbian and wanted to interfere 
and change parts of the script.9
Because of a lack of finances the shooting of the film was stopped several times. 
The state co financed the whole project, and the Ministry of Culture gave the film a 
budget of “around 100,000 Deutsch marks, the same amount that was given to some 
other  projects  that  year.”10 A great  advantage,  Dragojevic  says,  was  “the  private 
connection  of  the  main  actor  with  the  director  of  Television  of  Serbia,  Milorad 
Vucelic.”11 The Greek Ministry of Culture also played an important role, sending 
filming equipment to Republika Srpska in Bosnia to help, and later financing the 
post-production in Athens.12  The film was completed after many interruptions and 
was  first  screened in  1996,  after  which it  turned out  to  be a  blockbuster,  which 
nevertheless caused a great deal of controversy among the audience and critics, both 
at home and abroad.  Before I turn to consider the critical reception of the film, in the 
next section I first discuss the plot.
 
8 See Iordanova, Dina: Cinema of Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 143. See 
also:Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Ibid. Both Radovan Karadzic and Vojislav Seselj are on trial for 
war crimes at the Hague Tribunal. Zoran Djindjic, the first democratic prime minister of Serbia, the 
man who led uprising in 2000  and sent Milosevic to the Hague, was assassinated in 2003 by pro-
nationalist forces. Although the assassins were convicted, the political background was never 
investigated and therefore those who ordered Djindjic's assassination were never arrested. 
9 “ In one of its versions the film was supposed to end with two boys escaping together from the 
tunnel, away from the Ghost. They insisted that the boys can "run away together but must do so in 
different directions", although technically this would have been difficult to carry out. They insisted on 
it because such ending would demonstrate that "we must all follow our own path, and that we have 
nothing more to do with the other side". There were other weird demands such as to have access to all 
filmed material. I am glad we managed somehow to retain our independence, as otherwise we would 
have had censorship.” Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Ibid.
10 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008.)
11 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008.)
12 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008.)
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5.1.3. Film Plot
At the very beginning of the film it says, “the film is dedicated to the film industry of 
a country that no longer exists.”13 The film begins with local news from 1971 and the 
inauguration of the “Brotherhood and Unity tunnel” in Bosnia, which, in the words 
of the communist leader, “symbolizes both the path and the light of its people” (the 
people of Socialist Yugoslavia).14 This scene, which depicts the past is in black and 
white.  Colour  film  appears  when  a  pioneer  girl  gives  a  pair  of  scissors  to  a 
communist leader who then cuts himself during the ribbon-cutting ceremony. Music 
starts  and everybody dances in a circle,  in a so-called Kolo Dance,  that becomes 
faster and faster and the camera focuses on the hand of the leader covered in blood, 
after  which  comes  the  title  sequence.  The  obviously  symbolic  meaning  of  the 
introduction presents all the nations of Yugoslavia in a circle of the war to come, 
which led to the shared tragedy.
The film focuses on a story of friendship between a Serbian and a  Muslim boy, 
Milan  (Dragan  Bjelogrlic)  and Halil  (Nikola  Pejakovic),  through whose  personal 
relationship the author tells a story of civil war. It takes place in the year 1994 when 
the wounded Milan lies in the military hospital in Belgrade, and in the year 1992, 
when the war in Bosnia started. Although the film describes the tragic event in the 
tunnel, where a group of Serbian soldiers was trapped and surrounded by Muslim 
forces, it also shows all the horror of war and the tragedy of broken bonds between 
former neighbours and friends.  The title  Lepa sela, lepo gore that originally means 
“pretty villages burn nicely” comes from the comment of one of the characters, a 
Serbian soldier, after he and others have set a Muslim village on fire.
The story starts with Milan's transport to the military hospital in Belgrade, in 1994, 
and then shifts to the first day of the war in Bosnia few years earlier, and the scene of 
Milan  and Halil  playing  basketball.  To  Halil’s  question:  “Will  there  be  a  war?” 
Milan replies: “Sure there will be a war.” The director uses flashback interruptions to 
13 DVD Pretty Village Pretty Flame, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
14 DVD Pretty Village Pretty Flame, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
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give us a more complete insight into their friendship but also into historical events, to 
express the symbolic  meaning through the images,  and to increase the emotional 
pressure while developing characters.  The past and present events are interwoven 
throughout  the  whole  film,  mostly  through  Milan's  memories  of  his  and  Halil’s 
childhood, such as the year  when President Tito died (1980), which symbolically 
represents  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  old  Yugoslavia;  their  childrens'  play 
around the tunnel, in which they believed lived “an ogre”, a metaphor for evil, who if 
he awakes – “will set the village on fire”, but also provides memories of war-time 
and the tunnel around which the main plot is based. 
Developing the story about the war, the director introduces other characters, six of 
them  accompanied  by  a  woman,  an  American  journalist,  who  will  be  trapped 
accidentally  in  the  tunnel  together  with  another  six  Serbs.  All  six  characters  are 
involved in the war in different ways and each one represents a particular mind set of 
the people of that time. When they run into the tunnel after a battle and have to stay 
there for ten days,  their characters,  stories and personal dramas begin to unravel. 
When they are in danger their relationships develop, although they are confronted by 
their differences, in which arise verbal conflicts that reveal their personal attitudes 
and life-stories, sometimes in the form of a confession (shown again through the 
flashbacks) and recorded by the camera of the American journalist.15
Exhausted by lack of water and their hopeless situation they all in their own ways 
become aware of the nonsense of the war in which they have participated, and realize 
that  they will  not  survive.  They are  making jokes  with  each other  and with  the 
Muslims. Music that accentuates this moment of psychological drama is an old song 
of former Yugoslavia well known to both sides. At the end when they are leaving the 
tunnel,  only  Milan  and  the  professor  survive  carrying  a  wounded  friend.  The 
American journalist gets shot at the very moment when there is hope of escape, when 
she tries to reach for her camera, on which she recorded the stories of her tunnel 
15 They all show a lack of trust in the American journalist except Brzi, but at the end their 
relationship changes as she becomes a participant in the same tragedy, and  shares the same destiny: 
she too dies.
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companions. Her death signifies that there is no one left to tell the story. Milan and 
Halil meet at the entrance of the tunnel, the site of their childhood games and the 
“home of the ogre”, which they both hestitated to enter. Through their dialogue we 
discover that they were both convinced of the crime of the other, Halil believes that 
Milan burnt his house and garage, and Milan believes that Halil was responsible for 
the death of his mother.16 
After the story of the tunnel, which ends tragically, we are again in the year 1994 in 
the military hospital, witnessing the climax of the plot embodied in Milan's decision. 
After remembering everything, Milan tries to kill a wounded Muslim soldier who is 
lying in the next room as war prisoner. A professor tries to stop him but ends up 
unconscious on the floor. After Milan finally reaches the Muslim soldier he gives up, 
and remains lying on the floor in a pool of blood. One of the last scenes is set again 
in Milan’s and Halil’s childhood, showing them in the tunnel in front of the bodies of 
victims (including themselves as adults) and then running away. 
The film brings us back to the scene of Milan and Halil at the beginning, and the 
dialogue is repeated but to Halil’s question: “Will there be the war?” Milan replies: 
“What war, buddy?” As their friendship is interrupted by war and forever destroyed, 
there is a deep sorrow painted in Milan’s character as he is faced with the loss of 
everything he has valued in his life and at the same time with the lost values around 
him. 
The film ends with a re-opening of the tunnel in 1999, called this time “The Tunnel 
of Peace”, supported and opened by European and UN officials. The ceremony is 
16 Halil stands on the tunnel, Milan stands below him.
Halil: ”So you went into the tunnel?”
Milan: “I did”.
Halil: “Why’d you burn our garage?”
Milan: “Why’d you slaughter my mother?”
Halil: “I didn’t slaughter anyone”.
Milan: “I didn’t set the garage on fire, either”.
Halil: “Who did? That Ogre from the tunnel maybe?”
Halil falls wounded by fire from a distance and before he dies he says: “What’s up, Lauda?” 
(The name by which he called Milan before).
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again interrupted as the man, a representative of the EU or UN cuts himself, and the 
film ends as the music from the beginning is repeated. The last scene has a symbolic 
meaning and is a bad sign. It raises the question of the possibility of reconciliation 
and yet at the same time, a possible escalation into a new war, which is temporally 
contained by the artificial community created by foreign officials. The Balkans is 
shown to be a place with the potential to explode, as the story of the “ogre in the 
tunnel”  indicates,  but  with  people  who have  more  in  common,  than  differences. 
Dragojevic  holds  the  attention  of  the viewer  with compressed  content,  combined 
with  black  humour,  and  music  that  emphasizes  how  the  tragedy  of  the  trapped 
soldiers is a metaphor for the Yugoslav war. Before turning to consider the film in 
detail, it is useful to analyse the mixed reception that it has received.
5.2. Critical Reception of the Film
In  this  section  I  consider  the  major  strands  of  critical  reception,  positive  and 
negative, by Serbian and foreign critics and scholars. The critical reviews which the 
film received highlight its ambiguous reception. Controversy around this film opened 
a debate on whether a film coming from Milosevic's Serbia could possibly offer an 
objective perspective on the conflict. The ambiguity of the film is what created so 
many diverse readings, from the very positive to the very negative.17 Although this 
ambiguity allowed the different interpretations, the reception of the film was also a 
political matter at the time for some critics. According to Bernd Buder, German film 
critic,  “it  was  the  time  of  hysteria  in  the  cultural  world,  deeply  connected  with 
Kusturica's  Underground, a time in which each film from Serbia had to be proved 
120%  anti-Serbian.”18 Such  a  political  atmosphere,  especially  after  Sarajevo's 
suffering,  demanded from Serbian directors clear distancing and condemnation of 
Milosevic's politics, which did not leave a lot of space for ambiguity and personal 
reflection.  It is interesting that while in Bosnia the film was received in general as 
17 “The director of Viennale, the Austrian film event, refused to screen it,  claiming the film was 
‘Serb fascist propaganda’.” Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 146. 
18 Buder, Bernd. “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire.” Personal e-mail, 19/11/2007.
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pro-Serbian, some Bosnian Serbs found it not Serbian enough.19
The director describes how, after the film was screened in Serbia, he was exposed to 
“insults and almost physical attacks on the street” because the film was previously 
“strongly criticized by the so-called patriotic media.”20 Dragojevic explained that the 
film survived  and  was  not  exposed  to  censorship  because  it  came  out  after  the 
Dayton  agreement,  at  the time when the regime was trying  to present  itself  in  a 
different light showing the change in the political discourse in Serbia.21 In spite of 
these claims Dragojevic was still frequently represented as a clearly Serbian director 
who took the pro-Serbian side in his film. There were various reasons for this, from 
different  interpretations  of  the  film  to  the  production  issues  connected  with  the 
raising of financial support.22 Dragojevic, however, proved to have been led by the 
principle that it is morally acceptable for a director to get money from anyone for the 
purpose of making this film no matter what their moral or political allegiances might 
be.23 This  is  not  new  in  the  history  of  eastern  European  and  Yugoslav 
cinematography, where during the communist period many films were financed by 
the state only to be banned by the same, as was the case with the Black Wave. 
Dina Iordanova investigated this problem of extremely diverse receptions of the film, 
such as the one in The Washington Post which first took the film as pro-Serbian, later 
to  change  this  attitude  after  getting  information  that  the  leading  politicians  of 
Bosnian Serbs such as Radovan Karadzic had boycotted the film.24 According to 
some views, the fact that the film had a good acceptance among the U.S. audience 
was  because  it  is  reminiscent  of  so-called  American  style  anti-war  movies  and 
19 Paraphrased. See Hromadzic, Hajrudin: Nasilje u filmu kao ideoloski konstrukt, 
www.zarez.hr/73/z_film.htm; Last accessed: 19/09/2008.
20 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 25.01.2008.
21 Paraphrased, Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 
25/01/2008.
22 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 143.
23 “When I am making a film I cannot think: "I'd take money from these, but not from the other ones 
because they are bastards." It is pointless to think that way if you want to make a film. If someone 
gives us money, it's great as long as they do not try to censure me.” Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: 
Ibid.
24 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 146-147.
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Vietnam  sagas.25 Some  scholars  have  found  that  the  film  reflects  Hollywood 
clichés.26 However Dragojevic claims that this kind of comparison is mostly because 
of the filmmaking style but that the film is actually “deeply European, auteur film.”27 
In Milosevic's Serbia the civil war was represented in the media as the consequence 
of the so-called mythical destiny, from the Kosovo Battle until the present.  In this 
sense  the  war  is  shown  to  be  a  phenomenon  that  comes  in  cycles:  Serbs  are 
continuing mythical battles that were started six hundred years ago. In such a case 
nobody  is  responsible  and  therefore  nobody  is  to  blame.  The  war  in  such  an 
ideological construct appears to be nobody's fault or if anybody's, it is the fault of so-
called traditional enemies. Some scholars and critics found that these ideas lie at the 
heart  of  Dragojevic's  film.  The  metaphors,  stereotypical  representations  of  the 
characters,  and the depiction of  the  American  journalist  and her  interaction with 
Serbs were usually the reasons why the critics saw this film as a Serbian perspective 
on the war. According to some views, in Dragojevic's film the concrete conflict is 
also moved into the mythical sphere representing the war as the Balkans’ destiny. 
Nevena Dakovic argues that Dragojevic is promoting the universal, mythical concept 
of war.28 The metaphor of the ogre in the tunnel was seen as a mythical explanation 
of  the  war.  According  to  Filip  David,  Serbian  screenwriter  and professor  at  the 
Faculty  of  Drama  and  Arts  in  Belgrade,  the  ogre  in  the  tunnel  supports  the 
representation of the war as “the given state caused by some forces, which are in the 
domain of the mythical.”29 On the other hand, Dragojevic stated that the ogre in the 
tunnel stands as a “metaphor for primitivism and intolerance that can be found in the 
mentality of this region.”30 Primitivism is to be found in the “mentality of the people 
who  went  to  war,  wishing  to  meet  again  with  former  neighbours  when  'that'  is 
over.”31  
25 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 147.
26 David, Filip. “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”. Personal e-mail (27/11/2007) 
27 Srdjan Dragojevic:“Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
28 Dakovic, Nevena: Yugoslav Wars: Between Myth and Reality, 
http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/mpi/conference/dakovic.htm
29 David, Filip. “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”. Personal e-mail (27/11/2007) 
30 Srdjan Dragojevic:“Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
31 Paraphrased, Srdjan Dragojevic: “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 
(25/01/2008.)
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The most common criticism of the film was the lack of a direct message against 
Milosevic.  According to some critics this resulted in positioning the film as one that 
proposed that  the war was nobody’s  fault,  as in Kusturica’s  film  Underground.32 
Some critics labelled Pretty Village, Pretty Flame a strong anti-war film33 although it 
was seen completely differently by other critics, as a pro-Serbian film, based on a 
weak story of friendship,  with ideological  language full  of  stereotypes.34 Bosnian 
critic Hajrudin Hromadzic, for example, although recognizing that this film was not 
warmly  welcomed  by  Bosnian  Serbs  because  it  was  not  Serbian  enough,  still 
criticized the film as one which reflects the ideological blindness of Serbian society. 
Hromadzic  finds  that  the  film  reflects  the  demagogy  of  its  time  and  promotes 
populist ideas that ensue from the Kosovo Myth. He finds that the film did not respect 
the required time lapse from the actual Bosnian tragedy, and he compares it to the 
famous film of Denis Tanovic  No Man's Land (Nicija zemlja, 2001), which in his 
opinion unlike Pretty Village, Pretty Flame takes no one's side in its depiction of the 
war, and in that sense is “ideologically naïve.”35 What most critics and scholars who 
had  similar  views  overlooked  was  to  consider  the  subversive  aspects  of  such 
representations  of  Milosevic's  ideology.  Since  Dragojevic's  intention  was  to  deal 
with  the  “Serbian  side”,  this  portrayal  of  stereotypes  and  the  demagogy  of  the 
Milosevic regime should be explored as it might bear subversive elements.
 
The  stereotypical  portrayal  of  Serbs,  but  also  of  Muslims,  can  bring  in  the 
perspective of the “wild Balkan man” that Frederick Jameson discussed.36  Iordanova 
identified  the  stereotypical  depiction  of  the  Balkan  people  as  “voluntarily  self 
32 See Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p.111-155. 
33 “This is not Eastern European art-house stuff, this is real cinema.”Economist
      “Its delicate blend of Ivo Andric, political satire, Bunuel and superior Tarantino.” Sight&Sound
      “Spectacle in the tradition of Kusturica, Felini and Pekinpoh.” Hollywood Reporter
      “In sensibility this film embodies elements of Jean Paul Sartre’s existentialism and Samuel 
Beckett’s  absurdist humanism...Wilder in its black humor than “Mash”, bolder in its vision of politics 
and the military than any movie Stanley Kubrick has made, Pretty Village, Pretty Flame is one of the 
most audacious antiwar statements ever committed to the big screen.” Variety
DVD “Pretty Village Pretty Flame”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
34 See Hromadzic, Hajrudin: Ibid. 
35 See Hromadzic, Hajrudin: Ibid.
36 See  Jameson,  Frederick:  Thoughts  on  Balkan  Cinema in  Atom  Egoyan  &  Ian  Balfour,  ed.: 
Subtitles, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: MIT Press, 2004, p. 233-234.
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banishing.”37 In this way, as Iordanova concludes “Balkan cinema contributes to the 
project  of  exclusion  and  Third-Worldisation.”38 On  the  other  hand  scholars  like 
Dusan Bjelic argued completely the opposite: that these stereotypes are present in 
film only in order to be subverted.39 In this thesis and as a part of my analysis I will 
further explore the potential subversiveness of such cinematic representations.  
Another element that was perceived as problematic in the film is the character of the 
American  journalist.  The American  journalist  represents,  in  the  opinion  of  some 
critics, the Westerner who gets involved without a real understanding of the locals or 
the conflict, which is “clearly a comment to the international community's support 
for Serbia's enemies by using the sub tone of Serbia's self reflection of the border 
post of Christianity.”40 Furthermore she was seen as a “metaphor for understanding 
the Serbian side of the war” because she finds that “these primitive, rough warriors 
underneath have brave and proud hearts and are honest people.”41 On the other hand, 
some critics found that Dragojevic “certainly does not make heroes out of his motley 
crew of junkies and pickpockets” and that the film represents “a remarkable portrait 
of what was lost in personal, not political terms.”42 
I focus on the issues of stereotypical representation of the characters in detail in the 
next section 5.3. In this sense in the next section I will explore how the film informs 
its audience about the people and the impact of local mythologies on them.  
I intend to demonstrate that the analysis of specific elements in the film narrative can 
provide  a  new and different  understanding  of  the  film.  As  a  contribution  to  the 
debates around this film, the central part of this analysis is based upon the question 
of  whether  the  film  provided a  critical  depiction  of  nationalism  and  religious 
ideology. 
37 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 67-68.
38 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 68.
39 See Jameson, Frederick in Egoyan, Atom and Balfour, Ian ed.:  Subtitles, On the Foreignness of  
Film, Cambridge, Massachussetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2004. 
40 Buder, Bernd, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire” Personal e-mail (19/11/2007)
41 David, Filip, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire” Personal e-mail (27/11/2007) 
42 Morrison, Alan: No. 29 The Balkans: Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, Sunday Herald, 12/10/2008, p. 
25.
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5.3. Film Analysis: Contextualizing the Characters
The six main characters depicted in the film each represent a different social group in 
Serbia.  They are diverse in education and according to the regions they come from. 
Their bold and to some extent stereotypical representation, in the director's view, had 
specific functions in the film's plot: “I used stereotypes and clichés as a model for 
deconstructing them, and in the end to make fun of them.”43 With a dose of  black 
humour,  as  we  will  see  later,  Dragojevic  deconstructs  some  of  the  ideological 
premises of the time,  especially through Fork's character, where he is subverting an 
image of chetnik but also the new nationalist-religious myths. 
Dragojevic paints the characters, some of whom are indoctrinated by the regime's 
propaganda;  but  he  avoids  painting  the  alternative  voices,  characters  who  truly 
oppose the regime. Even when he does, as in the case of anti-war demonstrators, they 
are represented not too differently from the way in which Milosevic's propaganda 
presented them. This was the director's goal: he wanted viewers to see the world 
through the eyes of the main character, Milan. In Dragojevic's words: “ It is not my 
personal, but Milan's view; I think it is important to see things through the eyes of 
the  main  character.  He  thinks  he  is  fighting  for  Serbdom,  and  this  ideological 
platform is not created in his village, but in Belgrade, where he now lies wounded 
and finds nothing but disdain.”44
The director keeps on trying to portray the personal views of all of the characters, 
their  motives,  their  understanding of the world around them, and the impact  that 
nationalist-religious ideology had in shaping them. However the director denies that 
he  wanted  to  justify  the  actions  of  his  characters.  He  wanted  to  show how the 
ideological  construction of  Milosevic's  propaganda had direct  impacts  on diverse 
people in different milieux and of diverse cultural background. He is interested in the 
so-called victims of propaganda, people who truly believed in Milosevic's ideological 
concept. “When you succeed in giving life to such characters, it must have a positive 
43 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 25/01/2008.
44 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 25/01/2008.
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effect on the film, due to the fact that they are in the first place realistic.”45 
 
5.3.1. The People versus Liberals?
In this section I briefly discuss the cinematic portrayal of the so-called cultural clash 
that can be understood also as a consequence of the ideological conflicts that have 
existed historically in this region.46 Although probably not intentionally, the portrayal 
of some of the characters in the film provides us with an insight into the difference 
between so-called urban and provincial mentality.  This is a result of the director's 
personal impression that in urban parts of Bosnia where Serbs and Muslims lived 
together, friendships were possible because they were more exposed to cultural and 
social changes and modernization, while rural areas were divided into Muslim and 
Serbian  villages  which  did  not  provide  many  possibilities  for  developing  ties, 
especially because many families still remembered atrocities from the Second World 
War.47 In such areas, people were living more traditionally while modernization was 
taking  place  more  in  the  cities.  Dragojevic  decided  to  set  the  story  about  the 
friendship between a Serb and a Muslim in just such a rural area. Setting the plot in a 
rural area and  painting some of the rural characters gives us a hint of the perception 
of something known as the simple, people's spirit.48 This division in cultural identity 
is  still  present  in  Serbia,  especially  in  the political  divides  of  so-called “people's 
national block” and more liberal wings. 
While this complex clash within society was not examined directly in the film, the 
film nevertheless  gives  several  pointers  to  it.  One of them is to  be found in the 
conversation  between  Fork  and  professor,  where  the  director  was  undoubtedly 
portraying the situation in Serbia where independent intellectuals were perceived and 
45 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 25/01/2008.
46 In chapter 4, in the discussion of the film Premeditated Murder I discussed this problem in more 
detail. The background of the so-called cultural conflicts and the way they result from the ideological 
conflicts of the political elite over the last century is briefly discussed in chapter 3.
47 See Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Ibid. 
48 The vox-populi terminology was  recalling the idea of the “pure, people's soul”, the term that was 
supposed to mark an uneducated but honest and courageous Serbian peasant. This concept of the 
people was discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
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represented as a threat to the whole system which was based on a pro-war ideology. 
It is illustrated in the words of Fork: on the professor's saying that they had burnt the 
village whose name they did not even know, killing each other for a fistful of ashes, 
Fork replies: “if you intellectuals had been asked, all of Serbia would have gone to 
hell.” Obviously this sentence does not refer to the regime's intellectuals, such as the 
authors of the  Memorandum, but to the significant number of writers,  professors, 
journalists, and other citizens, all dissidents in the Milosevic regime, who were not 
only  suppressed  by the  regime but  often  overlooked  and ignored  by the  foreign 
media,  which  stereotypically  represented  Serbia  as  a  pro-Milosevic,  nationalist 
country.49 Rather than referring to the character of the professor, who after all is an 
active  participant  in  the  war,  Fork's  words  reflect  a  common  attitude  against 
independent intellectuals.  
 
Petar, a professor from Bosnia, is not what they called an independent intellectual50 
(my italics), but still he represents the only intellectual among the six characters in 
the tunnel. He is at the same time the only character whose personal story is not 
revealed in the film. We do not know his motives for  participating in the war nor 
how he ends up on the battlefield.  He is the only character who shows a certain 
discomfort during the war operations, and who at the end of the film tries to stop 
Milan from killing a Muslim soldier.  The professor however does not reflect  the 
liberal or anti-regime wing of Serbia. In fact the depiction of people who represent 
opposition to the regime is lacking in both Dragojevic's films. 
 
5.3.2. Portrayal of Urbanity and Urban Pacifism
Among the characters in the tunnel there are not many representatives of the urban 
population, except for Brzi (Speedy) who ends up in the war accidentally. Brzi is a 
drug addict from Belgrade, who comes to the battlefield by chance; he falls from the 
49 See Srbljanovic, Biljana: The Other Face of Serbia, Guardian: 31.7. 1999, www.guardian.co.uk; 
Last accessed: 16.09. 2007.
50 This term is used in Serbia usually to mark intellectuals who were strongly critical against the 
regime and usually of liberal views. 
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bridge onto a military truck. He is a son of an ex-colonel of the Yugoslav Army, and 
he does not  believe in the ideological  assumptions of  his  father's  generation;  for 
example, he is selling his father's golden clock, a present from the military on his 
retirement, to buy drugs. His urbanity is also painted through his choice of music for 
example: unlike Fork or Lazar, Brzi continues to listen Western rock groups such as 
Rolling Stones or The Police in the battlefield. Brzi is also the only English-speaking 
person. In a later conversation in the hospital Brzi's friends answer Milan's question 
on nationality by saying that they are of a “junky nationality.” This sentence reveals 
to  us  also  Brzi's  identity,  which  is  everything  but  true  nationalist.  In  fact  when 
introducing himself to the camera of an American journalist he starts it with a line 
from the Rolling Stones' song Sympathy for the Devil: “Please allow me to introduce 
myself...”51 In this way, Brzi is portrayed as a character whose background does not 
have much to do with local national mythologies, but in fact reflects more of the 
Western influence in shaping his identity. 
Besides  Brzi,  there  is  the character  of  Velja,  who represents  the  so-called urban 
criminals.  Velja  demonstrates  his  urbanity  mostly  through  referring  to  other 
characters, especially Lazar and Fork, as peasants. An ex-criminal, who committed 
robberies abroad, mostly in Germany, Velja was mobilized instead of his younger 
brother,  a  prospective  student  whom he  wanted  to protect.  Through the  story of 
Velja, Dragojevic here describes a situation in Serbia at the beginning of the civil 
war,  when  Milosevic’s  military  police  mobilized  young  people  by  force  for 
participation in war operations in Croatia and Bosnia.
The  representation  of  the  clash  between  city  and  city-dwellers  versus  provincial 
people shows in the scenes that  are  set  in the military hospital  in Belgrade.  The 
doctor for example, at least in the beginning, seems to be taking a neutral or even 
pacifist  view in treating both Serbian and Muslim wounded soldiers.  This  image 
however is destroyed after the doctor cordially welcomes Sloba, the war profiteer. 
This  suggests  that  there were no innocent people in the war:  everyone,  from the 
51 DVD “Pretty Village Pretty Flame”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
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doctor in the hospital to the anti-war demonstrators are influenced by Milosevic's 
ideology or are there to gain some personal interests from the war. 
Through  the  depiction  of  the  anti-war  demonstrators  the  director  gives  another 
glimpse  of  the  urban  population  in  Belgrade,  but  here  referring  more  to  non-
government  organizations,  whose  motives  and  system  of  values  are  however 
questioned by the director. This is one of the biggest failures of the film in the words 
of  professor  Philip  David  “the  most  negative  characters  in  the  film are  anti-war 
demonstrators...undefined  people  dressed  in  fur  coats  which  is  probably  to  mark 
them  as  traitors  and  foreign  servants.”52 David  argues  further  that  this 
misrepresentation  shows  the  attitude  of  the  filmmakers  towards  anti-war 
demonstrators in general,  who were in fact the opposite of the film's depiction of 
them, being mostly  young people  protesting against  Milosevic's  anti-war politics, 
many of whom lost their jobs as a result.53  
On the other hand, Dragojevic claims that he “did not want to spear anyone” and that 
he  took  a  “cynical  attitude”  towards  different  NGOs  whose  pacifist  role  for 
Dragojevic was “almost comical”, as the “financial support they were receiving”, in 
his opinion, “usually ended up in the leaders' pockets.”54 This view supported to a 
significant extent the official attitude of the regime, but is also a stereotype that exists 
even today in Serbia, of NGOs as foreign servants.  This is certainly one of the major 
problems  identified  in  the  film,  not  only  because  such  portrayal  supported  the 
regime's political stances but because it remained one of the major stereotypes in 
Serbian  society and remains  so  even today.  Linked with  the  director's  deliberate 
avoidance of including the alternative voices in Serbia that was mentioned earlier, 
even when he does get a chance to show them, Dragojevic fails to do so.  Therefore 
in Dragojevic's film Serbia remains a place of darkness with no real strength to resist 
or fight Milosevic's politics. The director also underlines the Western stereotypical 
52 Filip David, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (27/11/2007)
53 Paraphrased, Filip David, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (27/11/ 
2007)
54 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008) 
See also Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Ibid.
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view of  Serbs  as  the  so-called  bad guys.55 This  depiction  also  reflects  a  painful 
Serbian perception of how others see us. The subversion of these representations is 
an issue that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
5.3.3. Ideological Differences
The film reflects the major political and ideological problems that remain in Serbian 
political life even today. The director focuses upon the socio-cultural diversities of 
the characters in the tunnel who paradoxically are united because of the war. They 
have different backgrounds and different political attitudes, which is most visible in 
the conflict between the colonel of the Yugoslav army and the nationalist views of 
Lazar and Fork.  The only thing they have in common is  their  nationality,  which 
seems to be the only guarantee of their unity. In this way, the film introduces another 
important issue: hegemonization of Serbs under the political ideology of Milosevic. 
The image of the “simple-hearted peasant”56 is represented in the characters of Fork 
and Lazar. Fork represents the people who were influenced by the regime's media 
propaganda and at the same time he represents the subverted image of a Serbian 
honourable  peasant-warrior.  Fork (Viljuska)  who wears  chetnik marks,  which are 
nationalist  symbols,  and  Lazar  are  cousins,  obvious  nationalists,  who  become 
involved in the war mostly because they were indoctrinated by the media propaganda 
of  the state  television.  They represent  the so-called uneducated,  rural  part  of  the 
population, with an awakened sense of national identity influenced by the Milosevic 
propaganda. Through their characters Dragojevic paints the influences and impacts 
of nationalist-religious ideology on the so-called average population of Serbia. Both 
Fork and Lazar believe whatever they hear in the news, from pseudo-historical facts 
that Serbs are the oldest and the most cultured nation in Europe who are victims of a 
world conspiracy to the idea that as a holy nation Serbs are leading a defensive, 
55 In  the discussion about  whether or not  the characters  should allow the American journalist  to 
record them in the tunnel, one of the characters says that in the end  it does not matter what she will do 
with such material because the Serbs are represented in the foreign media as descendants of Hitler 
anyway. 
56 Iordanova, Dina: Ibid, p. 145. 
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mythological battle for their sacred lands. 
  
Ex-criminal  Velja's  conflict  with  another  character,  Gvozden,  an  ex-communist 
captain,  once devoted to socialist  ideals and now Milosevic's  colonel,  reveals the 
clash between the so-called older and younger generations in Serbia of that time. 
Clearly, Velja blames Tito's ex-colonels for causing the war. Gvozden's character is a 
metaphor  for  the  ex-communists  who now supported  the  Milosevic  regime.  It  is 
interesting that the actor of this character (Velimir Bata Zivojinovic) is one of the 
most famous ex-Yugoslav actors, who became famous through his roles in partisan 
films of Tito's era, such as Valter brani Sarajevo (Hajrudin Krvavac, 1972). Gvozden 
is depicted as a military character once so devoted to president Tito, that he walked 
350 km on foot to Tito's funeral, and who believed in the hierarchy and rules of the 
Yugoslav army. He becomes disillusioned in his belief in Tito, who as he admits in 
one scene, “knew how to lie nicely.”57 Gvozden is a nationalist who embodies ideas 
promoted in  the late  1980s that  Yugoslavia  was  a  'cemetery'  for  Serbs  and their 
national interests. Nevertheless he still sees his fight as a fight for the maintenance of 
Yugoslavia,  and  his  ex-comrades  from the  Yugoslav  Army  as  traitors.  His  role 
depicts the official stances of Milosevic's political discourse, promoted for example 
through the Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.58
The question at the end is whether there really are substantial ideological differences 
among the characters  except  in their  rejection of the communists  ideals  of Tito's 
Yugoslavia. And are they not after all united under the umbrella of the new political 
ideology?  The film suggests  that  what  has  really  happened in Serbia  is  that  one 
communist ideology has been replaced by a new, nationalist one. In this process, the 
partisan anti-fascist movement from the Second World War was denied in favour of 
chetniks, represented as a king's army rather than as fascist collaborators. Being a 
chetnik in the context of the 1990s was fashionable and promoted by media. This was 
demonstrated in various ways, from  new interpretations of World War II history and 
open calls of the church leaders for rehabilitation of some of the chetnik leaders, to 
57 DVD “Pretty Village Pretty Flame”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
58 See chapter 3.
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the music on some of the radio-stations, such as radio Ponos.59  Paradoxically these 
new ideas were introduced by former communists, as Velja states in his conversation 
with Gvozden. 
Dragojevic's  intention,  however,  was  not  to  criticize  the  Tito  era  and this  in  his 
opinion, “was very often a misinterpretation of the film.”60 Dragojevic claims that in 
fact the communist era was the only period when people lived in peace in this region 
of the Balkans.61 In Serbia the situation had changed since the late 1980s and the 
Memorandum,  and questioning of Tito's  period became a subject  of many public 
debates. The Church leaders for example by declaring themselves anti-communist, 
requested a complete break with the past, which consequently led to a new division 
of  citizens  into  patriots  or  traitors  of  Serbdom  and  Orthodoxy.  With  new 
interpretations of history it became unclear who were actually patriots and who were 
anti-fascists, during World War II for example. A new nationalist ideology required a 
strong sense of national belonging and a break with the Yugoslav past and therefore 
the emergence of pseudo-history can be observed as one of the essential elements of 
the regime's ideological discourse.
5.3.4. Symbolism: Milosevic and the New Generation 
One of the most interesting figures in the film is the owner of a roadhouse called 
“Sloga” (“Harmony”), who is provoking Milan and Halil and constantly challenges 
their friendship. His name Sloba, which is a nickname of Slobodan, is a reference to 
Slobodan Milosevic. Sloba’s character is a metaphor for Milosevic, he survives the 
war  and profits  from it;  and his  house,  turned into  a  warehouse during the  war, 
remains undamaged amid all the destruction around.  From the very beginning he is 
constantly challenging the friendship between Milan and Halil. In one of the first 
scenes in the film Sloba provokes tension between Milan and Halil, based on the 
59 Radio Ponos (Radio Pride) hosted many war-folk singers who were referring to themselves as 
chetniks, war-heroes, and who were glorifying some war leaders such as Radovan Karadzic for 
example. 
60 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
61 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
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national and religious diversity of Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia. Sloba’s language is 
the discourse known as “hate speech” of Milosevic’s media.  Sloba uses the term 
“balije”, which is a libellous name for Bosnian Muslims. This term actually evokes 
the five hundred years of slavery under the Ottoman Empire in which many Serbs 
suffered  for  Orthodoxy or  were  forced  to  convert  to  Islam.  It  was  not  the  film 
director  who made this  connection  but  the  regime,  which through its  media  was 
continuously reminding citizens of the historical suffering of Serbs. Sloba is the one 
who later in the film informs Milan that his mother was murdered and puts the blame 
on  Halil,  his  Muslim  friend,  not  losing  another  chance  to  emphasize  how  this 
friendship is impossible and how it was in fact never real. For Sloba, conflict is a 
chance for profit, and he is a true war profiteer. 
In the film there also appears the character of Marko, who has a smaller role, and he 
represents the so-called young generation of the Milosevic era, to which the director 
devotes his next film Wounds. Marko is called “mascot” by other soldiers,  he is not 
aware of the cruelty of war but his world-view is shaped by the ideology of violence 
of  the 1990s and by nationalism.  Marko is  impressed with the  idea  that  he is  a 
Serbian soldier who is participating in war actions. Marko's character is a metaphor 
for a generation growing up with an identity crisis, the rise of criminal-heroes and at 
the same time strengthened nationalist ideas, influenced by the culture of the 1990s. 
It is Marko who in one of the scenes draws graffiti on the wall of a burnt-out Muslim 
house,  “Serbia  to  Tokyo.”  The  film shows  the  young  post-Tito  generation,  who 
Dragojevic continues to deal with in Wounds, as bearers of nationalism. Growing up 
in  a  country  of  isolationism,  war-propaganda,  and  xenophobia,  young  people 
remained the main victims of the regime. In the next part of this chapter I analyse the 
cinematic depiction of the nationalist-religious ideology, its characteristics, impacts 
and promotion in the public sphere.  
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5.4. Representation of Nationalist-Religious Ideology in the Pretty Village, Pretty  
Flame
In this section I focus on how Pretty Village,  Pretty Flame informs us about the 
ideological discourse of the regime. This is to be found in the subtext of the film 
which  I  analyze  in  the  following sections.  Orthodox Christianity  is  not  explored 
separately in the film but is an integral  part  of the representation of nationalism. 
Although Dragojevic’s intention was not to deal with religious issues per se, the film 
nevertheless  informs  us  about  the  institutional  religion,  Serbian  Orthodoxy,  to  a 
significant extent. Dragojevic's intention was not to “ridicule religion” but  “instant” 
Orthodoxy and rediscovered national tradition, which in the 1990s political context 
represented the opening of “Pandora's  box.”62 The “pact”  of the Church with the 
state,  which began in the 1980s, for Dragojevic was a pact “with the devil”, that 
resulted in a deviation of religion.63 The populist use of religion for political purposes 
and criminalization of society is one of the consequences of this process that the 
director  wanted  to  describe.64 The director  is  not  sure  to  what  extent  this  was  a 
“conscious – intentional process”, as the representation of religious images was not a 
major  question  for  him65 however,  this  depiction  provides  an  insight  into  the 
dominant iconography of the 1990s, which was a mixture of nationalist and religious 
symbols. 
Religious symbols are included in the story as inseparable from the representation of 
nationalism. Religious intolerance is made visible as an integral part of the conflict 
as we have seen previously in the analysis  of Sloba's character who uses libelous 
names for Bosnian Muslims. It will also be discussed in the section on the perception 
of otherness. We shall look here at some of the main characters that demonstrate 
62 Praraphrased Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 
(25/01/2008)
63 Paraphrased Srdjan Dragojevic,  “Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame Questionnaire”,  personal  e-mail, 
(25/01/2008)
64 “In the TV show that I did for New Year in 1995, I had two criminals as the main characters who 
were wearing big crosses and who referred to the crucified Christ as a gymnast.” Srdjan Dragojevic, 
“Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
65 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
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their Orthodox identity or bring in awareness of the religious diversity between Serbs 
and Muslims. I also analyse the use of religious images in the film and their meaning 
in the context in which they are represented.
5.4.1. National and Religious Identity of the Characters
We learn most about the impact of a nationalist-religious mythology through one of 
the main characters in the tunnel, Lazar’s brother-in-law, with the nickname Fork. 
Both Lazar and Fork are metaphors for the  population who embraced the regime’s 
ideology. Fork wears chetnik marks and demonstrates throughout the whole film his 
belonging to Orthodox Christianity. In one of the first scenes with Fork we see him 
greeting  the  UN solider  with  the  traditional  Orthodox  Easter  greeting  “Christ  is 
Risen.”  The scene  takes place  somewhere  in Bosnia  at  a  battlefield,  in  the  zone 
protected by the UN. The absurdity of the situation is accentuated by Fork’s personal 
vulgarity and by the conversation being set among war profiteers. 
Fork's religious identity reveals a primitive superstitious religiosity where personal 
faith is replaced by the empty practice of religious customs and repetition of phrases 
without any deeper meaning or understanding of them. Some of these phrases are 
“God protects Serbs”, “God will grant”, followed by repeated self-crossing.  He lives 
with the delusion that God protects Serbs because Serbs are a holy nation, without 
examining this myth. Like his friend Lazar, Fork believes in a nationalist-religious 
myth of Serbs as a chosen nation, the idea based on the abuse of the Kosovo Myth. 
The mythological language popularised  in Serbia during the 1990s is revealed also 
in the scene when Fork explains into the camera of the American journalist,  that 
“Serbs are the oldest nation.” As the oldest nation Serbs were also the most cultured 
nation and the first to use forks, as Fork explains, at the time when others, such as the 
English or Germans “were still eating with their hands.”66 It is from this belief that 
Fork got his nickname. While he makes this passionate speech he is shaking his fork 
at  the camera. Fork looks not dangerous but ridiculous, and it was obviously the 
66 DVD “Pretty Village Pretty Flame”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
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director's intention to ridicule the local mythology and the pseudo historical facts that 
emerged from it. However through the fact that Fork participates in the war we find 
that this ideology was actually the most dangerous one as it remains  Fork's main 
motive for getting involved in the conflict.   
The story of how Fork goes to the battlefield is told in a flashback, which connects 
with the scene of his death. Fork chose to die afterwards, as we can assume, when he 
became aware not just of the hopelessness of the situation but also of the absurdity of 
the ideas in which they all have become trapped. He falls on the ground in a crucified 
position.  This  crucified position might  identify  Fork as a  victim.  Through Fork's 
character Dragojevic paints the way in which the populist propaganda of nationalist-
religious ideology found good ground among the less educated citizens, who were 
from the provincial parts of Serbia, mainly exposed to national media propaganda, 
and who at the time represented a significant part of the population of Serbia. The 
film suggests that, although he is a negative character and a participant in a brutal 
conflict, he is also a victim of the regime’s ideology. The film does not deny Fork's 
fault  but it  raises the question of the responsibility of those who started the war 
verbally  through  the  affirmation  of  nationalist-religious  ideology  which  was  a 
justification for the armed conflict. In this sense, Fork remains a predator but is also a 
victim.  Dragojevic’s  film  testifies  not  only  that  the  war  was  bad  or  that  its 
participants were brutal murderers, but as I argue, it proposes that a great deal of the 
responsibility lies with the war ideologists. 
The character  of  Sloba,  the war-profiteer  and the one who insists  on nationalist-
religious bigotry from the beginning of the film, is the war ideologist. Sloba, who 
stands  for  Milosevic,  provokes  national  tensions  between  Milan,  who stands  for 
Serbs,  and Halil  who stands for the Muslims.  He tells  Halil  for example that  he 
cannot read Bosnian newspapers as they are too big to hold, “like a sheet”, but “they 
are good for Muslim prayer.”67 After a doctor in the military hospital in Belgrade 
reminds Milan that all patients are equal to him, whether Serbs or Muslims, and that 
67 DVD “Pretty Village Pretty Flame”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.
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they are all in a foreign country, we see Sloba visiting the hospital with bribes for the 
doctor. The doctor’s attitude may be associated with the official attitude of the time, 
that  Serbia  was not  involved in the Bosnian war.  The scene in which the doctor 
welcomes Sloba,  who gives him a painting of the  Kosovo Maiden, suggests  that 
Serbia was not a foreign country, but the motherland of the ideology based on the 
Kosovo Myth symbolically embodied in the painting. The symbolic meaning of this 
image will be discussed in the next section, on religious images in the film. 
5.4.2. Religious Images in the Film
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, like the next Dragojevic film Wounds, has a significant 
number of religious images. The films have plenty of scenes with religious symbols 
that refer to Serbian Orthodoxy. These images represent the modern iconography of 
the 1990s and they became an expression of nationalism rather than of the sacred. In 
the  Serbian  public  sphere  there  developed  a  “nationalist  cult  of  images”68 which 
David  Morgan  has  discussed  and  which  is  not  a  uniquely  Serbian  phenomenon. 
Similar trends and elements can be found in American civil religion, where “the cult 
of  nationhood” developed symbols  that gained “iconic  status” and were used “to 
promote American patriotism and nationalism.”69 Religious images in the film are 
not intrusive, and their function is similar to that of the music in the film: they inform 
us of the cultural context and of the increase of  historical and Orthodox ideas in the 
public sphere, which was connected directly with the rise of nationalism.  
A sign that reappears continuously in the film is the cross with the four “s” whichone 
of  the  characters,  the  Professor,  wears  on  his  helmet70 (see  Figure  2).  This  sign 
68 Morgan, David: The Sacred Gaze, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
2005, p. 130. 
69 Morgan, David: Ibid, p. 130. 
70 Four “s” usually refers to the slogan: ‘Only unity saves Serbs’ (‘Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava’). 
Besides this populist interpretation, according to the historical sources these four “s” placed around 
four sides of the cross actually come from the Byzantine empire and the naval flag of the dynasty of 
Palaeologus.  Originally these were four Greek letters  “V”, which refer  to Jesus Christ  (Βασιλευς 
Βασιλεών Βασιλευοντων Βασιλευουσισ,  The  King  of  kings  who  reigns  over  the  queen  of  cities 
Constantinople, and according to the second version it means: O King help the King of the Queen of 
Cities-Constantinople)
http://www.nasasrbija.co.yu/skupstina/t_stolica13-1_3.htm; Last accessed: 18/7/2008.
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emerged in the public sphere at the beginning of the 1990s basically for politically 
purposes. The aim was to remind Serbs that only through unity, in the political sense 
of  the  1990s,  can  they maintain  their  state,  political  and national  integrity.  Four 
letters “s” stand as symbols for this unity and they are placed around the cross that 
stands for Orthodox Christianity. In this sense the state is not understood as a secular 
state but as a form of Orthodox national state that will unite all Serbs. Paradoxically 
this sign is worn by a professor who, as we have previously seen, was criticized by 
Fork as an intellectual lacking Serbdom. 
Figure  2:  Professor with the cross with  four “S”;  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame.  With  courtesy of 
“Cobra Film.”
This symbol mainly represents a visual public celebration of Serbian nationalism that 
took place in the 1990s. In the battlefield, where it usually appeared as graffiti on the 
wall,  the image had the function of a symbolic marker of territory expressing the 
desirable  extension  of  the  real  borders  of  Serbia.  This  image  has  been  included 
within the coat of arms, and since 2004 has been on the official state flag of the 
Republic of Serbia. It is also on the official flag of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Its 
meaning  varies  according  to  the  socio-political  and  historical  context  but  in  the 
context of the 1990s, it has nationalist connotations and stands as one of the symbols 
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of the nationalist-religious ideology of the 1990s. The sacramental image in this case 
receives the connotation of a social image. The sacramental is excluded in favour of 
a  social  image that  serves  as  a  source for  national,  social,  cultural  and religious 
identification. In this sense, we see a progression of this image from sacramental to 
socio-political. For many who survived the war, in former republics, this image still 
stands as a symbol of  Serbian nationalism. Certainly, sacramental connotation is lost 
in this context.
One of the most  provocative images is  certainly the one of Fork,  trapped in the 
tunnel, with an Orthodox cross hanging next to his head while he is firing a machine 
gun, giving a Muslim name to each bullet (See Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Fork with a cross and a bullet. Pretty Village, Pretty Flame. With courtesy of “Cobra Film.”
This powerful scene paints not only Fork's personal religiosity as it may appear at the 
first  moment,  but  reflects  the  deviation  of  religion  and Orthodoxy in  the  1990s. 
Again this does not represent criticism of religion per se, but its political misuse both 
by war  ideologists  and by the  church representatives.  In  the  1990s  therefore  the 
public image of the cross does not symbolize a call to redemption but a nationalist 
form of expression, a call to arms and fratricidal war. Paradoxically in the name of 
Christ  and righteousness,  Serbs  are  called  to  perform a  sacred  war  against  their 
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neighbours  who are  perceived  as  the  perpetrators.  The cross  therefore  no  longer 
stands as an image of love for neighbours but as a deviated image, an image of war. 
The ruling nationalist-religious ideology and its  direct impact is embodied in this 
scene of Fork with the cross and the machine gun. The absence of the church's public 
mission  to  build  peace  resulted  in  subordinating  Orthodox  Christianity  to  the 
nationalist ideology of the time. Unity in the bloodshed of neighbours replaced unity 
in Christlike love. 
The symbol of the fist with three fingers up is a greeting that demonstrates belonging 
to the Serbian Orthodox nation.71 Under the sign is  written the slogan “Serbia to 
Tokyo”, a populist catch-phrase used by the most militant warlords which reflected, 
even if  there is  an element of humour there,  the tendency to include all  Serbian 
territories in what is called “Greater Serbia.”72 (See Figure 4) 
The greeting with three fingers up was widely used in the 1990s and its meaning 
varied,  from a  nationalist  greeting to  the  symbol  of  resistance  against  Milosevic 
during the demonstrations in 1991. This is again one of the images that signifies the 
connection between the religious and national in the contemporary political context. 
Serbs  are  to  be  united  as  one  people,  of  one  blood  and  faith  under  Orthodox 
Christianity in one state, an ideology widely promoted, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, in all areas of public life.   
71 In the Orthodox Church believers cross themselves with three fingers,  and this  sign stands in 
populist interpretation as a symbol for Serbs as Orthodox.
72  See chapter 3.
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Figure 4: Milan in front of the symbol of the fist with three fingers raised.  Pretty Village, Pretty  
Flame. With courtesy of “Cobra Film.”
The image of the Kosovo Maiden in one of the hospital scenes has both national and 
religious character. The legend of the Kosovo Maiden is a part of the Kosovo Myth. 
According to this legend the Kosovo maiden was a fiancée of one of the Serbian 
knights and she  came to Kosovo field, after the battle, to find her beloved one. She 
carried wine and bread for wounded soldiers. She has a sacral rather than medical 
role as she gives the soldiers a last communion, weeping over them. The painting in 
the film ironically suggests the ideological concept of the civil war as a just war: 
Serbian soldiers are martyrs and the war in Bosnia is a continuation of the Kosovo 
battle.  The  war  profiteer,  Sloba,  who  gives  the  painting  as  a  gift  to  a  doctor, 
symbolizes Milosevic as a bearer of this ideological concept. The image has not only 
a symbolic but also a subversive connotation in the film, since Sloba does not in fact 
care for soldiers but uses the war as a source of personal extra profit.  
5.4.3. The Emergence of Pseudo-History
Ideological  discourse  is  presented  in  the  film  in  the  form of  an  obsession  with 
national history. The film offers plenty of indicators of the emergence of pseudo-
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history as an inseparable element in the formation of nationalist-religious ideology. 
These are represented in the subtext  of the film. For example,  in the scene with 
Fork's speech about Serbs being the oldest nation we discover the pseudo-historical 
ideas affirmed in Serbia in the early 1990s. At another point in the film a soldier in 
the  hospital  sings  a  song “who says,  who lies  that  Serbia  is  small”,  next  to  the 
Christmas tree decorated with a sign of the Orthodox cross with four “s.” Not only 
did  this  song  embody  the  political  desire  of  Milosevic's  ideologists  for  Greater 
Serbia, but also it was used to underline the importance of the historical moment of 
the 1990s and the reunion of Serbs under the chosen leader, Slobodan Milosevic. 
A scene of recruiting of volunteer soldiers and a short conversation between Fork 
and  a  street  salesman  who  sells  flags  and  other  nationalist  emblems,  show  the 
commercialization of mythology. At the same time, the scene reveals how mythology 
replaced  reality:  how  reality  is  supposed  to  represent  just  a  continuation  of  the 
mythological  existence  of  the  nation.  The  whole  scene  is  set  in  the  night  of 
mobilization, and looks almost surreal. The absurd arguments of a street salesman 
are followed by the strong rhythm of the trumpets, under a black flag on which is 
written: With Faith in God - Freedom or Death. The so-called “market of history and 
Orthodoxy” was common in Serbia, especially in the early 1990s. 
The film depicts  the increase in nationalist  songs popularised in Serbia  and their 
political connotations, whose aim was to invoke a memory of a glorious and heroic 
past  before  the  establishment  of  Tito’s  Yugoslavia.  An  awakened  sense  of 
nationalist-religious  identity  was  successful  because  of  the  re-interpretation  of 
history and the use of religious myths. These were commonly used to show the civil 
war as a just conflict. 
5.4.4. Representation of Media Propaganda in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame
 
The  film  shows  how  the  conflict  was  first  initiated  in  the  regime's  media  with 
language  which  contributed  to  the  escalation  of  the  war.  In  the  scene  where  he 
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introduces us to the two characters Fork and Lazar,  we discover more about this 
media discourse.  Lazar, his family and neighbours are all gathered around one TV 
set,  where they are devotedly watching a news broadcast on Radio Television of 
Serbia, RTS. The scene is set in a rural area, which could be anywhere in Serbia, an 
area covered only by RTS since all the other independent stations at that time hardly 
covered even the whole city of Belgrade. Images of destruction are followed by the 
voice  of  the  regime's  journalist.  In  the  news  that  Lazar  is  watching  Serbs  are 
victimized  while  others  were  identified  as  enemies  and  predators:  Croats  were 
identified  with  Ustashi  from the  Second  World  War  and Bosnian  Muslims  with 
Turks from the Ottoman Empire.  Media propaganda frequently refers to  Bosnian 
Muslims as Jihad warriors. Serbian people are at the same time depicted as the nation 
that  fights  against  the  “new  world  order.”  The  new  world  order  was  a  phrase 
commonly used by Milosevic's ideologists but also within the Church. Phrases such 
as this one that Dragojevic includes in scenes with media propaganda, reveal the 
complex political machinery that was behind this phrase. Historical injustices against 
Serbs, that are reiterated over and over again in the media, as we see in the film, echo 
the arguments of Milosevic's warlords. Dragojevic's depiction of the role of media 
propaganda is not to be underestimated, as its place in the film is not simply to justify 
Lazar's actions, but rather to show how Milosevic's ideology was promoted by media 
propaganda. Motivated by the media's interpretation of the war Lazar decides to join 
the army.  He is convinced that he is defending Orthodoxy and Serbdom from an 
Islamic  invasion.  Ironically  when  he  hitch-hikes  to  the  battlefield,  the  man  who 
drives him there is a Muslim. Lazar remains confused with the situation, incapable of 
recognizing that he is deluded by local mythologies.  
5.4.5. The Serbian Perception of Others
The Bosnian Muslim characters are represented through the eyes of the main Serbian 
characters. Our perception of  others in that sense depends on the gaze of Serbian 
soldiers which was “an important premise of the scenario.”73 Apart for Halil and the 
73 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, 25.01.2008.
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postman Nazim, Bosnian Muslims are rarely represented in the film. The depiction 
of Bosnian Muslims in the pre-war period is  significantly different  from the one 
during the war time. In the scenes that take place during the conflict we see Muslim 
soldiers  only as  shadows.  Shadowy soldiers  again  can  be  differently  interpreted. 
Since we see them primarily through the eyes of Serbs they are impersonal figures, 
since  the  perception  of  other  as  neighbour  (my italics) no longer  exists.  Former 
neighbours  are  enemies  now,  whose  deformed  voices  represent  the  complete 
distortion of their image as human beings. 
On  the  other  hand  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  film both  Halil  and  Nazim are 
portrayed positively. Halil's image remains human till the very end, which suggests 
that in spite of participating in the conflict against him Milan did not forget their 
friendship  and  the  bonds  they  had.  Another  suggestion  is  that  Serbs  see  their 
neighbours, Bosnian Muslims, as some kind of mythological figures of Turks, their 
so-called traditional enemies, rather than as the real people with whom they used to 
live. On the other hand Nazim's destiny is not revealed to us, we know only segments 
of his past that connected with the story of Milan and Halil's friendship. Nazim is 
portrayed as a naïve, ordinary villager, who honestly believed in the Yugoslav idea 
of fraternity; this is clearly demonstrated in the scene when Nazim is leaving, with 
Tito's picture on the car that Nazim is taking to his refugee life. This scene suggests 
the exodus that  is  to  come, of  the Muslim population in the Bosnian areas  with 
Serbian majorities.
The atrocities of Bosnian Muslims are shown in the scene of Marko's death, which 
we do not see, but hear the sounds of the agony of the dying youngster. This scene 
allows the reading that Dragojevic was proposing that all sides are guilty in the war. 
In the director's view his intention was to show that atrocities were committed on 
both sides, and to say differently “would be a lie.”74  The director draws a parallel 
between both sides rather than making an obvious political statement. Similarities 
between Serbs and Muslims lie in their  sense of humour but also in killing,  two 
74 Paraphrased Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame Questionnaire”,  personal  e-mail, 
(25/01/2008)
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things that frequently overlap throughout the film. However, although this portrayal 
allows diverse reading,  including the one that  the film showed Bosnian Muslims 
equally  as  war  criminals,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  the  film does  not  aim to 
provide a political analysis of the war, but rather to paint the Serbian participants and 
the ideological discourse that was justifying their actions. 
The  most  common  names  for  Bosnian  Muslims  used  in  the  film  are  “balije”, 
“circumcised”  and “Turks”,  which are the terms used in Milosevic's  media.  This 
shows how for Serbs, their former neighbours, Bosnian Muslims, became foreigners 
and deadly enemies. The designation of former neighbors as “Turks” was a result of 
pseudo-history, myths and religion in the political discourse of Slobodan Milosevic, 
and the director shows how people influenced by this ideology now perceived their 
former  neighbors  and  friends  in  a  completely  different  way.  The  film  however, 
paradoxically, shows more commonalities between Serbs and Muslims than actual 
diversities. People from Bosnia, besides sharing the same language, were bonded by 
the same ideology of brotherhood and unity. At the beginning of the 1990s ethnicity 
and religious belonging became political issues. This is a result of the emergence of 
the  nationalist-religious  ideology which was in  the service  of  the  strong pro-war 
propaganda.
Some critics claimed that the character of the American journalist was created for 
Westerners who should sympathize with Serbs through her eyes. However, there is 
more potential in this character in the film. Rather than standing just as a kind of 
political message to the foreign audience she also reveals the Serbian self-perception. 
By self-perception I mean mainly the stereotypes and perception of masculinity that 
exist within the Serbian culture. By using these stereotypes the director deconstructs 
the image of macho-Serbs. Through the brutal treatment of an American journalist by 
Serbs we find about  the brutality  of the  Balkan man towards women,  and about 
violence as a cultural model of communication.
More importantly, she indicates something that has been overlooked so far in reading 
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this character. She is the depiction of the Serbian perception of the West and she also 
reveals  the  unscrupulous  attitude  of  Milosevic's  regime  towards  the  international 
community. Dragojevic also paints this problem in his next film Wounds where the 
news on National TV about the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the international 
community, is followed by the trivial lines of a folk-song: “nobody can do anything 
to us, we are stronger than destiny, those who doesn't like us and can only hate us.” 
In  this  way Dragojevic  depicts  a  certain  carelessness of  society in  general  about 
isolation from the international community.  The sense of self-satisfaction verging on 
absurdity and xenophobia coloured with strong prejudice against the West whose 
media  was  perceived  as  demonizing  all  Serbs,  was  spread  through  Milosevic's 
nationalist ideology and was supported by media discourse, as we have seen in the 
previous  analysis  of  the  cinematic  representation  of  media  propaganda.  As 
mentioned  in  Chapter  3,  this  anti-Western  attitude  was  equally  supported  by the 
Church leaders who created a discourse about the West as a cultural and political 
entity  which  never  supported  and  appreciated  the  Serbian  struggle  throughout 
history. Not surprisingly the only one who has decent communication with the West 
that the American journalist stands for, is Brzi, the urban junkie. The interaction of 
Serbs  with an  American journalist  reveals  existing frustrations  of  Serbs  with the 
West. The American journalist in the film mirrors the ideological trends of the 1990s, 
where demonization of the West through conspiracy theories promoted in the media, 
were used to justify the conflict. Her character reveals equally therefore the Serbian 
perception of their own self-image and the Serbian perception of the West which was 
to an important extent shaped by the nationalist-religious ideology of the 1990s.   
5.5. Conclusion
In  the  analysis  of  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame,  I  have  discussed  the  cinematic 
representation  of  nationalist-religious  ideology.  I  have  looked  at  the  cinematic 
depiction of the emergence of pseudo-history and mythological discourse in media 
propaganda.  I have also analysed religious images and nationalist  symbols  in the 
context of the film, elements that were frequently overlooked in existing readings of 
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this film. 
The analysis  of  the  main characters  shows  that  the  film depicted  the  process  of 
reconstruction of Serbian national identity in the 1990s and after the collapse of the 
socialist ideology of brotherhood and fraternity of Tito's era. I argue that rather than 
aiming to provide a simplified portrayal of  “victims and villains” the film framed 
ideological issues. In this sense I argue that the film is not taking the Serbian side by 
providing  sympathy  for  villains,  as  some  critics  claimed,  but  on  the  contrary  it 
subverts  the  Serbian  self-image  based  on  the  ideological  premises  of  the  1990s. 
First,  the  film  subverts  the  image  of  Serbian  warriors  as  brave  and  honest 
mythological  figures.  Second,  this  lack  of  division  of  the  characters  into  purely 
positive and negative makes them more realistic, as people with conflicts and doubts 
that  are  not  necessarily  represented  in  Hollywood  style  as  innocently  good  or 
completely bad .75 The director stated that his intention was to deal with the Serbian 
role in the conflict:
I think it is important to deal with this side, our crimes, our heroic deeds that 
took place, our sins.  What do I care about others? Let Croats and Muslims 
make films about themselves. In fact I am proud that it is us who were the first 
to make a film which does not portray their own side in a good light. Someone 
malicious  called  this  “traditional  Serbian  masochism.”  However,  if  there  is 
anything  positive  left  in  us,  this  is  it,  even  if  someone  wishes  to  call  it 
masochism.76  
In this sense I argued that the film offers a pro-Serbian perspective on the problems, 
one which often includes ironic self-introspection. Although black humour can create 
a sympathetic angle for the main characters which critics found as taking the Serbian  
side (my italics), the film is doing the exactly the opposite by offering a subversive 
portrayal of the Serbian self-image.  The representation of the characters, as already 
mentioned,  demystifies the ideal of honourable Serbian fighters as peasant-heroes 
75 See Deacy, Chris: Ibid,  p. 137.
76 Teofil Pancic and Ana Uzelac: Ibid.
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with brave hearts.77   
Further I have argued that the film subverts many other premises and images that 
represented the political ideology of the 1990s. First it is important to say that the 
film frames the nationalist-religious ideology as the dominant ideology of the 1990s. 
Second, the film reveals ideological and cultural clashes that existed in Serbia. The 
film shows that the nationalist ideology was supported by the former communists 
and that the communist ideology of Tito's time was replaced by another ideology, a 
nationalist-religious one. 
How this ideology was promoted we see through the cinematic  representation of 
Milosevic's media propaganda. The impacts of such ideology on so-called ordinary 
people  is  given  through  the  representation  of  the  motives  of  some  of  the  main 
characters for the participation in the war. Obsession with pseudo-history and local 
mythologies, such as that of Serbs being the oldest nation, are shown in several parts 
of the film. The scene of recruiting soldiers for the war, for example, unites all the 
symbols  of  the  ideology,  flags  of  chetniks from World  War  II,  people  crossing 
themselves, and the sound of trumpets with folk music, which all together show the 
rise of the nationalist  hysteria.  The emergence of pseudo-historical  content  and a 
populist version of Orthodoxy into into the public sphere, as it is depicted in the film, 
reveals the importance of the ideology in the escalation of the war.  
The film critically explores some of the fundamental stereotypes and myths upon 
which  Milosevic’s  populist  rhetoric  was  based.  There  are  several  ideological 
assumptions underlying the conflict in Serbia at the time that the film represented, 
such as that Serbs are a heavenly people78 who suffer because of their righteousness, 
that “God protects Serbs” because they are waging a defensive war, or that Serbs are 
a  martyr  nation  whose  suffering  is  caused  by  a  “world  conspiracy.”79 This 
77 See discussion of anthropologists Ivan Colovic on Serbian political myths in the section: “Skerlic i 
srpski politicki mitovi” in Colovic, Ivan: Politika simbola, Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2002, p. 125-
142.
78 See chapter 3.
79 See chapter 3.
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deconstruction of the nationalist-religious ideology is found in the sub-text of the 
film. Through analysis of the representation of religion and religious images we see 
that  the film depicted religion as inseparable  from the sense of national identity. 
Serbian Orthodoxy is shown in its deviant form of the 1990s, as a religious ideology 
unified with nationalism. The film provides pointers to the way in which nationalism 
and religious intolerance were directly connected. 
The  representation  of  the  conflict  as  a  continuation  of  the  historical  battle  for 
Serbdom is subverted through scenes where for example war sites are depicted as 
places  of  black  market.  The  symbol  of  an  ogre  in  the  tunnel  may  suggest  that 
primitivism and intolerance are among the main  preconditions  for  the success of 
populist ideologies rather than just being a symbol of the mythological force that is 
rooted  in  the  Balkans  mentality.  In  this  chapter  I  suggested  that  it  is  useful  to 
reconsider whether the film really offered a mythical understanding of the war or 
whether it actually subverted this idea. The film shows that this mythical reading was 
created by the regime's ideology and promoted through its media propaganda. This 
means that the mythical  reading of the war in the film is represented as a strand 
within  the  discourse  of  the  political  ideology of  the  1990s.  In  that  case  we can 
conclude that the film does not offer the stereotyped depiction of the war as a part of 
the  Balkan  destiny,  but  rather  attempts  to  explore  this  ideological  premise.  The 
representation of nationalist-religious ideology suggests that the idea of a mythical 
war in the film is subverted rather than promoted.
The  film  does  not  offer  solutions,  ambitious  explanations  or  explicit  political 
judgements.  On the  other  hand,  reading  the  film’s  sub-text  and understanding  it 
within the specific cultural context in which it was made,  enables us to see some of 
the subversive elements in the film. Dragojevic claims that he was interested only in 
“dealing with the Serbian side” which he finds as “the only fair approach” to the 
subject.80  This approach enables the viewers to see the Serbian ideological context of 
the 1990s and the Serbs' own perception of the Bosnian War. The director also shows 
80 Srdjan Dragojevic, “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame Questionnaire”, personal e-mail, (25/01/2008)
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the war as profitable for Milosevic's nationalists but at the same time destructive for 
others, victims of this ideological discourse. In that sense, this is a film about how 
the war destroyed not the Bosnian Muslims but the Serbs themselves. The film was 
primarily aimed at a Serbian audience rather than at a Bosnian or foreign one. As 
Iordanova argues,  this  film was  about  “making  Serbs  confront  their  own wrong-
doings” but with an “all-sides-are-guilty approach.”81 On the other hand subversive 
elements  found in this film point  to the political  discourse of the regime and its 
responsibility for the war. 
Pretty Village, Pretty Flame is an ambiguous film, and only when we look at its sub-
text  will  it  inform us  about  the  time when it  was  made and about  the  ideology 
promoted in Serbia that underpinned the war. To overlook these elements would be 
to read the film incorrectly. I have suggested in this chapter that by analyzing the text 
and subtext of the film we find the elements that can be considered as subversive. 
Describing the film as purely pro-Serbian or anti-Serbian as was frequently the case, 
would be an incorrect and oversimplified reading of the film. The film is far more 
complex because it reflects the ideological trends within which it was made, at the 
same time subverting some of these ideological  premises.  By doing this the film 
offered to a significant extent a criticism of the ideology of the 1990s.
 





Chapter 6 is devoted to the analysis of the film Wounds (Rane, Srdjan Dragojevic, 
1998). This is the second film in which Dragojevic tackles the issue of the Yugoslav 
break-up and the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. In this film he critically explores 
Serbian  society of  the  1990s.  The film was  received by some critics,  as  will  be 
discussed later, as the director's strongest anti-regime statement. As in his previous 
film Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, Dragojevic builds a complex narrative with a lot of 
symbolism. Analysis of this narrative and its contextualization will provide a fuller 
understanding  of  the  film  and  give  better  insights  into  the  socio-political 
circumstances in Serbia of the 1990s that the film describes. My central questions 
are: how did the film depict the impacts of nationalist-religious ideology on Serbian 
society and to what extent was this portrayal critical and subversive? In this sense I 
discuss in this chapter how the film shows the emergence of the regime's ideology 
and its connection to the criminalization of society.
In  the first  part  of  this  chapter,  6.1.,  I  briefly  discuss  film genre,  I  consider  the 
process of making the film and the film plot. In the second part, 6.2., I survey the 
critical reviews of the film and I discuss the most important themes. Although the 
film did not provoke the controversial debates that Pretty Village, Pretty Flame did, I 
find that not enough attention was given to certain issues that this film raises. My 
aim is to enrich this discussion by offering  new perspectives on Wounds. 
The next  two sections 6.3.  and 6.4.  are  the central  parts  of  this  chapter  and are 
devoted to the analysis of the film. I first discuss the main characters of the film who 
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I contextualize within the socio-cultural and political context of the 1990s. I explore 
the ideological and generational conflict of  fathers and sons  (my italics) that took 
place in the 1990s. I focus on the female characters in the film. My aim is to discuss 
the cinematic representation of three culturally dominant types, which though being a 
stereotypical portrayal provides an insight into the perception of women within the 
masculine  warrior  culture  of  the  1990s.  After  this  I  consider  the  depiction  of 
criminals and war profiteers, who are metaphors for the real people of the Serbian 
cultural and political milieu.  
In  section 6.4.  I  analyze  the  cinematic  representation  of  the  impacts  of  the  new 
political ideology of Slobodan Milosevic on Serbian society. In order to understand 
the connections that the director draws between ideological discourse, war, crime and 
the formation of the new culture of the 1990s I divide my analysis into four parts. 
First  I  look at  the how the film shows the rise of nationalism in Serbia  and the 
beginning of the war. There follows an analysis of nationalist and religious images in 
the film. Then the focus shifts to the cinematic representation of the role of media 
propaganda in the 1990s.  Finally,  I  look at  how the film depicted the Milosevic 
culture of the 1990s, the economic collapse and the formation of a new system of 
values. Section 6.5. is the conclusion in which I discuss the findings based on my 
analysis. 
6.1. Wounds (Rane, 1998)
In this section I consider genre, the process of making the film and the plot. 
6.1.1.Genre
Wounds is a social drama, with elements of film noir and black comedy. The fact that 
genre can be a negotiable term is plain in the case of  Wounds.  Some critics saw 
Dragojevic's film as “ironic play on genre” with elements of surrealism and political 
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and gangster satire.1 The film was also characterized as “americanized genre-riffing” 
and was compared to Tarantino style  movies.2 Satirical  representation of the new 
Serbian patriotism and “the ethics of killing”3, are issues that the film deals with, 
which  put  this  film beyond gangster  saga movies.  Because the film is  indirectly 
dealing with war, by portraying mobilization, war operations and war profiteers, it 
can  be  also  classified  as  a  war-genre  film.  The ideological  aspects  that  the  film 
portrays and their impacts on the social order and structure of society are elements 
that demand further consideration when identifying genre, especially when it comes 
to politically engaged films. Wounds offers almost a documentary depiction of social 
reality. Authentic footage from 1993 is integrated into the film narrative to express 
the realistic aspect of the story. These are some of the reasons why we cannot simply 
speak about Hollywood influences, and the difficulty of defining film genre is one of 
the initial issues that suggests this. In the next section we will see how this film was 
made and what the initial inspiration was for the director to make a story about crime 
in Belgrade of the 1990s. 
6.1.2. Making the Film 
The film was made in 1998, in a co-production between Canal+ and Pandora Film, 
Germany.  The  idea  for  the  film  came  out  at  the  time  when  Dragojevic  was 
considering  leaving  the  country  and  after  the  Athens  premier  of  Pretty  Village,  
Pretty Flame.4 Dragojevic wrote the script in only two weeks.5 The director said that 
he was inspired by the real conditions in society, in which crime became a dominant 
cultural model through the young criminals who ruled the Belgrade streets during the 
Milosevic regime. The director's intention was primarily to tell the story of Belgrade 
in  the  1990s  and the  young  generation  who were  most  affected  by  the  regime's 
politics.6 The change in ideological discourse influenced social and cultural changes 
1 Grossman, Andrew: Wounds, 
http://www.scope.nottingham.ac.uk/filmreview.php?issue=may2002&id=789&section=film_rev
2 Grossman, Andrew: Ibid.
3 See chapter 5.
4 Goran Bjelogrlic, credits, DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
5 Goran Bjelogrlic, credits, DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
6 See Srdjan Dragojevic, credits, DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
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which in turn created the specific culture of Milosevic's Serbia, the culture of the 
1990s, famous for the appearance of criminals who were dictating new values. Such 
a portrayal of reality required authentic heroes, actors who were a part of this culture. 
For the roles of Pinki and Kraut, from five thousand candidates Dragojevic chose 
young Dusan Pekic (Pinki)  and Milan Maric (Kraut),  boys who had no previous 
acting experience.7 The authenticity of having real boys from the street proved to be 
decisive for the director and successful for the film. The director wanted to make a 
story that would reflect elements from real life as much as possible. For the same 
reason, there is no   catharsis at the end of the film and no salvation for the main 
characters because that would not match  the reality of that time.8 
The team of Cobra Film, together with Dragojevic had to search for independent, 
private sponsors. The film also received financial help from the Serbian Ministry of 
Culture, to whom the director “presented a fake script”9 in order to raise the money. 
The associate producer of the film was Aleksandar Avramovic editor of the Radio 
Television of Serbia, TV RTS. Post production of the film was done in Athens. The 
film was completed within 78 shooting days  costing approximately  $800,000.10 It 
was not well received by politicians who tried to obstruct the distribution of the film 
that nevertheless became a block buster.11 The film had significant success in the 
former Yugoslav republics, and was also screened at international film festivals.12
7 Pekic and Maric are representatives of the Milosevic era generation who grew up in a period of 
isolation and sanctions.  
8 Dusan Pekic who played the role of Pinki  died in March 2000 from gun shot wounds at the age of 
twenty. Pekic, a youngster from Zemun (a Belgrade suburb and an area famous for crime), although 
never previously interested in school, after his outstanding performance in Wounds expressed a desire 
to study acting. Pekic's first and only travel abroad was to Athens for the premier of Wounds.  See: 
Odlazak Dusana Pekica, http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2000/03/29/srpski/K00032813.shtm; 
Last accessed; 23/09/2008.




10 See: Ramsey Nancy: Ibid.
11 See Anthony Kaufman and Dave Ratzlow: Interview: Yugoslav Filmmakers Fight A Different War,  
Speaking with Goran   Paskaljevic and Srdjan Dragojevic, 
http://www.indiewire.com/people/int_Yugoslavs_990727.html; Last accessed: 23/09/2008.
12 http://www.cobrafilm.com/site1/engleski.html, Last accessed: 23/09/2008.
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6.1.3. The Plot 
The  director dedicated the film to post-Tito generations, children born after Tito's 
death (1980) and who were growing up in  Milosevic's  Serbia and the system of 
values of the 1990s. This is a story about them but also about Serbian society during 
the Milosevic regime. The representatives of this so called lost generation in the film 
are Pinki and Kraut, two youngsters on their rise to the world of crime. Pinki and 
Kraut are symbols of the young, Milosevic-era generation. 
The story is set in a suburb of Belgrade, among the blocks of flats, some military, 
built in Tito's time. The film covers several years which are connected to the most 
turbulent events such as the beginning of the civil war in 1991, the fall of Vukovar, 
the exclusion of Serbia from the international community and sanctions followed by 
inflation in 1993, escalation of the war in other former republics of Yugoslavia, the 
fall of Krajina and the period of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.  In parallel 
with the story about two youngsters the director paints the different socio-political 
phases in Serbian society, from the emergence of nationalism in the early 1990s to 
massive demonstrations against the Milosevic regime in 1996. 
The opening scene set in 1996 introduces the main characters Pinki and Kraut. The 
first image is a close-up of the cross hanging in youngsters' car where they sit, while 
outside, demonstrations against Milosevic are taking place. Pinki is the narrator of 
the story which is given through his personal gaze. The story starts in 1991 with a 
scene of Yugoslav Army tanks going to Croatia and being greeted by the exalting 
masses.  The director  depicts  nationalist  hysteria  and  the tremendous support  that 
Milosevic had at the beginning of the 1990s. This picture however gradually changes 
through the  film.  The film shows the  impacts  of  such  politics  on the  growth  of 
poverty and the rise of crime, but also the  protests in 1996. For its main protagonists, 
Pinki and Kraut these changes come too late.
Like in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, where the tunnel is the main site of Milan's and 
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Halil's childhood but also the place of their tragic ending, in Wounds an abandoned 
graveyard has a similar function. The graveyard set on the hill above the blocks of 
flats is a depressing site that symbolizes the youngsters' life and signifies their tragic 
end.  The  only  promise  of  a  better  future  that  will  never  come  for  the  main 
protagonists is written on a bill-board advertising a Yugoslav airline with the slogan : 
“With us, to the world”.  The outside world is excluded from the society of the 1990s 
that is isolated, self-sufficient, with a different system of values and its own rules. 
Pinki and Kraut are boys who learn how to play according to these new rules. The 
whole story is told through the character of Pinki: he is the story teller and we see the 
world through his eyes. 
The boys enter the world of crime quite early, at the age of thirteen, impressed by 
their  neighbour  Kure  (Dragan  Bjelogrlic),  a  criminal  who  committed  robberies 
abroad, mostly in Germany, but who later on based his business in Belgrade and 
became a war-profiteer. As many other criminals of that time, Kure is a so-called 
weekend-warrior 13 which was common in Serbia in the 1990s. Kure, as a model of a 
successful criminal becomes an idol of the two boys and their teacher. Both Pinki 
and  Kraut  are  of  a  similar  background,  Kraut  is  an  orphan  who  lives  with  his 
grandmother and Pinki is a son of a retired officer of the former Yugoslav Army.  
The main entertainment of the youngsters, and their teacher Kure is to watch a TV 
show together called “The Beat of the Street”, whose director is Lydia, the mother of 
Pinki's  and  Kraut's  friend  Darko.  Darko  is  their  only  friend,  and  a  boy  who 
desperately tries to  imitate  his  two friends but  nevertheless  gets  bullied by them 
throughout the film. “The Beat of the Street” is a TV show that hosts top criminals, 
who in this way receive celebrity status. The dream that the boys and their teacher 
share  is  to  appear  as  guests  one  day  in  Lydia's  show and  in  that  way  confirm 
themselves as class criminals. 
Pinki and Kraut irrevocably grow into young criminals, while drugs and brutality 
13 This term was used as jargon for people who would go to the battle zones for several days in 
month mainly to commit robberies and other crimes. 
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become a part of their every day life. They abandon school and their parents do not 
have  any control  over  them anymore.  Their  teacher,  Kure,  who becomes a  drug 
addict,  is  murdered  and  Pinki  and  Kraut  continue  their  criminal  careers 
independently. Kure's murder, as it is revealed later, surprisingly is not performed by 
a criminal but by Darko, the third boy who wanted to become like his friends Pinki 
and Kraut. 
At the time of the biggest economic crisis Pinki and Kraut live a privileged life style 
of expensive cars and easy money and become rulers of their area. Pinki and Kraut 
however live in a different world from their parents who are at that time struggling 
with galloping inflation. The desperation on the Belgrade streets is contrasted to the 
expensive  life  of  the  criminals.  After  they  murder  a  TV  journalist  and  proved 
themselves to be real tough guys, their dream finally comes true and they are invited 
to Lydia's TV show. Their appearance on TV represents a turning point in their life. 
Kraut starts a relationship with Darko's mother and TV star, Lydia, which proves at 
the end to be fatal for his friendship with Pinki. After their appearance in the favorite 
show, Pinki's father, Stojan, shocked by the revelation that his son is a criminal, first 
offers to join him in his activities but later on commits suicide. After this event, Pinki 
and  Kraut  become  even  more  brutal,  robbing,  torturing  and  killing  people.  The 
transformation of the boys from suburbia into bestial criminals is complete.   
Their activities put them into dangerous situations of revenge by other criminals and 
they decide to leave the country with the help of Lydia. Lydia who has connections 
in the state security provides them with false passports. After Lydia brings a passport 
to  Pinki,  Kraut  overwhelmed with  jealousy,  shoots  Pinki  inflicting  five  wounds. 
Pinki survives but according to their unwritten rule, their friendship can be restored 
only if Pinki gives his friend five equal wounds.  Kraut kills Lydia, in his own words, 
only “to show appreciation”14 for his wounded friend. 
The film ends with Pinki and Kraut in the graveyard of their childhood games, where 
14 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
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the only change is that now the billboard in the background has a new slogan, this 
time “democracy light.” Pinki is shooting at his friend trying to make the same five 
wounds, and they are making jokes with each other contemplating lost meaning and 
having no goal any more. Darko who wants to avenge his mother, attacks them and 
puts an end to Pinki's and Kraut's bloody ritual of reconciliation. The conflict  of 
these three boys, former friends, becomes a blood bath and in the end they all die.
6.2. Critical Reception of the Film 
In this section I discuss the critical reception of the film by both international and 
Serbian critics and scholars.  Wounds was classified as a film that uses patterns of 
film  noir.15 Foreign  critiques  frequently  compared  it  to  Trainspotting  and Pulp 
Fiction.16 The film was widely accepted by the audience of the former Yugoslavia as 
a film in which Dragojevic openly criticized the Milosevic regime. In this  sense, 
Wounds is  surely  a  less  controversial  film  than  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame. 
Although Dragojevic was perceived as a director who tells the story from the Serbian 
side, in the case of Wounds, he was not criticized for a lack of objectivity. The film 
was  received  with  sympathy  as  an  interesting  combination  of  “irony,  satire, 
surrealism,  an  absurdity  and  black  humor.”17 Black  humor  is  one  of  the  main 
characteristics of  Dragojevic's  films because it  reflects  life  in  Belgrade as “daily 
tragicomic, in which we developed this black humor to survive.”18
The film was the most viewed Serbian film shown in Croatia in 1999. The film had a 
similar  reception  in  other  former  republics.  It  was  also  shown  in  the  Sundance 
Festival, Berlin, Toronto, and Ljubljana Film Festivals. It received two Grand-prix 
awards  in  Stockholm  and  the  Fipresci  award  in  Thessaloníki.19 The  film  won 
15 Krtsic, Igor: “Serbia's Wound Culture, Teenage Killers in Milosevic's Serbia:  Srdjan Dragojevic's 
Rane (1998)”, in Andrew James Horton, ed.:  The Celluloid Tinderbox: Yugoslav screen reflections of  
a turbulent decade, e-book, http://www.kinoeye.org/03/10/celluloidtinderbox.pdf.; Last accessed: 
26/10/2008.
16 Ramsey Nancy: Ibid.
17 Ramsey Nancy: Ibid. 
18 Ramsey Nancy: Ibid.
19 http://www.cobrafilm.com/site1/engleski.html
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international  critics'  prizes  at  the  Venice  Film  Festival  and  the  European  Film 
Awards, gaining worldwide distribution.20 In Serbia, “the Serbian government tried 
to  limit  exposure of  Wounds,  forbidding publicity  and creating what  the  director 
called a complete media blackout.”21 “Wounds opened in May 1998, with a record 
30,000  admissions  the  first  week,  according  to  Variety.  Then  state-controlled 
television  and  radio  banned  ads;  newspapers  were  ordered  not  to  list  theaters 
screening it.”22 
This film has been seen as one in which the film makers are “more interested in their 
own  identity.”23 The  changing  identities  in  the  1990s  remain  in  the  focus  of 
Dragojevic's critical exploration of the reality of that period. Although this story of 
violence  was  recognized  as  self  critical  introspection,  a  number  of  scholars  and 
critics failed to identify the significance of the film as a story about the regime that 
provided  a  strong  criticism  of  society's  dominant  ideology.  Ivana  Kronja  for 
example, argues that Serbian films, and among them  Wounds, offered “more of a 
description of the state of society than a deeper explanation of its crisis.”24 Although 
she finds that Dragojevic's film dealt with media manipulation more than any other 
film, Kronja concludes that Serbian films in general “fail to give an analytic insight 
into the mechanism of violence in the society, to trace its origins and mechanisms of 
cancer-like spreading.”25 My aim is to demonstrate in this chapter that this film not 
only gave a description of the state of the society in the 1990s, but did also point to 
the causes of violence. 
One of the most complete analysis of both Dragojevic's  films was given by Igor 
20 Anthony Kaufman and Dave Ratzlow: Ibid.
21 “We had to struggle against that, traveling from town to town with word of mouth publicity, he 
says. And it worked. Wounds was the biggest grossing Serbian film in Belgrade after the war and the 
first  Serbian  film  to  reach  success  in  the  neighboring  republics.”  Anthony  Kaufman  and  Dave 
Ratzlow: Ibid.
22 Ramsey Nancy: Ibid,  22/08/1999; Last accessed: 26/11/2008.
23 Iordanova, Dina: Balkan Cinema in the 90s: An Overview, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-76560786.html
24 Kronja, Ivana: Violence as a Cause of and a Response to Frustration: Serbian Cinema and 
Violence Culture, 1990-2004, http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/kronja%20paper.pdf; 
Last accessed: 22/11/2008.
25 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
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Krstic.26 Krstic  approaches  the  film  as  a  cultural  text  in  order  “to  provide  a 
psychoanalytic  reading  of  Serbian  cultural  self-reflection  during  the  time  of  the 
Milosevic  regime.”27 Krstic  reads  the  film  as  “a  metaphor  for  a  culture  that  is 
traumatized by endless war and everyday violence.”28 My analysis follows Krstic's 
argument and in this sense I highlight the most important aspects of the Milosevic 
culture that are represented in the film. I suggest that these aspects provided criticism 
of  the  cultural  climate  of  the  1990s  and  identified  the  political  ideology  of  the 
Milosevic  regime as  being  responsible  for  the  formation  of  such  a  culture.  This 
criticism of ideology in the film has been overlooked and not explored enough. The 
film criticises  the  main  premises  of  the  ideological  discourse  of  the  regime that 
generated and promoted violence as the new cultural and socio-political model.
6.3. Contextualization of the Characters
For further analysis  of the film it  is important first  to situate  its  main characters 
within the 1990s socio-cultural milieu. Contextualization of the characters enables us 
to understand that this is not just a film about youngsters from suburbia who are by 
their  background  predisposed  to  become  criminals,  but  rather  a  story  about  the 
regime which is  the  main  cause  of  the  social  deviation  that  occurred  during the 
1990s. The film represents a form of self-retrospection which reveals the issue of 
identity crisis that came as a consequence of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the 
death of one ideology. This is a film about how crime emerged due to the Milosevic 
regime and how this affected the youngest population of this time. In this sense it is 
not a universal story about crime but a depiction of the criminalization of Serbian 
society  which  was  a  concrete  consequence  of  the  regime.  Characters  are  a 
26 See: Krstic, Igor:Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and 
Identity through Popular Culture, http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/ and Krtsic, Igor: “Serbia's 
Wound Culture, Teenage Killers in Milosevic's Serbia: Srdjan Dragojevic's Rane (1998)”, in Andrew 
James Horton, ed.:  The Celluloid Tinderbox: Yugoslav screen reflections of a turbulent decade, e-
book, http://www.kinoeye.org/03/10/celluloidtinderbox.pdf; Last accessed: 19/09/2008.
27 See: Krstic, Igor: Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and 
Identity through Popular Culture, http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/ 
28 Krtsic, Igor: Ibid, in Andrew James Horton, ed.: Ibid, 
http://www.kinoeye.org/03/10/celluloidtinderbox.pdf.
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“stylization of real, common characters in mid-nineties Serbia.”29 
The  analysis  of  the  characters  is  divided  into  three  parts.  First  I  analyze  the 
relationship  between  a  so-called  older  generation,  represented  mainly  by  Pinki's 
father, and youngsters represented by Pinki's and Kraut's characters. I explore their 
differences embodied in principal values which are shaped by the dominant political 
ideology  of  the  1990s.  The  next  section  of  my  analysis  is  devoted  to  the 
contextualization of female characters in the film, which I have divided according to 
the cinematic representation of the three dominant types. In the last part I discuss the 
representation  of  criminals,  and  how  the  director  describes  the  link  between 
organized crime and civil war. 
The contextualization of the characters  contributes to a  fuller  reading and deeper 
understanding of the film but also sheds light on the issues of Serbian society in the 
1990s. Dragojevic is interested in an average person,  in why and what drives them to 
certain  behaviour.  Although  in  the  end  Pinki  and  Kraut  are  no  longer  ordinary 
characters, they are a metaphor for the whole young generation affected by the social 
and political system in which to be a criminal was a popular and desirable life style. 
The  deep  crisis  of  Serbian  society  is  shown  through  the  main  characters.  They 
provide an insight into the internal issues and everyday problems of 1990s Serbia. 
The contextualization of the characters helps in understanding the social groups of 
the 1990s and also in understanding which real people they stand for as a metaphor: 
for example Kure and his girlfriend Suzana symbolize the warlord Arkan and his 
wife, the folk-singer Ceca. These are all the important aspects that will be considered 
in  the analysis  of  the characters.  In  the next  section  I  consider  how the director 
depicted the conflict between the so-called old and young generations. 
 
6.3.1. Fathers and Sons
Pinki and Kraut represent this new generation of young people in Serbia faced with 
29 Kronja, Ivana: Ibid.
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the  collapse  of  the  ideology of  their  fathers,  and  the  rise  of  the  new nationalist 
ideology. Differently from the previous generations born for example in 1970s, and 
who can be considered as bearers of resistance against the Milosevic regime, the 
post-Tito generation is usually taken as the one more shaped and indoctrinated by the 
values  of  the  1990s.  They  were  not  old  enough to  remember  life  in  the  former 
Yugoslavia, as they were children when the disintegration of Yugoslavia started with 
the emerging of nationalism in the late 1980s. Isolated from the outside world, raised 
in a time of war and economic crisis, with no chance to travel abroad, not even to the 
former republics, recognized now as enemy countries, the youngest population of 
Serbia was exposed to the cultural model of violence and brutality. The emergence of 
pro-war propaganda and hate speech resulted in the emergence of various forms of 
violence. The economic crisis and isolationist politics allowed the development of 
organized  crime and a  culture  of  violence,  which  were  supported  by  the  media, 
which  is  another  issue  that  will  be  discussed  later.  Violence  became a  mode of 
expression and was closely connected to crime and the war. It remained a social and 
cultural phenomenon of the 1990s.  
Crime developed in suburban areas where at  an early stage of life kids from the 
tower  blocks  chose the pattern of  their  idols,  famous criminals  affirmed through 
public discourse. The public celebration of violence which became “a shared social 
space” offered to youngsters a possibility of identification with criminals, who were 
very  often  recognized  by  the  official  media  as  war-heroes  and  patriots.30 The 
possibility  of  a  moment  of  glory  that  this  life  style  was  offering  to  anonymous 
youngsters appeared to be more attractive than a life on the margins of society. 
Pinki and Kraut are growing up in the time of the emergence of nationalism as the 
dominant  social  and  political  principle.  Their  involvement  in  crime  develops  in 
parallel with the rise of crime in society.  The more crime becomes the dominant 
cultural model the more Pinki and Kraut follow this new way of life. Besides Pinki 
and Kraut, the director introduces us to several other characters that support and help 
30 Krstic, Igor:Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and Identity  
through Popular Culture, http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/
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in understanding the story of the two boys. Kraut lives alone with his grandmother, 
as indicated in the film, a Serb from Croatia, who survived World War II.  In one 
scene she is telling the story of Ustashi atrocities during the Second World War and 
that she survived.31 The effect of her story is accomplished by the use of  black 
humor,  the  boys  gives  her  a  marijuana  cigarette,  which  gives  her  story  a  funny 
upturn, she talks about Ustashi who “walk on the water while holding knives in their 
mouth.”32 Her story is followed by a surreal scene in the background which gives it a 
dimension of hyperbolized mythical tale rather than describing a real life event.33 
More importantly, her story is a parable for the ideological discourse of the regime's 
media who were representing Croats as purely evil by reminding the viewer of the 
role that the Ustashi had in the genocide committed against Serbs during World War 
II.  
The film devotes much more space to Pinki's parents. As is shown from the very 
beginning of the film, they are typical supporters of Milosevic's politics.
Pinki's father, Stojan a retired officer of the JNA (Yugoslav Army) is represented as 
a fan of the new leader Slobodan Milosevic. Through Stojan's character is shown the 
emergence of nationalism into everyday life. In an argument with his neighbor,  for 
example, Stojan curses her for being Croat, while his wife, Pinki's mother, a typical 
housewife, is trying to calm him down and convince him that the neighbor is actually 
“one  of  us.”  Stojan  is  in  favour  of  the  new  political  ideology,  he  watches  the 
television  news  on  RTS  devotedly  and  openly  supports  the  war  operations.  He 
expresses firm elation while watching the fall  of Vukovar for example.  Stojan is 
shown to  be  a  believer  (my  italics),  as  a  man  who  blindly  follows  his  political 
leaders. Early in the film he is shown as a devoted communist. In the film in the 
scenes given in flashback we see that he named his son, Pinki, after the partisan child 
hero from World War II and we see him weeping over Tito's death. Back in 1991 we 
see Stojan putting on the wall Milosevic's picture and swearing at the neighbor, who 
31 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
32 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
33 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
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supports  the  opposition  leader  Vuk  Draskovic.34 Stojan's  attitude  represent  the 
attitude of the majority of the population in 1991 indoctrinated by propaganda, in 
which the opposition was demonized and Milosevic glorified. Milosevic's picture on 
the wall replaced Tito's portrait. Tito's photograph now lies on the kitchen table and 
serves as a kind of tray: the marshal's face is half-covered with jars. Through Stojan's 
character, Dragojevic shows the shift of former communists to nationalists, as was 
done in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame with the character of Gvozden. This topic is one 
of the central issues identified in both Dragojevic's films and it will be discussed 
more in detail in the following sections. Stojan, is also depicted as a tough father, as 
a typical military officer who solves all problems with his son by acts of violence. He 
beats his son Pinki in order to stop him to hanging out with criminals. In this way 
violence remains a form of communication that is transmitted from father to son, and 
that is dominant in the whole film as a model of communication with others. 
Towards the end of the film both Pinki's parents and Kraut's grandmother change 
their  political  attitudes.  They do not  support  Milosevic any more as the political 
climate in Serbia changes.  In the year 1995 and after Krajina fell, Stojan rapidly 
changes his political attitude. He calls Milosevic a traitor, and after hearing the news 
on television yells from his balcony “betrayal.” Kraut's grandmother's reaction to the 
same event is different from Stojan's anger, she sits motionless in front of television. 
The indication that this was probably one of the crucial events causing her to change 
her political attitudes is given at the end of the film: Kraut reveals to Pinki that his 
grandma died probably because she was scared as she voted for the first time against 
Milosevic.  The  fall  of  Krajina  in  1995  is  indicated  as  the  turning  point  for  the 
political awakening of these characters. From this time, Stojan remains disillusioned 
with  his  beliefs,  which  gradually,  together  with  persistent  economic  crises  and 
34 Vuk Draskovic, a controversial political figure and writer, was a leader of the first demonstrations 
against Milosevic in 1991. “He became one of the founders of the political opposition when President 
Slobodan Milosevic allowed multi-party politics in 1990, and for much of the 1990s was seen as the 
most prominent opposition figure in Serbia... Yet in spite of his bitter experiences at the hands of Mr 
Milosevic's regime, Mr Draskovic began to move closer to the government following his electoral 
defeats at the end of 1997.” Vuk Draskovic became a Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 2006. In the 
recent parliamentary elections held in may 2008 he joined the coalition “ ZES- Za Evropsku Srbiju” 
(“For European Serbia). See: Profile: Vuk Draskovic, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/316216.stm; Last accessed: 11/08/2007.
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awareness that these beliefs led his son to a criminal life, lead him to suicide.
For Stojan, supporter of Milosevic's ideology, the guilt is always somebody else's: 
Croats are guilty of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the civil war, Milosevic is 
guilty of the betrayal of Krajina; Clinton and the U.S. are guilty of the economic 
embargo. Stojan nevertheless never finds himself responsible for anything, and does 
not  recognize  his  own role  as  Milosevic's  supporter  in  the  circle  of  misery  and 
violence. Only when he becomes aware of it  at  the very end, it  does not have a 
therapeutic or redemptive effect but a fatal outcome.  
The abandonment of the political ideology of the 1990s did not result from complete 
political awakening and redemption of the fathers. Their abandonment of Milosevic 
took place because, in the words of Stojan, he “sold the holy land of Krajina”35 or in 
other words,  because after  the series of defeats they come to the conclusion that 
Milosevic had sold Serbian national interests. This is also the reason why Milosevic 
lost the support of the Church later on when it became clear that he was not the 
leader that would unify all Serbs under one wreath as his Kosovo spectacle in 1989 
had implied. Milosevic was not rejected not because he led the wars but because he 
did not lead them successfully. 
The fathers (my italics) supported Milosevic in spite of the economic crisis, isolation 
of the country,  the war and criminalization of society.  After it  became clear that 
Milosevic had abandoned the ideas of a Greater Serbia that he had promised in the 
late 1980s, he lost support. This is an important aspect of the film, which reveals that 
Milosevic lost supporters not because he led the wars but because he lost them.36 
This  is  probably one of  the reasons  why in  contemporary Serbia the nationalist-
religious ideology survived  Milosevic's downfall, which shows that without a full 
confrontation  with  dangerous  ideology  it  is  not  possible  to  truly  perform  the 
redemption of the fathers (my italics) nor make crucial changes in society.  
35 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
36 See chapter 3.
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The traumatic circle of fathers and sons in the film is shown as a cause-consequence 
effect. The belief of the fathers is proved to be fatal for the sons, who are influenced 
directly by the values of the ideological discourse of their fathers. In other words, the 
nationalist-religious ideology in society, its social and political practice of violence, 
led to the break down of society and its values which is represented in the sons. The 
sons,  however,  have  no  interest  in  the  ideologies  which  indirectly  shaped  them 
through both their fathers and the dominant cultural climate. The sons are the product 
of populist ideology of the 1990s. 
One of them is Darko, the son of Lydia, the journalist, who is desperately trying to 
imitate his two friends. Although Pinki and Kraut are constantly humiliating him he 
is nevertheless trying to become a part of the gang. Violence and brutality are at the 
core  of  their  communication.  Gradually  the  violators  Pinki  and  Kraut  turn  their 
victim Darko into violator. The violence among the youngsters culminates at the end 
of the film when they kill each other.
6.3.2. Female Characters
Political  ideology mentioned earlier,  that  promoted the myths  of  Serbian men as 
brave  warriors,  supported the  appearance  of  images  of  masculinity  in  the  public 
sphere as a cultural role model of the 1990s. This resulted in development of specific 
forms of misogynous culture typical of this period of time. Its depiction in the film is 
not  given just  in  representation of  the  violent  men of  the  1990s but  also  in  the 
depiction of female characters. Sexism adopted in public discourse is shown in the 
portrayal  of  women  in  the  film.  Reintroduced  religious  tradition,  or  popular 
perception of religion is linked to some of the stereotypes and perceptions of women. 
In a sense women did not move far away from being observed as objects of pleasure 
or  satisfaction  of  man's  needs,  sexual  or  domestic,  which  is  characteristic  of 
patriarchal societies and culture.  This portrayal  of femininity  and women in film 
gives  a  good  ground  for  applying  a  feminist  approach  in  film  theory  and  thus 
discussing the question that Ortiz addresses: “Is there a cinematic aesthetic specific 
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to women?”37  As Tomislav Longinovic argues in his analysis of  Keg of Gunpowder, 
women  are  “completely usurped by the enforced masculine culture” and further 
“their destiny is often subject to the contingencies of male bonding.”38  In this section 
we  will  look  at  typologization  of  female  characters  in  Wounds,  which  can  be 
identified  as three types dominant for the main stream culture of the 1990s. 
    
The  first  is  the  type  of  traditional  mother  and  housewife,  represented  by  Pinki's 
mother. In her world the man is the head of the house, to whom she is subordinated. 
She does not make crucial decisions but follows the male leader, her husband Stojan. 
Her major role is to fulfill her duties but she has no real authority, not even over her 
own child. Although she is the stronghold of the house her voice is not important, as 
the Balkan patriarchal culture proposes. She is a typical mother and housewife, in the 
patriarchal  tradition  in  Serbia,  whose  role  had  been  preserved  in  spite  of  the 
interruption that communist ideology brought in Yugoslavia after the Second World 
War. 
The second type is a woman who is only seemingly independent and has a career. I 
call this type  seemingly independent because her emancipation is not complete, she 
is still in fact subordinated to the man's world in which she has to play according to 
certain rules. Her biggest attribute remains her sexuality. This is embodied in the 
character of Lydia, a local star. Lydia is a single working, and what might be called 
independent  mother.  However  her  independence  is  subverted  through  her 
dependence on the man's world, politicians, criminals and institutions of the regime 
with  which  she  obviously  has  connections.  Lydia's  character  suggests  that  she 
accomplished most things through sexual relationships and at the same time she is 
portrayed as a person attracted to violence and brutality. She is a deliberate servant of 
violence in the tough masculine world of decadence which makes of her a local star 
among young criminals. Lydia is a heroine of the masculine world of war and crime 
37 Ortiz Gaye: Woman as Spectacle: Theological Perspectives on Women and Film in Christopher 
Deacy and Gaye Williams Ortiz: Theology and Film: Challenging the Sacred/ Secular Divide, 
Blackwells: Oxford, 2008, p.91
38 Longinovic, Z. Tomislav: Playing the Western Eye:Balkan Masculinity and Post-Yugoslav War  
Cinema in Imre, Aniko: East European Cinemas, Routledge: New York, London, 2005, p. 45.
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and she deliberately embraces her role ending up as a victim being finally violated by 
Kraut, a boy who never reaches full maturity in the film but nevertheless embodies 
the so called masculinity model of the 1990s.   
The  third  type  is  a  typical  sponsored  girl  popularly  called  sponzorusa,  who  is 
depicted in the character of a turbo-folk singer and a girlfriend of criminal Kure, 
Suzana. Suzana is a metaphor for the silicone girls, usually girlfriends of criminals, 
also called businessmen in a local jargon, who could offer them a luxurious and rich 
lifestyle.  This  lifestyle  was a  part  of  poplar  culture of  the 1990s and very often 
promoted by the regime's entertainment media such as TV Pink and through the folk 
singers  who  became  celebrities.  Sponzoruse are  the  cultural  phenomenon  that 
emerged in the 1990s with the collapse of Serbian society. This is connected to the 
stratification of society and the melting of the middle class.  The economic crisis 
during the embargo and isolation of the country caused division in the population 
between extremely rich and poor. This problem and its depiction in the film will be 
discussed separately later. The subversive representation of sponsored girls reveals 
not only the cultural collapse but also the degradation of the idea of emancipation. 
Emancipation in  the 1990s stood for  rich marriage rather  than for education and 
employment.  
The  system  of  values  changed  with  the  establishment  of   Milosevic's  culture, 
promoted  by  media  and  embodied  in  turbo-folk  music  and  violence.  Milosevic's 
culture is depicted as a deviated concept of both Western modernism and Eastern 
traditionalism. In  this  specific  cultural  context  the West  is  perceived through the 
symbols of capitalist commodities. In the film it is depicted through the youngsters' 
obsession with Versace suits and BMW cars.39 On the other hand patriarchal culture 
was  dominating  through  the  populist  interpretation  of  Orthodoxy,  affirmation  of 
masculinity in myths, nationalism and finally the perception of women as a mother-
housekeeper on one side and woman as a female, an object of satisfaction. In contrast 
to Tito's period, for example, when one of the dominant ideals for women was to 
39 See Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
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receive higher education or find a job and gain their independence, in the 1990s a 
patriarchal model returns in a new form. This new form proposed the image of the 
successful woman as the one married to a rich person. This was mainly promoted 
through the emergence of turbo-folk music whose representative was a turbo-folk 
diva  Svetlana-Ceca  Raznatovic  who was married to  criminal  and  warlord  Zeljko 
Raznatovic Arkan. Suzana's character stands also as a symbol for this folk-diva but 
also  the  values  embodied in  turbo-folk iconography of  the 1990s,  which will  be 
discussed later. 
The female characters are subordinated to the masculine culture formed in the 1990s. 
Re-christianization of  Serbian society, which went hand in hand with the politics of 
the 1990s supported this misogynist stereotypes.40 The populist version of Orthodoxy 
contributed to the perception of woman as a mother and a shelter for the Serbian 
warrior.41 
6.3.3. Criminals and War Profiteers
Through  the  representation  of  one  of  the  main  characters  in  the  film,  Kure,  the 
director paints the interconnection between organized crime and the civil war. Kure, 
a criminal who introduces Pinki and Kraut into the world of crime belongs to the so-
called older generation of criminals, like the warlord Arkan, who developed their 
criminal  careers  mostly  by  committing  different  sorts  of  crime  abroad.42 The 
criminals  of  former  Yugoslavia,  such  as  Arkan,  were  famous  for  robberies  and 
40 I call the process of the 1990s  re-christianization because a significant number of people were 
baptized or married in the Church. During Tito's Yugoslavia, the number of baptisms decreased, while 
marriages were mostly civil. With the return to the Church in the early 1990s a number of Christian 
practices was performed and even promoted as desirable practice in the media. Religion, religious 
customs, practices and belief became a part of cultural landscape and mediascape. 
41 See Radovic, Milja: Images of Women in Serbian Media, 6/09/2005, WACC Media Development, 
www.wacc.org.uk; Last accessed: 15/09/2008. 
42 Arkan  had “convictions for bank robbery in Belgium, Holland and Germany, and arrest warrants 
in Sweden and Italy...Raznatovic escaped from jails in Belgium and Holland, an achievement which 
many feel was linked to his employment by the Yugoslav state security. The Belgrade press later 
reported that Raznatovic worked as a government hitman, targeting troublesome Yugoslav emigres 
abroad.” Gangster's Life of Serbian Warlord, Saturday, 15 January, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/605266.stm; Last accessed: 11/6/2008.
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organized crime in countries of western Europe, such as Germany or Sweden. With 
the break-up of Yugoslavia these criminals were re-activated and worked for the 
State Security. 
The difference between the old and young generation, as shown in the film, was in 
their  local  myth  about  “code  of  honor”  to  which  Kure  nostalgically  refers  to 
throughout  the  film  remembering  “the  good  old  times.”43 This  code  involved  a 
respect for teachers on which older criminals insisted, while the younger generation 
of  criminals  was  perceived  as  disrespectful.  This  disrespect  was  reflected  in  the 
readiness of youngsters to assassinate their teachers which Pinki describes as the way 
of “graduating in this job.”44  This depiction of the myth of the Serbian underground 
and  the  so-called  the  change  of  code  and  how the  young criminals  escaped the 
control  of  their  teachers  is  described  also  in  the  film  Rage.45 Epic  violence  that 
started with the political use of the Kosovo Myth, affirmed in the 1990s, produced a 
celebration of violence in the public sphere. Violence for the sake of violence as an 
uncontrollable force in Belgrade streets came as a consequence of criminalization of 
society on all levels.
The  public  celebration  of  violence  was  performed  by  the  media  through  the 
glorification of criminals as war heroes. The media gave such criminals the status of 
celebrities.  Dragojevic depicts this by portraying the character of Kure as a criminal 
but at the same time as a war profiteer. Kure goes to the battle zones to return with a 
truck  overloaded  with  different  goods.  Kure's  funeral  however  gives  the  most 
significant picture of how gangsters were celebrated at the same time as patriots. In 
the funeral speech, the other criminal Pepper gives almost an epic tribute to Kure 
describing him as a “patriot” who in “the worst time for Serbs” decided to take a 
weapon and go to “defend the homes and tombs of our elders.”46 Using mythological 
language that was a way of expression in the 1990s he calls Kure a “patriot made of 
43 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
44 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
45 See Chapter 4.
46 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
189
the stuff of knights.”47  The funeral of Kure was according to the Christian Orthodox 
practice and the whole scene gives an impression of the burial of a national hero 
rather than that of a criminal. Only the crowd gathered in the graveyard and their 
bizarre conversation reveals that it is the funeral of a criminal, a common occurrence 
in  Belgrade in the 1990s. 
The whole funeral turns into a media spectacle when Lydia arrives with a TV crew to 
film the ceremony. Since she arrives late she asks the grave diggers to dig out the 
grave so she can shoot at least something. The bizarreness of the scene signifies the 
political importance that crime, violence and patriotism played in Milosevic's media. 
Ironically, Arkan, the untouchable king of the underground was shot and killed in 
January 2000, less then two years after  Wounds was made, and his funeral turned 
into another media spectacle. 
6.4. Representation of Nationalist-Religious Ideology and its Impacts on Serbian 
Society 
In this section I discuss the cinematic depiction of the political ideology of the 1990s 
and  its  impact  on  society.  Dragojevic  paints  the  political  ideology  of  Slobodan 
Milosevic as a nationalist-religious ideology, promoted through a populist discourse 
that was rooted in national and religious myths. In the first section I focus on the 
director's depiction of the beginning of the war and the rise of nationalism. In the 
second part, I look at the representation of national symbols and religious images in 
the  film.  I  discuss  how  the  director  uses  these  representations  to  describe  the 
ideological discourse and metaphorically to express the values of Milosevic's culture. 
In the last section I analyze the cinematic representation of media propaganda and its 
importance  for  the  regime's  politics.  I  explore  how  the  film  depicts  the 
interconnection between the economic collapse, formation of the so-called turbo-folk 
culture and the new system of values. Wounds more than any other film made in the 
47 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
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1990s investigates the 1990s culture as a product of the dominant political ideology.
6.4.1. The Rise of Nationalism and the Beginning of the War
What happened in Serbia in the phase of transition from socialism to capitalism 
was the emergence of nationalism and fascism as a shock absorber for the sudden 
exposure of capitalist alienation and deterritorialization—a desire to recuperate the 
lost sense of community and shared sociality qua identification with the nation as 
the source of stable identities.48
The  film  starts  with  a  depiction  of  nationalist  euphoria  in  1991.  The  opening 
sequence  shows  the  masses  of  people  on  the  streets  of  New Belgrade  who  are 
greeting the tanks of the Yugoslav Army, JNA, which are leaving for war operations 
in Croatia. Two thirteen year olds, Pinki and Kraut, are at a graveyard where they are 
bullying their friend Darko, calling him a Croat and a Shiptar, which in local jargon 
is  a  name for  Kosovo  Albanians.  They are  running  around the  tombs while  the 
camera shows names inscribed on the gravestones in both Cyrillic and Latin scripts, 
suggesting ironically that Belgrade traditionally had a mixed population, which the 
young generation, influenced by the new ideology, are ignorant about.
At the sound of the tanks the youngsters leave the graveyard to join the masses and 
greet the army. The next scene shows people who are greeting the army with the 
symbolic three fingers raised, toasting with a traditional drink rakija and dancing to 
nationalist  songs played on trumpets.  Hegemony that  was completed through the 
nationalist-religious ideology offered a new sense of identity and unity, which the 
film shows as a psychotic celebration of the beginning of the war. The scene suggests 
that  this  political  ideology  represents  the  beginning  of  a  circle  of  violence  that 
became a daily occurance. The characters of Pinki and Kraut are used in the film 
narrative  as  the  link  between  crime  and  the  emergence  of  nationalism  and  the 
escalation of the war. 
48 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
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While  Pretty Village, Pretty Flame is more the story of the war,  Wounds focuses 
more upon the consequences of the war for Serbian society. Both films tell one story 
about  the political  ideology of  the 1990s and its  impacts.  Dragojevic  makes  this 
connection not only by focusing upon the same topic and similar problems but also 
by  repeating  certain  lines  and  images  from  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame.  For 
example, in the opening scene of  Wounds with the Yugoslav Army tanks, appears 
the same actor from Pretty Village Pretty Flame, Velimir Bata Zivojinovic. In Pretty  
Village,  Pretty  Flame he  plays  Gvozden,  an  ex-colonel  of  the  former  Yugoslav 
Army, while in Wounds he appears just briefly in the introduction of the film, on the 
tank as a colonel of the Yugoslav Army that is going to war. In that way, the film 
might give an impression that this is the same character in both films. Similarly the 
same music appears in both films as a signifier of the popularization of nationalism, 
for example in the scene with tanks the same melody of “who says, who lies that 
Serbia is small” is repeated as in  Pretty Village, Pretty Flame.49 
Portraits of the leaders, such as Tito and Milosevic, have a similar role in both of the 
films. They  signify the ideological background of the characters, such as is the case 
with Nazim50 in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame. In Wounds pictures of the leaders in the 
context of the scenes where they appear suggest the death of one ideology and rise of 
the other one. For example, the scene where Tito's picture is being replaced with a 
picture of Slobodan Milosevic on the wall in Pinki's house, reveals the ideological 
shift that took place in society. The rise of nationalism in the early 1990s is depicted 
through the celebration of the new leader Milosevic and a new political ideology. 
The support given to war operations equally by masses on the streets and Pinki's 
father Stojan is a continuation of the nationalist euphoria shown in the introduction 
of the film. Dragojevic draws the transformation of a former socialist society into a 
culture  of  wounds  where  violence,  propaganda  and  kitsch  became  principal  by-
products of the new ideology.51 
49 See Chapter 5.
50 See Chapter 5.
51 See Krstic Igor: Ibid in Horton, Andrew: Ibid.
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6.4.2. Religious Images and Nationalist Symbols in the Film
Dragojevic uses similar images in both films to illustrate the political ideology of the 
1990s. These  images symbolize the values of Milosevic's Serbia. In the opening 
sequence of  Wounds,  the camera focuses on the fist with three fingers raised, an 
image  that  also  appears  in  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame.  This  was  a  nationalist 
populist  greeting  that  was  revived  in  the  1990s  and  traditionally  symbolizes  a 
belonging to the Serbian Orthodox nation. It stands as a symbol of both national and 
religious identity. The image of chetniks in the same scene suggests the emergence of 
nationalism and pseudo-history into the public discourse.  The  chetnik movement, 
declared first as a royalist army in World War II, later to develop into a Serbian 
nationalist paramilitary, was banned in Tito's Yugoslavia for its collaboration with 
fascists.52 The rehabilitation of the chetnik movement in the 1990s proclaimed as 
redressing  historical  injustice  nonetheless  had  political  goals.  It  strengthened 
nationalism and supported the arguments of the Serbian Academy of Science and 
Arts of Yugoslavia as an artificial state that was unjust only in the Serbian case.53 
The chetniks' flag “With Faith in God - Freedom or Death”, appears in both films. In 
Wounds this flag flies among flags of Yugoslavia with the symbol of the red star, 
which  people  are  waving  to  greet  the  Yugoslav  Army.  Mixed  flags  show  the 
absurdity of a populist ideology built on nationalism which was at the same time 
justifying the war as a fight for the maintenance of Yugoslavia. 
The image of a cross with four “s” shown in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, appears 
also in the Wounds as graffiti on the door in the corridor where Kure is killed.54 The 
meaning of this symbol has been discussed in the previous chapter and has the same 
purpose of painting the dominant iconography of the 1990s as a background to the 
story.  Crosses  and  icons  became  a  modern  iconography  of  Serbian  society  and 
Dragojevic depicts this emergence of religious images in the public sphere in both of 
52 See Glenny, Misha: The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London: 
Granta, 1999. 
53 See chapter 3.
54 See chapter 5. 
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his  films.  Although in  the Serbian socio-political  context  these images expressed 
what  David Morgan refers  to  as “symbolic  rather  than sacramental  ideas”55 their 
symbolism in the public sphere represented a populist attempt at sacralization of the 
nation. 
The image of an Orthodox cross appears frequently in Wounds. The film starts with a 
close up of the cross, which becomes one of the central images of Wounds. There are 
several possible interpretations of the function of this image in the film. The image of 
the cross around the neck of young criminals reveals the 1990s fashion of being a 
nationalist  and an Orthodox Serb.  In  this  way the symbol of the cross became a 
central symbol of the kitsch universe, which is sublimated in the  mise-en-scene.56 
Further as Igor Krstic argues, the cross stands as a symbol of death itself to which the 
film makes many references.57 The image of a golden cross symbolizes a corrupted 
Christianity,  embodied  in  nationalist-religious  ideology,  where  a  symbol  of 
compassion, love and suffering turns into its antithesis. In the context of Wounds the 
cross symbolizes death itself with no resurrection. Pinki and Kraut are the collateral  
damage (my italics)  of the 1990s politics.  Pinki and Kraut  are,  similarly  to anti-
heroes in  Dragojevic's previous film, final victims of “the death of a traditional value 
system.”58 
An image of the Last Supper is a part of film's  mise-en-scene.59 It appears as a big 
picture that hangs on the wall behind Pinki, Kraut and Kure, who sit together while 
they are watching “The Beat of the Street.” The Last Supper emphasizes the antipode 
of  this  Christian image and indicates  unity  in  blood of the teacher Kure and his 
disciples Pinki and Kraut.  Unity in blood and death as the central image of Wounds 
has exactly the opposite meaning from what this Christian iconography represents.  
55 Morgan, David: Ibid, p. 240.
56 Paraphrased, Srdjan Vucinic: Putovanje na kraj noci. Rane Srdjana Dragojevica, Rec 46 (June 
1998) quoted in Krstic Igor: “Serbia's Wound Culture, Teenage Killers in Milosevic's Serbia: Srdjan 
Dragojevic's Rane (1998)”, in Andrew James Horton, ed.: The Celluloid Tinderbox: Yugoslav screen 
reflections of a turbulent decade, e-book, http://www.kinoeye.org/03/10/celluloidtinderbox.pdf
57 See Krtsic, Igor: Ibid, in Andrew James Horton, ed.: Ibid. 
58 See Krtsic, Igor: Ibid.
59 See krstic, Igor: Ibid.
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Another  image that  appears  in  the  film is  a  logo of  the  Red Star  football  club. 
Although this logo is not an explicitly nationalist symbol its meaning in the context 
of the early 1990s provides a strong nationalist connotation. At the beginning of the 
film Kraut wears a t-shirt with their logo, while in the next scene Pinki wears a scarf 
of the Red Star. The Red Star logo indicates the link between football and nationalist 
politics  that  existed  in  the  early  1990s.  The  Red  Star  leader,  Zeljko  Raznatovic 
Arkan,  was  also  working  for  the  regime  and  the  State  Security  (DB -  Drzavna 
bezbednost) which rehabilitated many of the former criminals among whom Arkan 
was  the  most  famous.  He  was  one  of  the  organizers  of  the  first  paramilitary 
formations that later on participated in many combats in Croatia and Bosnia. Arkan 
was given the status of a celebrity in the Milosevic media. In  Wounds Dragojevic 
continues to explore media propaganda and he pays special attention to such negative 
media influences. 
6.4.3. Theme of Media Propaganda
In Wounds much more space is devoted to the role of Milosevic's media in the 1990s 
than in any other film of that time. The director considers several different aspects on 
regime's media during the 1990s. First, the film depicts the media as the main tool of 
war propaganda. Second, Milosevic's media are depicted as promoters of violence 
and the trash culture of the 1990s. And third, the film shows how the perception of 
Milosevic's  media  varied  through  the  years.  The  audiences'  response  to  media 
content shifted from unquestionable acceptance to massive protest. We will look at 
how each of these segments are represented in the film.    
Throughout the film, the National Television – RTS News is depicted as the regime's 
blatant vehicle for war propaganda. The same text that the RTS journalist reads in 
Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame  is repeated  in  Wounds.60 Dragojevic  continually 
60 “Once again history is repeating itself. Raging hordes of evil have risen against the entire Serbian 
people. Ustahi, foreigners and fanatics of Allah's Jihad with Mohamed's flag in their hands and 
swords...just as they did fifty years ago, they are attacking poorly armed Serbian defenders...their 
children will not be the victims of Croatian fascism, assisted by world powers, with intentions to draw 
a new map of Europe and create a monster with a forbiding name: The New World Order!”  DVD 
“Pretty Village Pretty Flame”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2001.  
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ridicules media propaganda in different ways. In one scene Pinki is masturbating in 
the toilet while his father is listening to RTS war propaganda. Also the introduction 
of the RTS TV News is changed in the film and, instead of the globe, Dragojevic 
puts an image of the earth as the flat model carried by turtles. In a similar fashion 
Dragojevic adds to the commentary of the RTS TV journalist a folk-song “nobody 
can  do  anything  to  us,  we  are  stronger  than  destiny”,  that  in  the  words  of  TV 
propagandist  embodies  our  “people's  wisdom.”61 Official  media  propaganda  is 
ridiculed and represented in the film as a war machinery of lies whose main purpose 
was indoctrination of citizens and the creation of an isolationist and self-sufficient 
xenophobic culture. 
Pinki's father, who represents the so-called average citizen in the film, imbibes media 
propaganda and watches TV news giving his support to the war. In one of the scenes 
he is watching a decimated Vukovar on TV, which is actually authentic documentary 
footage. Only at the end the film do we see a  change of attitude towards Milosevic's 
media:  we see Pinki's  mother,  taking part  in a  protest  against  Milosevic's  media, 
hitting a pot on her balcony together with other neighbors at the time when the main 
TV news on RTS starts. This change however comes too late for Pinki and Kraut, 
who  describe  the  demonstrations  against  Milosevic  at  the  end  of  the  film  as  a 
“rebellion of mice.” 
Unlike in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, in this film Dragojevic goes a step further and 
depicts the role of Milosevic's media in the promotion of the culture of violence. This 
is shown through the representation of the TV show symbolically called “The Beat of 
the Street” (Puls Asfalta) which has great influence on Pinki and Kraut, whose dream 
is to appear in the same show which hosted many of their idols from the world of 
crime. Lydia the director of this show is a local celebrity among youngsters,  the 
devoted  audience of this program. She is also creating celebrities out of people who 
have proved their status in the underground.62 Lydia is shown to be connected both to 
the  state  security  and  criminals,  which  signifies  the  close  link  between  regime's 
61 DVD “Rane”, Beograd: Cobra Film, 2002.
62 A similar TV show was screened in TV Politika and BK television, stations closely connected to 
the regime, and was called Crni Biseri. 
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media,  criminals  and  the  state  institutions  during  the  Milosevic  regime. 
Popularization of crime and criminals by the media has great influence on youngsters 
whose  views  and values  are  shaped by  the  Milosevic  culture  of  destruction  and 
decadence.  Wounds stands out as a unique film of the 1990s as one which dealt with 
the Milosevic media and provided a critical depiction of media propaganda of the 
1990s and the influence it had in the socio-political and cultural sphere.  
6.4.4. Economic collapse, Turbo-folk and the System of Values
The  film  portrays  the  economic  collapse  of  society  to  be  a  consequence  of 
criminalization,  and  international  isolation  of  the  country  under  Milosevic's 
dominion. Economic sanctions only contributed to the stratification of society and 
the melting of the middle class. The galloping inflation in 1993, the collapse of state 
firms and unemployment strengthen the regime and the development of the black 
market. Most of the citizens of Serbia were forced to find alternative ways to support 
their  families.  Empty  shops  and  queues  for  bread  and  oil  became an  every  day 
picture of Milosevic's Serbia. To provide an authentic picture of this time Dragojevic 
uses  original  documentary  footage  from  1993  that  shows  people  in  one  of  the 
Belgrade queues fighting over the loaves of bread. 
In  these  circumstances,  with  a  new  elite  that  consisted  of  criminals,  the  young 
generation turned towards an easy money life-style finding the way of their parents 
not  relevant  any more.  The system of  values  promoted by the  media included a 
glamorous  life  style  which  did  not  match  reality.  The  new system  of  values  is 
embodied in the song that Suzana, Kure's girlfriend,  sings in the film and that is 
devoted to “bank-notes.” Similarly to  Cabaret's song  “money makes the world go 
around”, Suzana, obviously without any talent for singing, performs a song about 
how  money  makes  everything  possible  in  life.  This  bizarre  scene  suggests  the 
decadence of the new life style and turning Serbia into a “cabaret Balkans”63,  an 
isolated place ruled by the Milosevic family. The degradation of 1990s Serbia can be 
63 Film of Goran Paskaljevic. For more details see chapter 4.
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compared to  cinematic  depictions  of  decadence in  German society at  the  rise  of 
World War II.  
Western  brands  became a  norm of  this  life  style,  in  an  economically  exhausted 
Serbia. Versace clothes and BMW cars became a matter of status among criminals 
also called “new businessmen.” Pinki who watches his father repairing his old car or 
counting bank notes totaling billions of dinars that have no worth and can no longer 
buy even the basics, turns towards Kure as a symbol of the fast and dangerous life 
style that offers Western luxuries. During the 1990s, in the time of xenophobia and 
nationalism,  paradoxically,  goods  and  values  from  the  Western  market  were 
promoted. In an isolated Serbia, Western goods and brands became a norm and a 
matter of social status. The market in that sense proved to be stronger than nationalist 
ideology. Furthermore depiction of these social images of status can be read as a 
prophetic  vision  of   global  perspectives  of  the  new free  market  region  that  will 
develop on the ruins of former Yugoslavia. 
This  was  the  time  that  saw  the  rise  of  the  phenomenon  of  sponsored  girls, 
sponzoruse,  who were often but  not  necessarily turbo-folk singers.  The so called 
sponsors of these girls were usually new businessmen, who were capable of offering 
them a different life style from the one they had with their parents. Suzana, first 
Kure's girlfriend, but later a girlfriend of other criminals, is a drug addict and folk-
singer.  She  symbolizes  this  female  role  model  of  Milosevic's  culture,  promoted 
through Milosevic’s media such as TV Pink, a bearer of trash culture.64 Turbo folk 
music is a symbol of the trash culture, which is defined as “an aggressive nationalist 
adaptation of pop culture used as a generator of a nationalist-consumerist mode of 
'Serbness'.”65 Turbo-folk music and its representatives conceptualized and visualized 
the ideological  and cultural  values  of the time,  and thus legitimized the political 
extremism of the 1990s. 
64 See Chapter 3. 
65 Monroe, Alexei: Balkan hardcore, Pop Culture and Paramilitarism, Central Europe Review, Vol 
2, No 24, 19 June, 2000, http://www.ce-review.org/00/24/monroe24.html; Last accessed: 1/10/2008.
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6.5. Conclusion
Wounds is a film that primarily deals with the Milosevic regime and the concrete 
consequences  that  it  left  on  Serbian  society.  In  this  chapter  I  argued  that  by 
deconstructing and analyzing the film narrative and then contextualizing it  in the 
socio-political  milieu  of  the  1990s,  we  see  that  the  film  offers  not  only  a 
retrospective on what happened in Serbia but also offers a critical observation of a 
specific  political  system and the consequences it  left  on society.  In other  words, 
Dragojevic  portrays  crime  and  violence  as  a  byproduct  of  the  emergence  of 
nationalism.  A  new  political  discourse  affirmed  pro-war  propaganda,  which 
influenced the formation of the specific cultural model of the 1990s. The Serbian 
culture of the 1990s can be identified as a culture of thanatos, which the graveyard, 
as the main setting in the film, suggests. Many factors certainly contributed to the 
development of this culture of death: the political use of the Kosovo Myth, portrayals 
of the victimization of Serbs by the media and open attacks on others, insisting on 
nationhood and religiousity  as  one  entity,  representation  of  the  war  as  holy  and 
righteous.  In  the  Serbian  cultural  milieu  criminals  and  war  profiteers  were 
established as popular icons of the 1990s. In this way various criminal activities, 
from  war  profiteering  to  political  assassinations,  all  became  legitimate  political 
practice. 
In  such  a  situation,  the  stratification  of  society  was  inevitable.  It  came  as  a 
consequence of the economic blockade which in fact only strengthened the regime 
and supported the development of crime, corruption and the black market. Isolation 
of the country made an atmosphere of collective apathy and depression. On the other 
hand the so-called Serbian elite close to the regime spread the ideas that the whole 
world was against Serbia, which was fighting this “new world order.”66 Turbo-folk 
culture imposed new values promoted by TV celebrities who were often criminals or 
connected  to  them.  This  new  culture  supported  the  ongoing  process  of 
criminalization of society and promotion of nationalism, xenophobia, intolerance and 
66 See chapter 3.
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brutality. 
The circle of violence and destruction of Serbian society starts with the emergence of 
the political ideology of Slobodan Milosevic. Media manipulation is shown to be one 
of  the  most  important  mechanisms  for  the  creation  of  the  dominant  culture  of 
violence.  How violence  emerged into  the   public  discourse  Dragojevic  describes 
through his depiction of the regime's media who were overwhelmed with pro-war 
propaganda and images of criminals who were often given celebrity status and thus 
became  new  cultural  role  models.  The  film  makes  reference  to  the  connection 
between crime and the regime. 
Wounds  is a film which provides a unique approach to the theme of violence and 
criminalization of  Serbian society. The film successfully framed one of the most 
difficult  socio-political  periods in  recent  Serbian history showing how a story of 
violence and crime, was directly connected to local ideologies. Unlike any other film 
made on this topic,  Wounds shows that everyday brutality, civil war and crime are 
really the story of the regime. In other words, crime and violence are not phenomena 
that stand alone, but are shown to be part of the wider story of the political ideology 
of the 1990s. Pinki and Kraut's street story of crime is only a consequence of all these 
elements linked together. The film's cinematic exploration of Pinki and Kraut's self-
deception offers a rich insight into the main issues of 1990s Serbia.  The film shows 
how the emergence of a new political ideology had concrete consequences in the 
formation of a culture of violence and criminalization of society. The disintegration 
of Serbian society can therefore be read as the final result of the nationalist-religious 
ideology formed in the late 1980s. Political ideology is at the root of the social and 
cultural changes, which as I argued in this chapter, the director suggests throughout 
the film.  
I also suggested that the complex film narrative informs us in more depth about the 
background  of  the  problems  shown  in  the  film.  The  representation  of  political 
ideology in the film highlights the fact that nationalist-religious discourse was one of 





In this thesis I have investigated the cinematic representations of nationalist-religious 
ideology in several Serbian films made during the 1990s. I explored how films can 
inform us about the ideological discourse of the Milosevic regime and its impacts on 
Serbian society. In this study I therefore investigated representations of religion and 
nationalism in the films, as the main elements of the political ideology of the 1990s. 
My  intention  was  to  investigate  the  subversive  potential  of  these  cinematic 
representations in order to answer the question whether subversiveness is possible if 
films speak within the specific ideological context in which they were made. 
My study  showed  that,  by  telling  a  story  of  ordinary  people,  the  Serbian  films 
addressed some of the fundamental issues in Serbian society. I argued that several 
films of the 1990s provided a form of political and ideological critique by subverting 
some of the main ideological premises of the Milosevic regime.  In this chapter I 
discuss  the  results  of  my analysis,  and further  developments  that  arise  from this 
study. First of all I summarize and outline the results of my analysis of the selected 
Serbian  films.  There follows a  discussion  of  the cinematic  subversiveness  of  the 
Serbian films analyzed. Here I discuss why the cinematic representations outlined in 
the  previous  section  can  be  considered  as  subversive  representations  of  the 
nationalist-religious  ideology.  After  the  final  remarks  I  finally  outline  the 
contributions this study has made and future research that can be developed on the 
basis of this thesis.    
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7.1. What do the Films Reveal about their Sociocultural and Political Context 
and How do they Inform us about the Ideological Discourse of the 1990s?
The aim of this section is to summarize how the Serbian films act as cultural texts 
connected with the context in which they were made, and in that sense what they said 
about  this  context  and  the  dominant  ideological  discourse.  This  part  of  my 
concluding chapter is based on discussions from previous chapters and analysis of 
films and their context.
 
In chapter 3 of this thesis I discussed the Serbian socio-political context of the 1990s 
and  I  explained  the  main  characteristics  and  impacts  of  the  nationalist-religious 
ideology and the promotion of this ideological discourse in the public sphere. The 
aim of chapter 3 was to provide an ideological context for the Serbian films under 
discussion.  At  the  same time  an  understanding  of  the  context  contributed  to  the 
analysis  of  the  films.  In  chapters  4,  5  and  6,  I  analysed  several  Serbian  films 
investigating how they pictured Serbian society and what these depictions say about 
the ideological constructs of the Milosevic regime. I argued that the Serbian films did 
not just “mirror” the ideological discourse but on the contrary they investigated the 
dominant ideology and its impacts on the so-called ordinary people and on society in 
general. This investigation often revealed a critical view of the reality of the 1990s 
and showed that the films subverted some of the ideological premises of the regime. 
In the next sections I outline the major findings based on my film analysis. 
7.1.1. Serbian Films as Parabolic Stories about Society
The discussion of the Kosovo Myth and its political use, in chapter 3, was useful for 
understanding the references that films make to this myth as a crucial part of the 
1990s ideological discourse. We saw that the film about the battle of Kosovo was 
screened at the beginning of a time of national euphoria, in 1989, and that the author 
of  the  text,  Ljubomir  Simovic,  an  academic,  strongly  supported  Milosevic's  new 
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political program.1 Observed outside of the specific socio-political context, this film 
could  appear  purely  as  a  historical  spectacle  which  deals  with  one  of  the  most 
famous  Serbian  epics,  but  when  we  contextualize  it,  we  can  see  its  political 
implications. This example illustrates how the film was used as a tool of political 
propaganda. In this sense this film represents a useful resource for understanding the 
ideological discourse of the Milosevic Serbia, since the film uses the Kosovo Myth to 
communicate the major postulates of the nationalist-religious ideology. 
Most of the 1990s films discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis, were influenced and 
inspired by the Yugoslav collapse and the outbreak of the war. All the films analysed 
were telling the story of people in Milosevic's Serbia. In this sense they offered an 
inside perspective on the ongoing issues in Serbian society. This so-called Serbian 
perspective often included the director's personal views on some of the important 
issues,  such  as  the  question  of  identity  within  the  new  ideological  context  for 
example. The films of the 1990s showed various problems of Serbian society and 
highlighted different aspects of the Milosevic regime. The dark picture of Serbia and 
the  depressing  atmosphere  which  prevails  in  the  1990s  films  reflects  the  social 
reality.  The films dealt with ongoing issues differently from Milosevic propagandist 
media,  which  were  constantly  providing  a  false  picture  of  reality,  as  previously 
discussed:  the regime's media were depicting a glamourous style of life while in 
reality a crisis was taking place.2 
The films depicted various socio-political problems and covered different aspects of 
Serbian  society,  focusing  on  issues  such  as  the  increase  of  crime  and  violence, 
economic crisis, degradation of values, and alienation of individuals, all of which 
were the consequences of isolation of the country ruled by Milosevic's regime. Each 
of these films has a different approach to the subject and provides a different angle 
on  the  issues  explored.  For  example  two films  that  both  painted  the  problem of 
1 See chapter 4 for more details. 
2 The verse of one turbo-folk song best illustrates the message that the regime was sending through its 
TV stations such as TV Pink. The singer sings about the difficulties of life, but concludes that it is not 
actually too bad and that it could be worse, while the whole song has a fast upbeat rhythm. See 
chapters 3 and 4 for more details. 
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violence,  such  as  Rage and  Keg  of  Gunpowder,  are  constructed  in  completely 
different ways.3 While Rage illustrates the brutality of street violence without giving 
any  additional  explanation  of  the  causes  of  the  violence,  and  thus  leaves  an 
impression of just  “mirroring” the existing situation,  Keg of Gunpowder  explores 
violence as a consequence of isolation and the war on ordinary people who, trapped 
in this circle, become violators. 
The most common theme exploited in films however was the civil war.  The majority 
of films reviewed which dealt with the war themes, tended to question the war and 
the violence from a moral and ethical standpoint, while the media propaganda on the 
other hand tended to justify the war as a “sacred mission” of the Serbian people, 
based on the  Kosovo Myth. The cinematic representation of the war often included 
the  depiction  of  the  role  of  mythological  discourse  in  justification  of  the  war. 
Premeditated Murder, discussed in chapter 4, is a case in point since it deals with the 
local  ideologies  and  their  impact  on  the  people.  Even  the  controversial  film 
Underground, is useful for understanding the ideological discourse of its time: while 
the film is trying to discuss the issue of ideology, it is at the same time reflecting 
some of the ideological premises of the 1990s. 
To sum up, the films of the 1990s inform us about the socio-political context of their 
time by addressing fundamental issues in society. The films framed the ideological 
premises  of  the  Serbian  political  regime  but  some  of  them  also  reflected  the 
stereotypes  and  ideological  concepts  of  their  time.  Because  of  this  ambiguous 
character of the films and in order to better understand their complexity I suggest that 
Serbian films can be divided into three categories. In the first category I would place 
the films which critically depicted the political ideology of the regime and in which 
directors critically explored some of the ideological premises of the 1990s, such as 
Orthodoxy and nationalism. In the second category are the films which were shaped 
by  the  political  context  and  which  therefore  reflected  some  of  the  ideological 
assumptions of the regime, which would be the case in the film The Battle of Kosovo. 
3 See chapter 4.
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In the third category would be the films which tended to do both: to critically explore 
the political-ideological context of the 1990s but at the same time to be influenced by 
it, the film Underground, for example. I argue that most of the films explored would 
belong to this third category. However, it is important to say that whichever of these 
categories a film belongs to I argue that it can still significantly inform us about its 
socio-political  context  and  as  such  represents  a  useful  resource  for  studying  the 
ideological  discourse  of  the  1990s.  The  majority  of  films  explored  express 
ambiguity,  and for this reason they might be considered as belonging to the third 
category. This is a complex problem and it will be further considered in this chapter 
as a part of my discussion on cinematic subversiveness. In the next part I discuss in 
detail  the  results  of  my  analysis  of  the  films  and  their  depiction  of  nationalist-
religious ideology,  which forms the core of this thesis. 
7.1.2. Cinematic Representation of Nationalist-Religious Ideology
 
Among the films discussed in this study I chose the two Dragojevic films as those 
which offered the most significant portrayal of ideology both as the background but 
also as an inseparable part of the main story. Both Pretty Village, Pretty Flame and 
Wounds are strongly connected to the socio-political context in Serbia. They depict 
some of the crucial problems of the time in which they were made. The first film 
deals with the war while the second explores the problems of crime and violence. My 
analysis  shows that besides these dominant topics the films reveal a lot about the 
background of the problems explored. They inform us about Serbian society and its 
ideological discourse of the 1990s. In fact of all the films of the 1990s they portrayed 
best  the  main  characteristics  of  this  political  ideology  by  representing  its  core 
elements. Nationalist and religious symbols and references in the films show that the 
films  portrayed nationalist-religious ideology as the core of 1990s politics. The films 
paint  the  interconnection  between  the  actual  problems  and  the  dominating 
ideological discourse in society. The problem of violence and crime in  Wounds is 
shown to be directly connected to nationalist hysteria and a pro-war discourse which 
involved a public celebration of violence. The spirit of the  Memorandum  and the 
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nationalist discourse of the late 1980s is expressed in both films. The attitudes of the 
main characters reflect this discourse: their actions are influenced and directed by the 
ideology,  and  they  often  wear  symbols  that  are  a  visual  statement  of  their 
convictions. 
The war is represented as a conflict  of former neighbours (Pretty Village,  Pretty  
Flame),  people who speak the same language, share the same cultural  and social 
values  and  have  more  commonalities  than  differences.  Influenced  by  media 
propaganda  and  the  rise  of  nationalism  they  become  aware  of  their  differences, 
embodied in their religious and national belonging. Regardless of the fact that these 
characters were not practising religion but lived in the ideology of “brotherhood and 
fraternity”, their national and religious identity becomes a central issue and also a 
point of their divorce. From this point the other (my italics) is always perceived as a 
foreigner, a mythological enemy who has to be terminated. The process of alienation 
is shown to be a consequence of the crash of ideology of Tito's Yugoslavia. 
The nationalist-religious ideology is depicted in films as an aggressive  vox-populi 
ideology of  exclusion.  The films show the development  of  this  discourse  almost 
chronologically through the rise of nationalist hysteria in the early 1990s: in Wounds 
masses  throwing flowers  on the tanks going to Croatia;  in  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  
Flame the depiction of the first day of the Bosnian war and moving on to the changes 
in the public sphere after  the Dayton Peace agreement.  As discussed in previous 
chapters,  some of  the  characters  express  disappointment  with the  collapse  of  the 
nationalist plans and Milosevic's politics. Interestingly, both films end in the post-
Dayton era in Serbia. 
7.1.2. (A) New Identities in a Changing Ideological Context
The nationalist-religious ideology of the 1990s is closely connected to the question 
of identity, in fact its role, we may say, was also to offer a new sense of identity after 
the collapse of communism. We can see that the sense of identity, of who I am as an 
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individual  and  to  whom  I  belong as  a  social  individual,  strongly  depended  on 
ideology.  The  collapse  of  Yugoslavia's  ideology  of  “brotherhood  and  fraternity” 
opened up a  new ideological  arena  which would enable  self-determination  of  an 
individual as a part of a wider social group. The return to tradition, to the Church and 
the  nation,  represented  a  reconstruction  of  Serbian  identity.  Nationalist-religious 
ideology appears as a substitute for the previous socialist ideology.4 Socialism was 
criticized and replaced by nationalism. These narratives,  which play an important 
role  in the construction of national identities,  Igor Krstic  recognizes as “fictional 
realities”, which are nonetheless “crucial for the way an individual understands him - 
or herself, how he or she is entangled in a society's self-representation, and how a 
certain  cultural  or  social  group  determines  its  collective  perception  of  self  and 
others...”5 Nationalist-religious ideology as a dominant social narrative provided a 
“mirror for group identification”6 and in that sense was crucial for homogenization of 
Serbian society. The films depicted this problem, for example through the characters 
of  ex-Yugoslav  Army colonels,  in  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame and  Wounds  the 
director paints the transformation of their identity, from Yugoslav to Serb nationalist. 
Another  theme that  emerges  in  the  films  and  that  connects  to  the  perception  of 
national identity is the issue of  historical memory (my italics).  Most of the films 
discussed,  such  as  Underground,  Deserter,  Premeditated  Murder tackled  the 
problem  of  recent  Yugoslav  history.  This  is  not  unusual  since  the  so-called 
unresolved  historical  issues,  traumatic  experiences  of  World  War  II  and  the 
communist period became the subject of the public discussions from the late 1980s.7 
Films provided diverse perspectives on this issue.  Pretty Village, Pretty Flame for 
example, provides an almost sentimental picture of Tito's Yugoslavia. This depiction 
of the communist past subverts the present nationalist madness of the 1990s. These 
depictions  of  the  two  different  periods  are  closely  connected  to  the  problem of 
4 See chapter 3.
5 Krstic, Igor: Re-thinking Serbia: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Modern Serbian History and Idntity  
through Popular Culture. Other Voices, v.2, n.2 (March 2002)
http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/krstic/; Last accessed: 11/11/2008
6 Krstic, Igor: Ibid.
7 See chapter 3.
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Serbian self-perception.  This problem is depicted in  Pretty Village,  Pretty Flame, 
through the story of two  main characters separated by the war. The flashbacks to 
their childhood in Tito's Yugoslavia suggest that their personal crisis is caused by the 
simultaneous loss of friendship and of country. The absurdity of war is emphasized 
as  the  film  continuously  reminds  its  audience  of  commonalities  between  two 
nationalities, Serbs and Muslims, and their common social and cultural identity in 
Bosnia built on experience of life together. One of the questions that film opens up is 
what is actually the identity of the main characters, are they truly nationalists or are 
they people who with the escalation of the war have lost their identities? 
Wounds on the other hand pictures the problem of identity through the conflict of 
Tito's generation and the post-Tito generation. The main characters, two youngsters, 
identify with criminals who are a byproduct of the regime. This identification results 
in the two boys turning into criminals.  On the other hand the films show the problem 
of glorification of criminals in the public sphere, who tended to present themselves 
as Orthodox Serbs who fight for their land and people in the “spirit of Lazar.”8 The 
self-identification  of  criminals  with  historical  figures,  was  allowed  by  the 
mythological discourse of the regime, which aimed to legitimize them as true Serb 
heroes.9 This issue,  strongly depicted in the films, therefore can not  be observed 
outside of the ideological context, as the nationalist-religious ideology – described in 
detail in chapter 3, allowed the creation of what might be called  collective fantasy 
(my italics). “Such fantasies”, as Krstic argues, “play a vital role in the construction 
of  identity  through  their  capacity  to  engage  individual  objects  and  mediate 
contradictory cultural or social discourses.”10  I argue that the films offered a deeper 
insight into the ideological discourse of the 1990s  by providing an understanding of 
how the ideology was directly related to the question of identity. This  aspect cannot 
be considered without understanding the Serbian context, which is one of the reasons 
why I  argue  that  the  reading of  the  film will  often  depend on  knowledge of  its 
8 This refers to Lazar Hrebeljanovic from the Kosovo Battle. See chapter 3.
9 The best example is the case of Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, discussed in previous chapters, who liked 
to present himself as a Serbian defender while the state kept his criminal activities secret. The same 
applies to Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic who were celebrated and presented as war heroes. 
10 Krstic, Igor: Ibid. 
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specific sociocultural and political context. 
The issue of identity, tackled in Serbian films as a part of a wider exploration of 
political ideology, involves the question of how we see others and how others see us  
(my  italics).  The  identification  of  characters  with  mythological  figures  created  a 
perception of others as enemies, but not just any enemies. The enemies are a part of 
this mythological discourse: they are referred to as “Turks” or “ustashe.”11 In other 
words the enemy is also a traditional one, which leaves an impression of some kind 
of traditional-Balkan conflict, which was how the regime tried to present it. Here we 
see the importance of ideological discourse built on national and religious myths and 
their  political  purpose.  Within this discourse,  we can conclude,  the perception of 
others, is always based on self-perception as discussed earlier. 
The perception of how others see us (my italics), is explored in particular in Pretty 
Village, Pretty Flame.  Others here refers primarily to foreign, Western audiences. 
Audiences (my italics) is a word which perfectly describes the Serbian perception of 
Western  involvement  in  the  Yugoslav  crisis.  For  Serbs,  Westerners  represent  an 
audience,  so-called spectators  of  the  war,   who do not  understand much but  are 
willing to stereotype the sides in the conflict through their media. This problem is 
shown through the  character  of  the  American journalist  and her  interaction with 
Serbs trapped in the tunnel. The camera's eye, that records Serbs, provides us with a 
number of stereotypes of self representation, that are based on the outsider's gaze. 
The film narrative provides  a  number  of  stereotypes  of  the Balkans people.  The 
outsider's  gaze  coexists  mainly  from stereotypes  of  the “Wild Balkan man”,  that 
Frederick Jameson discussed. The film reflects anxiety over marginalisation, of “how 
others see us”, which at the same time is ridiculed. Iordanova argued that this seemed 
like an attempt by Serbs to justify themselves to the foreign audience who,  they 
assumed, stereotyped Serbs 12, or as some of the characters said “as we all came from 
Hitler.”  I suggest that the film depicts Serbian frustration with the West but at the 
same time this offers a subversion of both local and Western stereotypes. Serbs are 
11 Ustashe were militant fascists in the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War.
12 Iordanova, Dina: Cinema of Flames, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 156.
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obviously aware of these stereotypes and as one of the critics said, they confirm: we 
are like that and we love it. Religion played an important role in reconstruction of the 
Serbian national identity.  In the next part therefore we will look at how the films 
particularly  dealt  with  religion  and  how  they  inform  us  about  the  role  of  the 
Orthodox religion in the political ideology of the 1990s. 
7.1.2. (B) How do the Films Inform us about Orthodox Religion in Serbia during the 
1990s?
Since chapters 5 and 6 included discussion of cinematic representation of religion, 
here I outline the final remarks regarding these representations, in order to consider 
how the films inform us about  religion in the 1990s. First it is useful to recall that 
religion and religious issues  in  the films analysed  are represented in three  ways: 
through dialogue, through images and through mise-en-scene. Religious elements in 
films  are  not  intrusive,  rather  they  are  integrated  into  the  story.  The  populist 
discourse  shaped  in  the  public  sphere  in  the  late  1980s,  that  to  be  a  real  Serb 
inevitably  involves  belonging  to  Orthodoxy,  is  reflected  in  the  films.  Religion 
defines  national  belonging  and  vice  versa,  to  be  a  part  of  one  nation  inevitably 
involved belonging to this particular religion. Religion is connected to the sense of 
national belonging and in particular to nationalism. The rise of religious awareness in 
the former Yugoslavia takes place with the first signs of national tensions. This is 
depicted in the film Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, from the very beginning of the film 
and before the escalation of conflict, where religious differences are emphasized in 
the  dialogue  of  the  characters.  Throughout  the  film  the  religiousness  of  the 
characters, when it is shown, is represented as a source of hate towards “others”, as 
an expression of superstitious performances and beliefs, rather than as an illustrator 
of their spirituality. 
This  spirit  of  the  late  1980s,  when  the  hegemonization  of  Serbs  took  place,  is 
reflected in the opening scene of  Wounds,  and the “explosion” of nationalist  and 
religious images as an introduction to the story. In both films religious images are 
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always connected to national symbols, which shows their transformation from sacred 
to socio-political statements. Serbian nationalism had its iconography, which films 
depict  as a  blend of religious and fascist  symbols,  whose public function was to 
create an idea of the ultimate unity of Serbian people under the program “God-king-
householder”13, except that the “king” was replaced by the Milosevic regime, who 
nevertheless at the beginning of the 1990s had an almost iconic status even for the 
Church.  Parallels  to  the  Kosovo Myth are  inevitable,  the Serbian  nation is  under 
threat and needs to be saved, and such a crucial moment demands unity – all the 
elements that Milosevic used to promote his political program in 1989. As described 
in chapter 3, Milosevic was perceived almost as a kind of “national messiah” whose 
role was to start the final liberation of Serbs and unify them under the umbrella of 
national  unity  and  Orthodoxy.  Although  Milosevic  himself  was  not  a  religious 
person, in the early stages of his rise to power he used religion as a helpful political 
weapon.  At  this  time  religion  was  promoted  in  the  public  sphere.  In  the  films 
therefore religion appears as a part the national self-identification. Both the images 
and dialogues in the films testify to this ideological discourse. 
Orthodoxy  proved  to  be  an  inevitable  element  in  the  depiction  of  Serbian 
nationalism, which the director identified as a “deviation of religion.” Religion and 
nationalism are shown to be directly connected to violence and crime. People whose 
public image was created to present them as national symbols were those who were 
in fact directly responsible for war atrocities and criminalization of  society.    
In  Wounds  religious  images  are  used  as  a  part  of  the  mise-en-scene  and have 
different connotations. The decadence of the criminal life style which became a role 
model for the young generation of the 1990s is criticized through the use of some of 
the Christian iconic images. The director paints the culture of the 1990s as a culture 
of self-destruction through the mise-en-scene in which the image of the Last Supper 
has a central  role.  The unity around Christ  is  replaced with the unity around the 
“false messiah”, in this case the teacher of the young criminals.  They are not aware 
13 See chapter 3.
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of Christ as such, and this sacramental image has the opposite meaning. The unity 
sealed  with  blood,  in  the  graveyard,  shows  that  there  is  no  salvation  for  the 
characters.  Even the five wounds that  the characters  inflict  on each other,  which 
inevitably  recall  Christ's  wounds,  have  no  Christian  meaning  whatsoever.  Rather 
these metaphors point to the final degradation of Serbian society, which is painted as 
a culture of thanatos. 
To conclude, the analysis of the films shows that religion is represented as an integral 
part  of  nationalist  ideology,  for  which  reason  we can  speak  of  it  as  nationalist-
religious  ideology.  The  cinematic  depiction  of  religious  images  and  symbols, 
therefore, indirectly informs us about the role of Orthodoxy and the Church in the 
political context of the 1990s. This reflects the way that Orthodox representatives did 
not  resist  the nationalist  ideology or  the society's  culture  of  violence,  but  on the 
contrary supported this discourse seeing it as a return to Serbian tradition and faith 
after years of communism. The attitudes of some of the Church leaders had a great 
impact on society and fueled an important part of the discourse for the justification of 
the conflict and its promotion as a just war. Images such as the one of an Orthodox 
cross and the gun in the film, illustrate the consequences of such political stances. 
The representation of religion and religious symbols in the films have a metaphoric 
function,  which  with  careful  analysis  can  inform  us  about  the  disintegration  of 
Serbian society under the Milosevic regime and the political ideology based on “hate 
speech”, violence and exclusion.  
7.1.2. (C) Media Propaganda and the Promotion of Ideology
Media propaganda is in the spotlight in both films. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
media  had  a  crucial  role  in  the  promotion  of  the  regime's  ideology.  Nationalist-
religious  discourse  was  spread  through  the  major  state  media,  such  as  Politika 
newspapers  and  Radio-Television  Serbia.  The  role  of  the  media  in  the  political 
regime  of  the  1990s  is  depicted  in  the  films  Pretty  Village,  Pretty  Flame  and 
Wounds, in two ways: first in spreading war propaganda and second in shaping the 
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new  cultural  milieu  of  the  1990s.  Media  manipulation  is  explored  especially  in 
Wounds, where the director portrays the huge influence of the regime's media. The 
media were the bearers of Milosevic's politics and they reveal the characteristics of 
his political discourse. In this sense we may say that before the conflict escalated, the 
war  first  began  in  the  media,  through  the  massive  production  of  “hate  speech.” 
Milosevic's media had a central role in the promotion of a number of stereotypes 
about “others”,  which are clearly depicted in  Pretty Village,  Pretty Flame,  where 
Croats  and  Bosnian  Muslims  are  always  represented  as  armed enemies  who  are 
attacking brave and innocent Serbian people. By using this mythological discourse 
the media represented Serbs as traditional victims of traditional enemies, revoking 
slavery under the Ottoman Empire and the genocide in Croatia in the Second World 
War. The West is again conceptualized as a sociocultural space ruled by a political 
elite  who want  to  impose  a  “New World  Order”  on  the  Serbian  nation.14 These 
stereotypes about the West which promoted the so-called conspiracy theory that the 
world  was  against  the  Serbs,  had  political  purposes:  to  embrace  the  country's 
isolation as a positive step, and to embrace Milosevic as a leader with an aura of the 
mythological  hero  who  would  resist  this  colonization.  This  is  also  one  of  the 
similarities between the political discourse and the discourse developed within the 
Church,  which  shows  that  the  political  ideology  of  the  1990s  had  its  roots  in 
previously developed assumptions. Media propaganda tended to portray the war as a 
just  war.  Nationalist-religious  ideology  was  at  the  heart  of  this  discourse  and  it 
provided perfect grounds for such a portrayal. 
The sites of war and destruction that emerged in the public sphere with the escalation 
of the conflict  not only indoctrinated the audience but also distracted it from the 
growing  social  and  economic  problems:  the  inflation  and  economic  crisis  were 
explained by the war and by the embargo unjustly imposed by the West. At  the same 
time as an alternative to war scenes and destruction with which television bombarded 
the audiences on a daily basis, the media offered a concept of cheap entertainment 
developed in other  regime-backed stations.  Entertainment  programs represented a 
14 See chapters 5 and 6.
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form of anesthetic for the masses, offering a picture of wealth and stability, reserved 
for the more skillful population. In other words, the poor citizens were persuaded to 
understand their poverty to be a result of their inability to produce money. The role 
models became folk-singers and criminals whose life style was offered as a model of 
success. These programs formed a new aesthetic recognized as an aesthetic of the 
1990s. The new cultural milieu of Milosevic's Serbia created the so-called turbo-folk 
culture,  which  was  actually  a  part  of  the  political  program  of  the  regime.  The 
depiction of turbo-folk culture as a political project of the 1990s and its impact on 
society are shown in Wounds. 
The cinematic depiction of the media in the 1990s shows that the media had a key 
role  in  spreading   war  propaganda  and  that  they  were  the  main  promoters  of 
nationalist-religious ideology. From 1989  religious and national themes prevailed in 
the  media,  which  were  shaping  public  opinion  and  which  aimed  to  strengthen 
Milosevic's  political  program.  Both  films  depict  the  discourse  of  strong  war 
propaganda when showing the content of the regime's media, mainly Television of 
Serbia. 
To  summarize,  Serbian  film of  the  1990s  was  strongly  engaged  with  the  socio-
political context of its time. The films depicted some of the most important issues of 
Serbian society, in the first place the civil war, but also the problems of violence, 
crime, isolation, economic collapse and the impacts that they had on the people. I 
have argued that  Pretty Village,  Pretty Flame and  Wounds inform us about these 
problems in particular,  depicting the ideological  discourse of the 1990s.  The two 
Dragojevic films show the growing problems of the Serbian society and the civil war 
to  be  a  result  of  the  political  ideology  of  the  1990s.  I  argue  that  Serbian  films 
depicted the political ideology of the 1990s as a nationalist-religious ideology. Not 
only that, the films also showed the main characteristics of this ideology, from its 
discourse and promotion in the public sphere to the portrayal of its ultimate impact 
on local people. This depiction is to be found both in film text and in the images. I 
argue that these films were not just mirroring existing problems, but that they pointed 
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to the ideological discourse of the regime as a cause of these problems.
 
7.2. Cinematic Subversion of the Regime's Ideology
In this thesis I have analysed different forms of of cinematic subversion of ideology. 
This includes subversion through the use of film narratives,  characterizations and 
symbols. As we have seen these subversive cinematic portrayals are more ambigious 
than  first  meets  the  eye,  as  was  demonstrated  in  my  discussions  of  the  critical 
reception of films during this period. I consider the films I have analysed to be films 
of subversion. In the first place I  make a distinction between films of resistance and 
films of subversion, following in the footsteps of scholars such as Dusan Bjelic.15 
Bjelic  characterized  as  films  of  resistance  those  films  with  an  authentic  artistic 
expression within the national cinematography, which as such resist and reject the 
cultural and ideological forms and stereotypes of the cultural context in which they 
are made. The  Black Wave movement, in Bjelic's opinion, is an example of this. I 
discussed  the  Black  Wave in  this  thesis  because  of  its  political  and  cultural 
importance, wanting to emphasize the importance of this cinematic tradition which to 
a  significant  extent  influenced  later  directors.  Resistance  however  should  not  be 
taken in an  oversimplified  way. As  I  mentioned previously these films were not 
simply criticizing the totalitarian socialist regime and its corruption but to a great 
extent they can be considered as films which explored ideologies, providing criticism 
of  Western  capitalism  as  much  as  Eastern  communism.  Such  cinematic 
contemplations bear witness to the  golden age of cinema that started a tradition of 
film  as  social  and  political  critique.  Precisely  because  of  its  socio-critical 
engagement  with  the  world  it  is  not  surprising  that  this  period  is  considered  as 
“Pericles' golden age of Yugoslav culture.” 16 
Bjelic on the other hand identified as subversive films those which are influenced by 
15 Bjelic, Dusan: “Global Aesthetics and the Serbian Cinema of the 1990s” in Imre, Aniko (ed.): East  
European Cinemas, New York, London: Routledge, 2005.
16 Intervju: Filip David: Srbija Dobrice Cosica nije porazena, http://www.naslovi.net/2008-11-24/e-
novine/srbija-dobrice-cosica-nije-porazena/927390; Last accessed: 27/01/2009.
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or are communicating within the commonly found aesthetics and stereotypes,  but 
nevertheless  at  the  same  time  subvert  some  of  these  stereotypes.  I  argue  that 
subversiveness can be identified in several areas. Subversion does not take place only 
in aesthetic forms but also in the film text. Since every film is framed by its context I 
argue that it is not necessary for a film to be completely outside of its contextual 
discourse in order to be subversive. Rather, films which have adopted some of the 
ideological  assumptions  still  have  the  potential  to  express  subversive  elements 
through  the  self-reflection  and  exploration  of  the  context  from  which  they  are 
speaking. While in the case of the  Black Wave for example we might say it was 
relatively easy to define resistance, how do we identify subversiveness in the selected 
films of the 1990s? 
If  we  are  only  looking  for  complete  rejection  of  ideological  assumptions  and 
stereotypes  in  films,  we  will  not  find  it.  This  is  however  not  a  condition  for 
subversiveness.  I  suggest  it  is  important  to  analyse  stereotypes  and  ideological 
premises in films and reconsider whether they are there only to reflect their political 
context or to subvert it?
I argued that these films subverted stereotypes. Here I recall some examples: self-
representation  frequently  uses  the  outsider's  point  of  view,  for  example  the 
stereotyped representation of the Balkan people as backward group from an area 
prone to conflict in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, in order to subvert this stereotype.17 
The  representation  of  others,  on  the  other  hand,  offers  a  grotesque  picture  of 
“ourselves” primarily, since “the others” are actually absent: the camera's eye does 
not depict them as real human beings but most of the time as shadows, which suggest 
that  “the  others”  are  mythological  creatures,  a  projection  of  our  own ideological 
fantasies.18 Besides playing with stereotyped representations of ourselves and others, 
the films also play with genre using black comedy which emerges as a sub-genre in 
17 See chapter 5.
18 In Pretty Village, Pretty Flame the Bosnian Muslim soldiers are represented as shadows. The 
Western world on the other hand is represented through the New World Order conspiracy theory. See 
chapter 5 for more details. 
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both films. Comedy is often used as a tool of subversion, for example in the visual 
representation of the news jingle of Radio Television Serbia.19
The rhythm of the film Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, its montage and style, has been 
compared to Hollywood style movies, while Wounds has been compared to film-noir 
and  Tarantino  style  films.20 Both  films  have  elements  and  influences  of  the 
Hollywoodization  which  influenced  Yugoslav  cinematography  in  the  post-Black 
Wave period.  I  argue,  however,  that  although  the  films  could  be  considered  as 
speaking  through  Hollywood  aesthetics,  they  still  reflect  a  personal  form  of 
expression  of  the  auteur who  wants  to  compose  his  critical  vision  of  reality. 
Frustration with reality was decisive in structuring the narrative. The subtext of the 
film coexists from subversive elements, analyzed in this thesis, and subverts again 
the main text of the film which may appear as ideologically and politically  similar to 
the regime's one. In this way, the director structured the main text of the film through 
the ideological discourse of the 1990s, but only to subvert the same discourse  (my 
italics).  Evidence  for  this  argument  is  that  characters  in  both  films  speak  the 
“language”of their time, rich in different stereotypes and prejudice from sexism to 
nationalism, but which is nevertheless subverted in both films. 
  
The representation of war as a mythological cycle, which many scholars took into 
consideration  when  it  comes  to  the  depiction  of  the  war  in  Serbian  film  of  the 
1990s,21 is one of the central issues. This is for two reasons. First if we consider that 
the films support the mythological explanation of the war then it would mean that 
they do not have a critical point of view of the ideological discourse of its time, 
which I argue was not the case. Second, the mythological elements and metaphors 
might be considered as an intentional reflection of society's stereotypes, which can be 
then another way of subversion. My argument that emerges from the film analysis is 
19 See chapter 6, section 6.4.3. on cinematic depiction of media propaganda. 
20 This was discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
21 As previously discussed in chapter 5, this was one of the key problems in reading Serbian film. 
This concept was discussed by a Serbian scholar Nevena Dakovic. For more details see:  Dakovic, 
Nevena: Yugoslav Wars: Between Myth and Reality, 
http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/mpi/conference/dakovic.htm; Last accessed 1/12/2008.
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that  the  second is  most  likely  the  case,  since  the  whole  narrative  is based  on  a 
stereotyped  ideological  perception  of  reality,  which  is  constantly  ridiculed  and 
subverted in the films. I argue that the films, especially Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, 
which is set on the battlefield, did not suggest a mythological concept of the war, 
because as my analysis shows there are  many pointers in the film that suggest that 
the Milosevic regime was responsible for the war,  from the representation of the 
character of Sloba, the war profiteer with a name that echoes that of Milosevic, to the 
clear depiction of nationalist discourse and media propaganda. 
Scholars such as Nevena Dakovic referred to the “ogre from the tunnel” metaphor as 
a metaphor used to represent  the mythological cause of the war. According to the 
director an ogre metaphor is used primarily to describe a primitivism and lack of 
knowledge in the rural areas where intolerance of any kind can be generally found.22 
The  director  seems  to  make  a  claim   that  people  from  such  areas  in  former 
Yugoslavia were easier targets for political manipulation. The “ogre in the tunnel” is 
a central site around which representatives of different  political options gather to 
deliver their ideological message to these people. An ogre metaphor becomes in this 
way also a symbol for false ideologies, which seem to be destined to collapse in the 
Balkan area. This metaphor can also be understood as a depiction of the regime's 
official  explanation  of  the  war  founded  and  built  upon  local  mythologies. 
Mythological  aspects  of the regime's discourse are as we have seen subverted in 
various ways: the atrocities of the Serbian soldiers, their deviant religiousness and 
personal  morals  represent  a  subversion  of  the  official  representation  of  Serbian 
warriors as brave heroes.
 
The naivety of the soldiers, the depiction of their human side, in the opinion of some 
scholars, represented an attempt to provoke the sympathy of the audience for obvious 
villains.23 The representation of the human side of the villains, however can be seen 
as  a  depiction  closer  to  reality.  The director  avoids  using  a  classical  Hollywood 
approach of what is known as “good cop - bad cop” in painting the characters. In fact 
22 See chapter 5, section 5.2. on critical reception of Pretty Village, Pretty Flame. 
23 See discussion in chapter 5, section 5.2. 
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the film reveals the possibility of a situation in which so-called “ordinary” people, 
when indoctrinated, can commit appalling atrocities. War crimes are made possible 
by a system which at the same time makes a profit from the war and the lack of 
order. We could argue that such a representation tends to deconstruct the stereotype 
of Serbs as a nation that embraces genocide, taking into account that the atrocities 
happen  when  the  society's  ideology  supports  them  and  when  concrete  political 
structures  profit  from  it.  The  undoubted  naivety  of  some  of  the  characters  in 
embracing the ideological framework turns them in the end into the victims as much 
as their enemies. Still, this does not mean that the film equates victims and villains 
but rather asks the question who is the real villain, only the one who pulls the trigger 
or those who created and promoted the ideology of the war? 
The narrative of Wounds is structured similarly but in this film it is much clearer and 
easier than in Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, which because of the war theme that it 
explores from such recent a historical perspective, the critics put in the category of 
politically incorrect film.24 In my analysis I found that Wounds nonetheless contains 
the same national and religious images and symbols as Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, 
which  are  even  connected  in  the  same  context:  through  the  depiction  of  the 
expansion of nationalism which is portrayed through euphoria and the hysterical state 
of the masses.  
The representation of religion, through powerful images such as the cross and the 
gun, represent on the other hand a direct subversion of religion of that time, which 
instead of reconciliator  became a motivator  for nationalist  conflicts  and therefore 
war.  Even  if  such  a  depiction  of  religion  in  the  film  was  just  mirroring  the 
iconography of 1990s society, this image still represents a subversion of religion – 
since the sacramental symbol of the cross deviates from being a symbol of peace and 
salvation to a symbol of hate and extinction. It is useful to recall that the director 
stated  that  he  was  occupied  with  religion  inasmuch  as  he  wanted  to  show  its 
nationalist  connotation and therefore  degradation.  To conclude,  the Serbian films 
24 See Iordanova, Dina:  Ibid, p. 146. See also discussion in chapter 2, section 2.3.2. on studies on 
Serbian cinema of the 1990s, and chapter 5, section 5.2. 
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portrayed the dominant ideology of Serbian society in a critical way.  
It is important to remember that these are ambiguous films. My choice to explore the 
subversiveness of relatively controversial films appeared as a difficult choice which 
has required the application of a multi-dimensional methodological approach to the 
problem.  Because  of  the  ambiguity,  these  films  as  previously  mentioned  were 
frequently considered by scholars and critics to be  politically incorrect films (my 
italics).25 This is a definition against which I argue in this thesis, for several reasons. 
One of the reasons is that the diverse and often extreme attitudes of the critics shows 
that such categorization of politically correct and incorrect film is not possible in the 
first place. Second, such categorization is dangerous and not always applicable when 
it comes to the arts and artistic expressions of reality. The final reason is that such 
oversimplified definitions are untenable as suggested by my analysis which shows 
that films are far more complex. In considering the film's aesthetics, film genre, and 
film narrative we testify to its  vivid ambiguity.  This ambiguity qualifies these as 
films which framed the ideology but were at the same time framed by the ideology. 
In other words they criticize and subvert the ideological assumptions of the 1990s 
while they also inevitably reflect some of those assumptions (such as is the case with 
the portrayal of war demonstrators) as a product of their time. This does not negate 
their  subversiveness,  since  subversiveness  is  not  found  in  strong  political  anti-
propaganda  statements,  but  on  the  contrary  in  films  that  speak  within  a  certain 
ideological frame, that were influenced and shaped by it, but at the same time play 
with those issues and criticize the discourse that surrounds them.
7.3. Concluding Remarks
In this thesis I have used a multi-dimensional cultural studies approach  in order to 
propose an alternative reading and better  understanding of Serbian cinema of the 
1990s. In the focus of this thesis is the issue of the nationalist-religious ideology of 
the 1990s and its cinematic depiction. It is important to say that my aim was not to 
25 See discussion in chapter 2; See also discussion on critical reception of the film in chapter 5. 
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claim that this political ideology was the only cause of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia but rather to emphasize its importance in the escalation and justification 
of  the conflict.  In this  sense  I  argue that  the  films manifested  a similar  attempt. 
Unlike other scholars who claimed that the films were offering their view on the 
causes of the conflict I argued that the films were rather pointing to the ideological 
context which supported the conflict and allowed the development of “hate speech” 
and politics of exclusion. The films are told from the Serbian perspective, which does 
not mean they are taking the Serbian side, but that they are dealing with the Serbian 
side and its responsibility in embracing such an ideological concept. The fact that the 
films are told primarily through the Serbian gaze is important as it informs us more 
about the issues and stereotypes and most of all about the impact of ideology on the 
people and therefore on the films. In this sense, I argue that the films serve as a rich 
resource  for  studying  Serbian  society  and  the  ideological  concepts  of  the  1990s 
culture.
One of the reasons for the films' diverse reception was, as already mentioned, in the 
ambiguity of the films. This ambiguity lies in the fact that the films not only depicted 
but also at the same time reflected the context in which they occurred. Depiction in 
this sense means intentional and often critical representation of the ongoing issues, 
while  reflection  means that  the  films by default  being from this  specific  context 
adopt and speak within a certain discourse without recognizing that they are also a 
product  of   the  criticized  context.  I  argued  that  in  spite  of  this  we  need  to 
acknowledge that even a film framed by its local ideologies (and which film is not?) 
can speak subversively of its context.  Therefore the understanding of this specific 
socio-cultural  and  political  context  represented  an  important  aspect  for  the  film 
analysis,  for  which  reason this  thesis  commences  with  an  analysis  of  the  socio-
political background.  
The analysis of the films revealed many issues that the films depicted and that were 
strongly  related  to  the  context  explored.  The  analysis  of  their  critical  reception 
showed that scholars and critics were usually focused only on the main topic, such as 
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the war, and overlooked the other issues connected to this main topic.26 The elements 
they overlooked, such as the representation of religion and nationalism, inform us 
strongly about the context of the Serbian society but  also about the character of the 
films  and  the  extent  to  which  they  were  critically  engaged  with  the  ongoing 
problems. These representations are a form of cinematic  depiction of the cultural 
matrix of Serbian society and as such they show that films were not just mirroring 
but exploring the causes of the war and the collapse that was surrounding them. 
To sum up, in this thesis I investigated how the films inform us about the ideological 
discourse  of  the  1990s  and  therefore  about  Serbian  society  under  the  Milosevic 
regime. My analysis of the cinematic depiction of the political ideology was focused 
upon the exploration of the nationalist-religious ideology found in the films. On the 
basis of my findings I proposed that the representations of the national and religious 
elements in the films constitute a critical statement on the nature and characteristics 
of the dominant ideology, whose main elements are at the same time subverted.  In 
this sense, I argued that subversiveness is possible when a film is speaking within a 
very  specific  ideological  context,  and  even  when  there  is  an  overlap  between 
cinematic discourse and society's discourse. I suggested in this thesis that the Serbian 
films in subversive, though sometimes ambiguous ways,  interrogated the political 
ideology of the Milosevic regime.   
7.4. Questions for Future Research
This thesis provides a foundation for future research that could develop in diverse 
ways, from the further exploration of film as a political critique, and topics related to 
it such as global aesthetics, to the exploration of these films from a theological point 
of  view.  Another  possible  development  might  be  a  further  exploration  of  the 
nationalist-religious  ideologies  in  Serbia  and  the  former  Yugoslav  region,  their 
characteristics and changes since 2000. Here I briefly consider possible aspects of 
future research that could be developed from this work.
26 See chapters 2, 5 and 6.
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7.4.1. Film Studies
This  study  I  believe  can  make  a  contribution  both  to  film  studies  and  to  an 
interdisciplinary area of film and religion. First, it proposes the reading of Serbian 
film in a way that has not been undertaken so far. It points to the necessity of taking 
into account the national and religious symbols when it comes to analysis of Balkan 
films,  especially  in  those  studies  which  deal  with  issues  of  identity  and  self-
representation or with Balkan film in general, its characteristics and elements that 
determine it as an cultural entity. 
Second,  this  study  encourages  further  investigation  into  film  as  ideological  and 
political critique: how is this criticism expressed in national and global cinema, what 
are the characteristics of subversion and criticism, how does film use stereotypes, 
and how does it stand against global hegemony both  aesthetically and ideologically? 
I suggest that film should be studied within its specific cultural and socio-political 
context  and  that  depending  on  this,  we  would  be  able  to  identify  the  global 
stereotypes implied in local, national cinematographies and the possible subversion 
of these stereotypes. These are some of the issues that this study proposed and that 
merit further investigation. 
7.4.2. Film and Religion 
In the field of film and religion, this study would be a good basis for future research 
on some of the national cinemas of Eastern Europe and its relation to religious issues, 
such as in contemporary Russia for example. It would be interesting to look at the 
number of so-called religious films produced recently in Russia for example, how 
these connect to the ideological context of society: whether these films criticize or on 
the contrary promote Orthodoxy as a part of a specific national-political ideology.
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7.4.3. Theological Aspects
One aspect that is not considered in this study but that could be developed further on 
the grounds of this thesis is a theological criticism of the selected films. This aspect 
is based on the subversive perspectives of religious representation. To criticize the 
deviation (my italics) of religion demonstrates at the same time an awareness of the 
ideal that has been compromised. In this sense it would be important to consider in 
future research whether  so-called secular  film can provide theological  critique.  It 
would also be important to consider whether films in this way can perform theology. 
The issue of corruption is  a  theological  issue,  but  when this  issue is  raised in a 
secular film and against the compromised theology, how do we consider these films? 
In this sense, it would be useful to develop further audience research and investigate 
what the audience does with such content, whether it provokes any contemplation on 
religious  deviations  and   whether  this  can  then  represent  a  form of  theological 
criticism. These are all themes that can be drawn from this study and that could be 
considered in possible prospective explorations of film as political critique, and in 
future research in the field of film and religion, which is generally lacking in studies 
on Eastern European and Balkan Cinema. 
 
7.4.4. Socio-Political Issues
In  this  study  I  have  offered  a  significant  exploration  of  the  nationalist-religious 
ideology of 1990s Serbia, its historical and theological aspects, political implications 
and the impacts it had on society. In the course of the discussion I have suggested the 
importance and impact that nationalist-religious ideology still have in Serbian society 
eight  years  after  Milosevic's  downfall.  Its  main supporters  can be found in some 
political  parties,  in  academic  structures  and  in  the  Church.  In  many  ways  this 
ideological  discourse  continues  to  shape  crucial  political  decisions  or  is  used  to 
justify certain political  and social  events.  Therefore it is important to suggest the 
continuation of studies on this  topic,  with a  methodological  approach that  would 
include  both  the  Church  and  the  state  and  its  representations  in  the  public  and 
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popular culture of contemporary Serbia. It would be useful to explore further the role 
of this ideology in restructuring identities in the post-Milosevic era and in the process 
of transition to a new European identity. In this sense, it would be interesting to see 
how this ideology has changed and how it relates to some of the current issues in the 
region, and what its impact is on the socio-political life in Serbia and consequently 
on the whole Balkan region. 
With regard to all these possible future investigations that could be drawn from this 
study, I would however suggest two key dimensions which await future research. 
The first would be on national cinema as a part of global cinema, and its subversive 
aspects. A good resource for such investigation would be popular Balkan and the 
Eastern European films which focus upon the issues of changing identity (my italics), 
and its national and religious aspects. Second, I propose the continuation of research 
on the nationalist-religious ideology in Serbia and the former Yugoslav region, its 
socio-political role and its representations in modern culture and popular media in 
the light of the current socio-political and cultural changes of moving towards a more 
“European identity.” 
– END OF THESIS –   
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